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ABSTRACT 
This study analyses the impact of scale, establishment mobility and 
policy siibstitution in the corporation's geographical behaviour. To 
maximise opportunities for observing change, the effects of recession 
on firms using a particular marketing system — product franchising — 
are examined. It is argued that competitive powers, represented by 
company structural attributes and expressed through relative network 
control capacities, should assist larger organisations to undertake 
spatial tactics which maintain their market and economic standing. 
Nineteen agricultural machinery franchisors are classified on a number 
of key variables into large and small groups. Their manufacturing, 
wholesaling and retailing activity between 1967 and 1972 is compared on 
criteria relating to the entry and exit of outlets. Certain locational 
strategies adopted by major competitors are seen to stabilise or improve 
distribution control, thus demonstrating a relationship of structural 
factors, channel management and representation courses. However, a 
broader association of these measures and market and general financial 
performance cannot be shown because of data limitations. Subsidiary 
findings point out the greater stability of large corporations in a 
setback, the lower probability of continuation suffered by small 
franchisors' dealers and the attack on small towns enforced by the 
economic contraction. Through the use of an operational model within 
an intensive, longitudinal analysis, the enquiry concludes that scale 
effects pervade locational decision-making, not only among enterprises 
but across the whole business sector. For the largest firms, spatial 
policy is clearly an interchangeable means to goals and, thus, 
establishment mobility can be pronounced. The divergence of such findings 
from previous work contributes to the ongoing review of traditional 
thinking in industrial geography and economics and prompts further 
research into the interface of the corporation and the entrepreneur. 
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PREFACE 
The corporation has become a major business force in advanced 
countries since the Second World War, having expanded its activities 
both internationally and across a wide range of goods and services. 
Despite the growing importance of large concerns, geographical work 
attempting to analyse the distribution of industries or individual 
manufacturing facilities has been generally pitched at the level of 
the entrepreneur. After a spirited call for research into the firm 
in 1958, interest waned until the late 1960s. Today in Australia, 
public attention is increasingly directed towards the role of 
enterprises; their broad impact on host nations' economies and 
environments adds new urgency into investigations of their spatial 
behaviour. 
A serious difficulty in this respect is the limited assistance 
which classical location theory can provide. Not only have its 
assumptions of economic rationality and certainty been criticised, but 
a more significant weakness from the present viewpoint is that its 
focus — the single-plant undertaking — is a vastly different 
proposition to the multi-nodal conglomerate. To improve the 
applicability of existing formulations, the immediate need is for 
empirical studies of processes and interrelationships within corporate 
decision-making. Areas of special concern, distinguished because of 
their apparent divergence from the situation of the small businessman, 
are scale effects, outlet mobility, and the substitutability of 
locational with other operating strategies. To observe these 
contingencies, a topic offering extensive geographical change is 
required. The study therefore centres on marketing, the vaison d' etve 
of the majority of a sizeable merchant's estaiblishments. Possibilities 
of movement are enhanced by concentrating on recession, whose negative, 
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contractive and expulsive forces accentuate the need for adjustment. 
This fresh outlook proposes results which, apart from their practical 
bearing, could be used later to highlight regularities in large 
producers' conduct londer more favourable conditions. 
Problem and objective 
Like the major company, vertical marketing has enjoyed 
unprecedented progress since the Second World War. A contributing 
factor has been the spectacular growth of franchising. Through its 
success, this particular technique has attracted an ebullient 
literature but prospects for user firms during a setback have been 
almost wholly neglected. The issue raises an important applied 
problem with direct relevance to the questions above. Thus, the 
objective of the thesis is to determine the economic and spatial 
response to depressed demand of corporations engaging this mode of 
distribution. 
Hypothesis and methodology 
Given current constraints, the enquiry must be narrowed to a single 
alternative within the franchise system — product franchising — 
a method providing producers with outstanding advantages of centralised 
marketing administration without undertaking costly forward integration. 
In a business downswing, when competitive pressures in the channel and 
market threaten survival, a network's fortunes relate strongly to the 
control applied by the franchisor through managerial and financial 
means. Since capacities for authority are derived from structural 
attributes signifying economic and positional power, the larger supplier 
could be expected to enjoy more embracing channel leadership than his 
small opposition in both distribution policy and practice. Two 
applications ensue from this 'structural' hypothesis. First, a spatial 
XV 
postulate advances that principal producers should exhibit locational 
representation in the productive, administrative, wholesale and 
retail sectors which is intended to maintain or augment their existing 
distribution management. However, such courses may not be always open 
to minor competitors. Second, in a finanoiat framework, it is 
anticipated that these geographical tactics, together with a 
purposeful marketing code, should assist bigger undertakings to better 
overall market and economic performance. In sum, structural features, 
proxied in relative franchise strength, should emerge as decisive 
influences on corporate strategy-formation during a commercial 
contraction. 
These contentions are tested with evidence from the Australian 
agricultural machinery industry during the rural crisis of 1967-72. 
Nineteen leading undertakings are grouped into 'large' and 'small' 
divisions on the basis of structural attributes. Relative authority 
is then distilled from their dealer contracts, distribution, and 
accounting results, thus affording an evaluation of the economic 
postulate. Similarly, detailed analyses of subject firms' locational 
adjustments allow assessment of the spatial argument and conclusions 
to the specific problems about corporate policy-formation. 
Overview 
Part One covers the rise of the enterprise, outlines its 
divergence from the entrepreneur and considers the shortcomings of 
formal location theo3ry. Attention is focussed initially on the 
marketing function in recession (Chapter One). Chapter Two is devoted 
to franchising, the derivation of the applied problem and the 
formulation of hypotheses. 
Part Two reviews the extraordinary malaise which recently beset 
product franchising organisations in the farm equipment industry 
XVI 
(Chapter Three). Leading sellers are identified and then classified 
with a computer-based technique into structural divisions for the 
subsequent analysis (Chapter Four). 
Part Three incorporates the empirical enquiry into the distribution 
policy and practices of sampled companies (Chapters Five to Eight). 
Relative levels of network control are examined within the terms of the 
main argiiment (Chapters Six and Seven) . The discussion encompasses 
both spatial and economic performance and proposes a solution to the 
applied problem (Chapter Eight). 
Part Four uses these results to develop conclusions about 
specific processes and relationships of corporate decision-making 
queried at the outset of the thesis (Chapter Nine). The overall 
design is shown in Figure P.l. 
XVI1 
FIGURE P.l: Design of the thesis and subject-interests 
of the various chapters. 
Source: Adapted from an idea of P.J. Rimmer, 
PART ONE 
PROBLEM SETTING AND STATEMENT 
Until the late 1960s, the rise of the corporation received little 
attention in geography because of researchers' preoccupation with the 
small firm of classical location theory. Present evidence, however, 
suggests that the enterprise's locational dynamics vary greatly from 
those of the entrepreneur, thus questioning the applicability of many 
previous findings to new problems. The disparity can be evaluated 
through study of scale effects, establishment turnover and 
substitutability of spatial policy. To maximise opportunities for 
observation of facility movement, a focus is proposed on marketing in 
recession. More specifically, as outlined in Chapter Two, distribution 
under product franchising offers a suitable applied issue through which 
certain processes and relationships of the large company's strategy 
selection may be assessed. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CORPORATION: A NEW FORCE IN BUSINESS 
SPATIAL DECISION-MAKING 
Researchers became acutely conscious in the late 1960s that commercial 
trends warranted a reappraisal of traditional perspectives in 
industrial geography and economics. Their uneasiness crystallised into 
a concern with the rise of the modern corporation, in which a nxmber of 
subsidiary firms assume a parent/holding company structure to achieve 
certain group objectives (cf. Parsons, 1972: 99). Throughout the 
advanced countries, the post-1945 era has seen an increase in the size 
of both individual manufacturing establishments and legal business 
enterprises. Large undertakings now dominate the most important 
sectors^ and, by the year 2000, could easily account for more than half 
the world's gross product (Bergman, 1973: 255). They have played a 
pre-eminent role in the development and exploitation of Australian 
resources and now exercise a prominent influence on the total economy 
(Logan, 1965: 12; Mason, 1974: 1). 
Though these giant operations are associated principally with 
fields of mass output — automobiles, iron and steel, chemicals, 
petroleum and aluminium — they are also well-represented in such 
activities as the production of foodstuffs, trucks and agricultural 
machinery. They can be observed in various stages of maturity (Steed, 
1971c: 55). Initially, they accumulate capital and rationalise its use. 
Next, they integrate horizontally and vertically to allow the continuing 
absorption of overheads and attainment of scale economies. Finally, new 
frameworks are constructed within which assets can be mobilised rapidly 
to meet short and long-term market movements. Many corporations are, 
therefore, adopting a conglomerate, multi-plant disposition through 
merger and acquisition or by diversification into unrelated forms of 
endeavour (Mautz, 1968: 10). Meanwhile, others are winning 
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multi-national status through direct foreign investment — a phenomenon 
of interest to geographers because of its implications for host nations 
in both the developed and third worlds (see Blackborn, 1972; Venu, 
1974). Recently, the interregional ramifications of expansion have 
occupied Krumme (1970) and Parsons (1972), while the aggregate effects 
of corporate growth have been reviewed by Browaeys (1974) and Lindgren 
et at. (1974). As the pervasive impact of the large company commands 
increasing public attention through vociferous media coverage, research 
into its locational dynamics must assume a high priority among academics. 
THE NEED FOR A NEW OUTLOOK 
For the explanation of complex spatial behaviour 
of modern industrial firms, traditional 
locational concepts still represent an essential 
but insufficient basis (Krumme, 1970: 318). 
Geography and micro-economics have long been absorbed with the individual 
entrepreneur, the superstar of classical location theory^. Yet, the 
parameters of his small operation are somewhat remote from those of the 
corporation (Krumme, 1969a: 34). A large organisation is a coalition 
of sub-groups, each with specific tasks, authorities and 
responsibilities, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Its objectives, 
derived by internal negotiation rather than personal edict, become 
stabilised through bureaucratic measures such as the budget and 
administration manual. Unlike the circumstances of the proprietor or 
partnership, the control and possession of the enterprise are separated; 
for this reason, peculiar types of perceptual and motivational disparity 
inevitably emerge (Mueller, 1972: 202-06). Functional heterogeneity 
compounds the variety of issues affecting decision-making. Such 
complexity has occasioned a revision of the conventional theoretical 
standpoint on 'the firm' as a spatial strategist. 
FIGURE 1.1: The functional structure of an international corporation. 
(World-wide organisation chart of Massey Ferguson Ltd, November 1966). 
Source: Neufeld (1969: 234-35). 
U1 
'The firm' under pressure 
While accountants grapple with issues of diversified reporting 
(Rappaport et at., 1968), social scientists are questioning purely-
deterministic ideas about 'the firm' and the 'location process' in an 
awareness that policy-formation is an explicitly behavioural procedure 
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or, at least, one which occurs with incomplete information . Although 
economic theory might still be valid for a wide class of events (cf. 
Alchian, 1965: 31), a number of writers since 1950 have tried to modify 
or supplant the monistic doctrine that entrepreneurs optimise location 
to secure the highest possible profits^. Their argument advances that 
in uncertain surroundings there is no objective means of knowing when 
these maximising situations occur. One school, organisation theory, 
sees the company as a network of human relationships governed by a 
'bounded rationality' and operating in a socio-economic homeostasis with 
the ultimate goal of survival (McGuire, 1964: 30-31); the well-known 
proposition of 'satisficing' behaviour advanced by Simon (1959: 262-64) 
has, however, drawn some criticism (Marris, 1964: 266-77). Alternative 
prescriptions have concentrated on either the role of inter-firm 
association or the managerial utility function in an attempt to 
generalise the standard micro-economic approach (see Phillips, 1962: 
22; Gordon, 1974: 125-28). More recently, Webber and Daly (1971: 16) 
have re-directed attention to the concept of a minimvm acceptable level 
of returns. If a rate of profitability compatible with the immediate 
aims of management and shareholders is reached, a producer may possibly 6 
turn to other goals such as increases in sales , net assets or even 
all-round growth as an end in itself (Baumol, 1964: 325). In sum, the 
challenge to marginalist theory, while at present unconsummated, has 
created far greater acknowledgement of the processes of commercial 
decision-making and has emphasized the central part played by the 
tacticians themselves"^. 
These considerations have prompted a fresh outlook in geography; 
complementing explanations of industries' metropolitan and national 
patterns or the Weberian course of delimiting the optimal placement 
for a particular activity, some authors are taking location as given 
and dwelling on the methods by which companies and their environments 
interact. Their stance recognises the need to discuss the economics 
of a site in terms of a continuous, chronological time-dimension, thus 
obliging additional dynamic studies of the internal machinery of the 
firm (Dziewonski, 1966: 18) . Already, enterprises in fields as 
disparate as shipbuilding (Steed, 1968), linen (Steed, 1971b), pulp 
production (Barr and Fairbairn, 1974) and the beet sugar industry (Watts, 
1974) have been investigated. In a more general frame, Daly and Webber 
(1973) have considered company growth in the context of the Australian 
city. All these papers are contributing to a new thrust pioneered by 
McNee (1958, 1959, 1960) and Keuning (1960) in analysing the spatial 
dynamics of the corporation. 
The corporation and the entrepreneur 
Despite insights flowing from organisational and behavioural 
viewpoints, the methods of major suppliers' adjustment are generally 
uncharted. The immediate need is for empirical studies which analyse 
the means, interrelationships, and ramifications of their geographical 
policy-making. Potentially, such enquiries should also assist in 
evaluating the applicability of existing location theories by relating 
results to established frameworks centred on the small businessman. 
Thus, areas in which the response of the enterprise and entrepreneur is 
assumed to diverge must be addressed from the outset. 
Three issues deserve closer examination. The first is the general 
influence of scale effects in business location, both at the corporate 
level and along the whole company size spectrum. The meagre evidence 
to hand indicates that industry leaders' operations are unrelated to 
those of the small businessman. For example, their market spans 
a nation or continent rather than a metropolis and complete coverage 
might require several manufacturing and numerous distribution outlets. 
Since strategy selection is seldom pervaded by lifestyle factors, the 
incidence of relocation in response to demand shifts can be pronounced: 
major corporations have a surprisingly high 
turnover of... facilities and...their plants 
are by no means tied to particular products 
(Steed, 1971a: 207). 
Hence, moh-il-ity within the networks of enterprises constitutes a second 
concern in this investigation. 
Traditionally, the geographic initiatives of the single-plant firm 
have been regarded as infrequent events which presume heavy capital 
investment. Among more sizeable undertakings, much spatially-oriented 
strategy is probably accomplished without a full-scale commitment of 
funds (see Rees, 1972: 204). Such policy is usually a minor component 
of a total set of choices made by corporations in their efforts to 
survive and grow in a constantly-changing environment. But, even in 
a non-investment framework, any form of locational alteration is 
a costly and risky proposition and, often, companies may be able to 
entertain a less disruptive course. In the past, the limited 
perspectives of conventional analysis and predisposition to find the 
reaons behind the entrepreneurial 'location decision' may well have 
missed instances in which alternative financial or structural measures 
were used to avoid the expense and upheaval involved in the movement of 
personnel and fixed assets (cf. Rudd, 1954: 72-79). Therefore, this 
study's third thrust is directed towards the pre-conditions of policy-
formation among major suppliers and, in particular, the potential 
suhstitutability of spatial tactics with alternative solutions to 
problems. 
Objective of the study 
To amplify these three specific interests, the project's purpose 
is to analyse tlie: 
(a) processes of corporate decision-making with special reference 
to scale effects, mobility and strategy substitution; 
(b) interrelationships among endogenous and exogenous issues which 
govern geographical choice procedures. 
Clearly, a situation affording strong possibilities of plant movement 
is demanded. It can be found during a recession within the business 
cycle -- a contingency rather neglected in Australian literature 
because postwar prosperity has restrained interest in economic 
contraction. Under such circumstances, it becomes tenuous to hold the 
activities of many organisations, especially the financially-weaker, as 
progressing towards long-run profit maximisation. Quite apart from the 
conceptual difficulties accompanying the notion of negative profits 
(losses), the assumption of an extended perspective is tantamount to 
a somewhat Goethean view of the world in which success ultimately 
8 prevails over failure. Statistics on the life expectancy of companies 
show beyond doubt that so benign an attitude would be misplaced. If 
disadvantaged concerns are not actually climaxing long-term returns, 
they could be undertaking a variety of more immediate objectives. 
Courses which provide security and ensure survival by curtailing losses 
are obvious contenders but would be regarded in decision theory as 
divergent from the maximax criterion proposed in the standard account of 
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the firm . They are probably also more serious abberations than 
temporary deviations in a search process which the marginalist counter 
might prescribe (cf. Alchian, 1965: 30). 
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Thus, in a depression, business could react in ways other than 
those directed in the strict, micro-economic approach. This apparent 
anomaly suggests that conditions of extreme uncertainty — anathema to 
determinism — can give an unusual and cogent view of corporate 
decision-making. Recession might force spatial action which would not 
have otherwise eventuated, accentuate short as opposed to long-term 
motivations in ensuing policy, and stress the often-overlooked role of 
demand factors in location (cf. Greenhut, 1964) . Since competition 
should appear highly disarrayed, the conclusions could also serve to 
point up 'normal' patterns in a more favourable era. 
In order to interpret the interaction of an industry with its 
environment and to see implications in plant movement, the study must 
be operationalised with an applied problem. From the outset, 
concentration within one of a company's functional sectors affords the 
analysis manageable proportions and a practical setting (cf. Figure 1.1) 
At this (divisional) level, operating as well as investment strategy 
options may be ascertained, so granting an equitable test of the 
substitutability theme mentioned above. From the current viewpoint, an 
emphasis on marketing (at the expense of the enterprise's other 
activities) provides the most suitable focus. 
MARKETING: A PROBLEM FIELD 
The examination is drawn around marketing for several reasons. Because 
of Australia's limited demand but vast areal extent, most corporations 
require many more distribution than manufacturing facilities. In 
contrast to the asset fixity and inertia typical of the latter, sales 
outlets are usually relatively footloose, with lower entry thresholds 
and greater sensitivity to turnover, income and consumer shifts. As 
a direct variable cost component, they bear the brunt of initial 
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management cut-backs in a financial setback. Marketing, perhaps the 
most widespread and volatile of commercial operations, thus maximises 
the opportunities for empirical observation of change and creates 
better prospects for evaluating the mobility of company installations. 
In view of post-1945 progress in distribution practices, it is 
appropriate to acknowledge the growing importance to corporate success 
of the 'marketing concept' (Rise, 1966: 9-12; Barraclough, 1970: 246). 
Executives' long-standing concern with output has instigated a remarkable 
by-passing of selling expenses which, when taken to include simply 
advertising, transport, and wholesale and retail margins, can comprise 
half or even more of the final price of a good^^. Geographers and 
economists have paralleled practitioners in their preoccupation with 
production. Seemingly little is known of Australia's marketing 
organisation, since none appear to have followed the pioneer attempt of 
Lengyel and Beecroft (1947, 1949) to establish methods or costs by 
industry. Censuses have avoided the questions and available statistics 
are crude and sparse. Yet, the function's importance is illustrated 
in the fact that, in June 1971, twenty-two per cent of the non-
agricultural workforce in government, secondary or tertiary employment 
were engaged in occupations relating to wholesaling, retailing, storage 
or transportation^^. Such activities have not been extensively 
investigated^^ — partly due to the laissez-faive atmosphere which has 
prevailed in this area since the time of Adam Smith (Adelman, 1962: 266, 
Stacey and Wilson, 1965: 100). 
One manifestation of the insouciance is that recent advances in 
distribution technology have lagged behind those in manufacturing (Cox 
et at., 1965: 196-97). Since sales channels are still dominated by 
small, conservative merchandisers, it is questionable whether research 
advances, especially in retail management, would be readily accepted 
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(McClelland, 1964: 165)^^. Even in general metropolitan commerce, the 
fundamentals of control may be lacking. Among Sydney and Melbourne 
firms, Winter (1966: 206) found that, although nearly all maintained 
continuous production cost accounts, only sixty per cent kept 
distribution records; Neuschel (1967: 125) provides corroborating 
evidence from the United States. Such inadequacies combined with 
extensive specialisation have precluded much rationalisation or moves 
towards scale economies in distribution. It took powerful analytical 
techniques and the advent of computing in the 1950s to show that 
performance could improve. In future, as manufacturing reaches 
asymptotic efficiency, attention to wholesaling and retailing will offer 
the most effective means of curbing expense and enhancing overall 
productivity (Parker, 1962: 16; Stolle, 1967: 100). Thus in its own 
right marketing constitutes worthwhile research topic. 
Marketing: definition and theoretical status 
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Though the term 'marketing' has various interpretations , the 
following definition of the American Marketing Association is stipulated 
in most publications: 
marketing — the performance of business activities 
that direct the flow of goods and services from the 
producer to the consumer (Alexander et dl., 1963: 
15) . 
In the United States, recognition of the subject began in about 1900 in 
response to lengthening supply channels, loss of contact with the 
ultimate consumer, attitudes of oaveat emptor, and the growing 
complexity of retailing (Bartels, 1962: 12-27). According to Converse 
et at., 1965: 125-26), the main approaches have included: 
(a) the investigation of institutions, an account of the various 
agencies involved in distributing a product; 
(b) commodity analysis, reviewing the processes required to 
wholesale and retail specific classes of goods (see Mount, 
1969); 
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(c) the functional school, which examines operational aspects of 
marketing such as sales administration, invoicing, materials 
handling, and so forth. 
Yet, as a consequence of the insufficient research noted before 
marketing theory is not well developed and has long drawn criticism, 
even from within the discipline (e.g. Alderson and Cox, 1948: 138; 
Grether, 1950: 113). In an area of enquiry which has grown 'rather 
like Topsy' (Kernan and Sommers, 1968: vii), there is no deductive 
formulation which can be used to explain the location or relocation of 
distribution facilities. Such theory as exists has been incorporated 
from the methodological sciences (operations research, Bayesian 
statistics, game and decision theory, simulation), business studies, 
economics, and social and behavioural disciplines (sociology, psychology, 
linguistics, anthropology). The important early contributions of 
marketing geography (e.g. Reilly, 1931), have not been maintained. 
Marketing geography; the problems 
Despite its wide scope, the 'delimitation and measurement of 
markets and...[investigation] of channels of distribution' (Applebaum, 
1954: 246), marketing geography has had a blighted career: 
since 1961...there have been many fewer 
publications in marketing geography than in other 
fields...with practical applications ... the major 
publications refer only to business conditions in 
the United States... there has been especially 
little sign of... acceptance ... in [Australian] 
professional journals (Doddridge and Mackenzie, 
1971: 2). 
The 1971 Research in Progress, published by the Institute of Australian 
Geographers^^, substantiates Doddridge and Mackenzie's lamentations. 
The limited interest accorded the specialisation — twenty-two of some 
thousand tertiary-level projects — has been pitched primarily at the 
consumer. Household surveys, shopping centres and retailing have been 
key topics. The cost ratio of marketing in business could alone 
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demonstrate the seriousness of the neglect; more particularly, only 
two entries considered the virtually-forgotten angle of the producer. 
This viewpoint is now adopted because of its pertinence to studies 
of enterprises. By use of a restricted sample and intensive interview 
and data collection procedures, the present analysis deals with the 
core facts of companies — the accounting and economic statistics 
which, despite their omission in the past, form the crux of decision-
making in an aggressive, competitive milieu. The relationship of this 
information with other variables which shape corporate behaviour cannot 
be assessed satisfactorily without some appreciation of the conduct of 
marketing. The following discussion raises the possibility of 
alternative distribution systems and, in the next Chapter, one is 
selected as a suitable focus for investigation of the problems outlined 
above. 
MARKETING PROCESSES 
Marketing has many facets. For one author, it should maximise 
consumer satisfaction, provide the opportunity for optimum-scale 
manufacturing, deploy effort to the greatest social advantage and 
realise entrepreneurial profits (Lockley, 1951: 61-62). Clearly, 
a holistic and integrative activity is involved. The structural schema 
portrayed in Figure 1.2 encompasses the interaction of the main elements 
in any marketing initiative (Mallen, 1967: 102). The direct components 
— pricing, product determination, product mix and distribution, 
promotion and market research — can be seen influencing and, in turn, 
reflecting strategies formulated elsewhere in the company and the 
outside world. Given such complexity, a producer-based study must 
engage a sub-model of the locational decision-making process in order to 
pursue any meaningful empirical analysis. 
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FIGURE 1.2: The elements of marketing. 
Source: Mallen (1967: 1021 
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Corporate spatial strategy in marketing 
Among the interrelationships outlined in Mallen's diagram, most 
spatially-oriented policy occurs within the ambit of distribution. Its 
development is detailed in a planning schema adapted from Stern (1966: 
13) and shown in Figure 1.3. Before a plan is commenced, the company 
directorate must recognise its overall aims — the higher-level, long-
range manifestations of its economic philosophy. Although these goals 
have attracted much academic debate (see Machlup, 1967) , they can be 
assumed multi-dimensional, varying with the nature of the firm, the 
market, and environmental and perceptual influences (Townroe, 1969: 17; 
Mueller, 1972: 200). After they have been shown to be feasible in the 
light of contemporary conditions, the corporation's marketing division 
can generate its own short to medium-term objectives . Those with spatial 
application may range from concrete proposals — the enforcement of 
national coverage or an upgrading of retail outlets -- to less tangible 
schemes typified in an intensification of sales promotion. These 
strategies are evaluated first in relation to overall goals and then to 
three elements which affect the firm's general operations. 
(i) The business environment covers a gamut of macro-economic, 
social, technological, ethical, governmental, historical, 
legal and competitive considerations. 
(ii) The market applies a filter to spatial propositions. For 
example, methods adopted in one regional or product market 
might be quite inappropriate in another. Market size, 
intensity and distance all affect the geographical dynamics of 
the distribution structure necessary to provide adequate 
coverage. 
(iii) The company situation provides the means to implement policies. 
Firm size, measured in asset or turnover terms, is perhaps the 
most important single variable affecting distribution. It 
largely determines the nature of any existing system and the 
extent of its throughput. A company's financial position 
similarly constrains or enhances its spatial actions, 
especially when extraordinary adjustments are under review. 
The organisation of representation, level of management 
experience and perception all influence policy-formation (cf. 
Udell, 1968; Aylmer, 1970). Attitudes to risk are also 
important. 
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FIGURE 1.3: A schema for spatial decision-making 
within distribution. 
Source: Adapted from Stern (1966: 13). 
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If a spatial plan is acceptable within the current state of these 
inter-dependent constraints and anticipated competitor counter-
strategies, it undergoes a more specialised assessment among the 
elements of the 'marketing mix'. This framework of variables has been 
characterised as 
a battery of devices or types of marketing 
activities that are coordinated into a single 
effort to reach a particular target. The... 
attack advances on several fronts simultaneously. 
[Its] coordination is a critical element in the 
development of marketing strategy (Bell, 1966: 
351) . 
An equilibritmi of forces in the marketing function must be achieved 
before a company can perform satisfactorily and accomplish its 
aspirations. Thus, a strategy must be compatible with ongoing activity 
in three main sub-mixes (Lazer, 1962: 13). 
(i) The product siib-mix covers such interests as product line 
analysis, innovation, planning, service, quality, warranty, 
pricing and so forth. 
(ii) The communications sub-mix includes personal selling 
activities — the allocation of sales effort, integration of 
sales and service, lines of administration and feedback from 
the field to headquarters, marketing responsibilities and 
territory coverage by representatives. Non-personal aspects 
of merchandising incorporate advertising, sales promotions, 
public relations, research and reporting. 
(iii) The distribution sub-mix involves decision-making in physical 
distribution and channel analysis. The former is concerned 
with transportation, shipping, storage and inventory control. 
The latter requires a continuous appraisal of the present and 
future adequacy of the company's distribution system to fulfil 
the tasks demanded by the marketing objectives. 
A spatial proposal which is still satisfactory after this extensive 
testing is subject to cost/benefit analysis before final implementation. 
The development of policy is well attended by feedback loops which allow 
for substantial modification, and major internal and external 
interrelationships exist within and among marketing operations. Thus, 
in the product sub-mix, service provisions depend on product quality and 
warranty conditions. Yet, they are also affected by the manufacturer's 
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brand image, the importance of replacement demand, type of user, and 
size of unit sales — questions determined primarily in the 
communications area. Substitutions can enhance or inhibit the chances 
of spatial action. For example, a firm unwilling or unable to undertake 
communications responsibilities in a region could call on an independent 
distributor for assistance -- thus varying its distribution sub-mix. 
Product requirements infiltrate all aspects of marketing (Miracle, 
1965: 20-2 3). High-value goods are unlikely to be supplied through 
middlemen because they are able to stand the costs of direct supply. 
Similarly, technical goods are sold without intermediaries so that 
their performance can be demonstrated adequately. In contrast, bulky 
or heavy products are usually sent to brokers who can achieve economies 
of scale through specialisation and superior materials handling. 
Perishable or fashion articles typically have short channels while, 
with durables, the reverse applies. The extent of a firm's range is 
also important for it governs the type and quality of agencies for whom 
business will be attractive. 
Stern's model advances a crisp but comprehensive statement which 
clearly recognises the role of endogenous and exogenous influences and 
inter-divisional conflict in a company's conduct under uncertainty. 
Closer inspection of the marketing function in terms of a particular 
distribution method favoured by large, capital-goods producers — the 
franchise system — permits further insights into corporate spatial 
behaviour. Indeed, franchising, a means of selling through a small 
number of relatively-permanent wholesale and retail establishments on 
the basis of written agreements, is ideally suited for current purposes 
since it exhibits a degree of formalisation, definition and operational 
'compactness' unmatched by other alternatives. 
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RESUME 
Enterprises have acquired a dominant place in the commercial world and 
are attracting increasing academic interest. Their spatial impact, 
assumed to be different to that of the entrepreneur, can be probed most 
efficiently in their product distribution, although marketing geography 
is not sufficiently developed to allow a highly theoretical approach. 
Yet, the relevant procedures of locational decision-making are 
interpretable through an adaptation of Stern's (1966: 13) planning 
model. Recognition of different distribution modes enables franchising 
to be chosen as a focus for study of scale effects, establishment 
mobility and policy substitution in corporate behaviour. 
21 
CHAPTER ONE FOOTNOTES 
1. Steed (1971a: 207, 1971c: 54); Eliot Hurst (1972: 145). 
2. Vernon (1967); Barber (1971: 265); Steed (1971d: 90). 
3. See, for example, Katona and Morgan (1952), Mueller and Morgan 
(1962) . 
4. Townroe (1969: 16); Dicken (1971: 426); Gordon (1974: 123-24). 
5. Alchian (1950); Tiebout (1957); Alexis (1962); Cyert and March (1963); Wolpert (1964); Webber (1969, 1972). 
6. Baumol (1958: 187-98, 1959: 46-53) predicted that, assuming 
satisfactory profits are achieved, a firm's objectives could turn to the 
maximisation of sales revenue. Debate on the topic has continued ever 
since. For two recent contributions, see Hawkins (1970); Mueller 
(1972) . 
7. For general accounts of the contraversy see McGuire (1964); 
Machlup (1967) . 
8. Lebow (1948: 13); Churchill (1955); Ozanne and Hunt (1971: 96-97); 
Steed (1971a: 207); United States of America [Department of Commerce] 
(1972: 485). 
9. Discussion of aspects of decision theory appears in McGuire 
(1964: 124-27). 
10. Distribution costs to the economy are covered in an historical 
vein in: Borsodi (1927); Twentieth Centiory Fund (1939); Malenbaum 
(1941); The University of Melbourne (1946); Barger (1955). The 
immediate statement is referenced in Phillips (1951: 11); Cox et al. 
(1965: 287-89); Converse et al. (1965: 621); Wentz and Eyrich (1970: 
22). Cost factors of the physical distribution function alone are 
treated in Snyder (1963); Bowersox (1969). 
11. Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Official 
Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, 57 (1971), p. 706. 
A similar percentage obtains in the United States. See United States of 
America [Department of Commerce] (1972: 225-29). 
12. According to Bowersox (1969: 65), the first book on physical 
distribution management was not produced until 1961. It is: 
E.W. Smykay et al.^ Physical Distribution Management, Macmillan, New 
York, 1961. Other comments on the lack of research in physical 
distribution are found in Stewart (1965: 65); Sussams (1967: 36). 
13. As one illustration, a survey by Maguire and Kench (1971: 11) 
revealed that of all business enquiries to the Public Library of New 
South Wales between February 1968 and March 1970 only one and a half per 
cent directly concerned the marketing function. 
14. See Bursk (1964: 5); Rodger (1965: 21^" Bell (1966: 3-5). 
22 
15. Institute of Australian Geographers, Research in Progress, 
Adelaide, 1971, 97pp. The content of studies from bachelors degrees 
with honours to professional research for the years 1969-71 were 
analysed. 
23 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM: ALL THAT GLITTERS, 
Since the Second World War, vertical distribution structures have 
gained prominence in advanced economies^. Their growth has been 
assisted by the rise of three forms of franchising which, together, 
constitute one of several contractual styles of marketing (Table 2.1). 
Franchising's unique characteristics distinguish it not only from major 
alternative distribution methods^ but also from minor variations which 
rely on employees, licensees and concessionaires^. A historical review 
of the system's headlong rush into the commercial limelight of the 
1960s exposes the inherent over-enthusiasm of some attendant literature 
and the need to examine the efficacy of franchising in recession. 
Later, large and small firms from a selected industry are studied in 
order to elucidate the aspects of corporate decision-making highlighted 
previously. 
THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM 
4 Few definitions of franchising are as pointed as that of Ingraham 
(1963: 13) who sees the technique as incorporating 
an organisation composed of distributive units 
established and administered by a supplier 
through the device of a contract called a 
'Franchise Agreement' as a medium for expanding 
and controlling the marketing of his products. 
The insinuation of supplier manipulation in these arrangements is not 
inappropriate, since many American franchisors have been prosecuted 
for infringement of fair trade and anti-trust legislation this 
century^. However, the difficulties of describing so broad a concept 
succinctly are such that Ingraham does not explain the differentiation 
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TABLE 2.1: ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES 
Orientation 
or Class 
Variants 
(and Sub-types) Commentary 
Horizontal 
(laissez-faire) 
Numerous hybrid 
forms 
'fragmented networks in which 
loosely aligned manufacturers, 
wholesalers and retailers have 
customarily bargained agress-
ively with each other, esta-
blished trade relationships on 
an individual transaction basis, 
severed business relationships 
with impunity, and otherwise, 
behaved independently'. 
Vertical Corporate 
(chain stores) 
Contractual 
(franchising) 
(co-operatives) 
(voluntary chains) 
'[systems which aim to allow] 
establishments at each level [of 
distribution] to operate at an 
optimum scale so that the 
marketing functions within the 
system are performed at the most 
advantageous level or position'. 
Administered 
Source: Adapted from Davidson (1970: 7-10) 
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from other types of marketing implied in the 'agreement'. The 
6 main features of conventional franchising are that : 
(a) a contractual relationship proposing numerous 
responsibilities, contributions and benefits is voluntarily 
adopted by two parties for a specified time; 
(b) this association affords to the franchisee the right to 
offer, sell or distribute the goods, services or concepts 
of the franchisor in a prescribed manner; 
(c) the franchise typically employs selective distribution and 
requires the full activity of the franchisee as a legally 
independent businessman; 
(d) both participants share a common public identity through 
trade marks, advertising and goodwill; 
(e) the franchisee normally takes full title to any products 
obtained from his supplier. 
In essence, this system achieves vertical integration in two or 
more successive stages of distribution and thereby offers its founder 
a certain degree of network control (Malacki, 1973: 7-10) . It relies 
on a normal licence, coupled with ongoing provisos to ensure uniformity 
and acceptable standards of service. Depending on the type of 
franchising, retailers may use their own or their producer's business 
name; generally, however, they have little flexibility to alter 
product features or their overall marketing mix. Franchising is 
initiated when a merchant installs a limited number of outlets to 
intensify and promote his links with the market. The retailers sign 
contracts outlining the basis of the association. In return for their 
distribution activities, they receive discounts ranging in most trades 
from ten to twenty-five per cent of a product's selling price as 
determined by the manufacturer. Dealers of large firms generally 
finance stock from their own funds or from floor-plan sources; small 
franchisors, on the other hand, might be required to provide retail 
credit assistance, since their sales organisations are usually less 
established. Goods may be supplied direct from the production works 
but, in many cases, company-owned or independent distributors are used. 
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While the impact of franchising is becoming increasingly apparent 
in Australia^, the system has already contributed significantly to the 
economy of the United States. Principally, it has: 
(a) encouraged higher standards in retailing by its enforcement 
of proven techniques which are generally more consonant 
with the market than those of unaligned businessmen; 
(b) improved retail management by affording entrepreneurs the 
training, experience and logistics support of the franchisor, 
together with economies of scale in supply usually associated 
with large corporations (Curry et at., 1966: 92); 
(c) helped to stabilise small business by spreading retail risk, 
stimulating local employment and dispersing modern marketing 
techniques in areas which otherwise might not have been 
serviced (Ingraham, 1963: 219; Fine, 1968: 19); 
(d) broadened the economic base of the nation by allowing 
distributive organisations to expand despite limited capital 
and by giving many former employees the opportunity to 
conduct their own business (Ozanne and Hunt, 1971: 114; 
Hunt, 1972: 35-38). 
Franchised outlets appear attractive and well-run because they offer 
merchandise of standard quality and dependability from conveniently-
situated premises (Lewis and Hancock, 1963: 85-92) . Along with the 
provision of a wider range of goods and services to the consumer, this 
type of distribution has fostered marketing innovation (Ingraham, 1963: 
219). Its pluralistic features are highly regarded in the land of free 
enterprise. As Judge Dawson commented during Sussev versus Carvel 
(1962) 
the...system has the advantage, from the standpoint 
of our American...competitive economy, of enabling 
numerous groups with small capital to become 
entrepreneurs. [It] provides the public with... 
a uniform product... from small... contractors, 
rather than the employees of a vast chain. The 
franchise system is therefore good for the economy 
(italics added). 
Development of the franchise system 
Modern franchise practice arose from the fusion of two separate 
9 forces which originated in medieval Europe . 
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(i) In a constitutional strain, franchises were feudal laws which 
permitted freedom from restraint or servitude and later 
came to represent an immunity or privilege conferred by 
a sovereign. 
(ii) From a commercial standpoint, licensing arrangements first 
developed in the Middle Ages and were prevalent among 
British and American merchants by the Colonial Period. 
Thereafter, the rise of oligopoly in various industries 
during the Industrial Revolution made possible the 
standardised marketing agreements now characteristic of 
franchis ing. Stronger producers soon attained sufficient 
power to ensure tliat these contracts were upheld. 
Despite this background, the exact emergence of the system, as presently 
conceived, is uncertain. A number of authors refer to its use by sewing 
machine companies in the American economy of the 1860s. Probably it 
was taken up by agricultural machinery suppliers at the same time. Yet 
the chief impetus came after 1900 with the upsurge of the United States 
automobile industry^*^, in which technological progress was rapid, 
products often unreliable and consumers uneducated. An exclusive 
dealer force could cushion many inadequacies of production-oriented 
manufacturers by offering a high level of service over a dispersed 
market (Davisson, 1954: 92). 
Before 1920, the new measures were concurrently being incorporated 
in other fields. Drug producers became involved after 1902 followed 
by soft-drink bottlers who recognised a medium for attaining 
standardisation and quality control over wide areas. The final boost 
to manufacturer (or wholesaler) inspired product fvccnohising came with 
the induction of the oil magnates after 1930, partly as a result of 
institutional issues (see McLean and Haiyli, 1954). Despite some 
hybridisation^^, the basic formula is now conspicuously strong as a means 
of petroleum distribution (Hall, 1964: 62; Townsend, 1965). 
Though product franchising is still the dominant form of the 
general system, most postwar growth has occurred in the business or trade 
12 
name variants (Table 2.2). Both date back to the 1920s, when foods, 
variety and hardware merchants formed 'voluntary chains' as a strategy 
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TABLE 2.2: TYPES OF FRANCHISING 
Type of 
Franchising 
Typical Distribution 
Channels 
Principal Industries Involved 
Product 
Manufacturer-
(wholesaler) -
retailer 
Automobiles, trucks, 
petroleum, hearing aids, 
agricultural machinery, con-
struction equipment, water 
conditioners, swimming pools 
Wholesaler-retailer Foods, drugs, hardware, home 
and automobile accessories, 
variety stores 
Business 
Manufacturer-
wholesaler 
Soft drinks, beer 
Manufacturer-
wholesaler 
Fast foods, beverages, soft 
ice cream 
Trade name 
or service 
Service sponsor-
manufacturer 
Fabricated textiles 
Service sponsor-
(wholesaler) -
retailer 
Carpet cleaning, soft ice 
cream, fast foods, removals, 
car rentals, beverages, hotels/ 
motels, tools/equipment 
rentals, coin-op laundries and 
dry cleaners 
Franchisor-
franchisee both on 
all levels of 
distribution 
Bread, milk, mattresses 
Source: Adapted from Thompson (1968: 41) and McGuire (1971: 11-12). 
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against burgeoning corporate distribution (Ingraham, 1963: 64; Hall, 
1964: 63). After the Second World War, the United States experienced 
massive socio-economic change, exemplified in suburban sprawl, increased 
leisure time, greater personal mobility, and the marketing revolution. 
Huff (1961: 9) suggests that these factors, combined with pent-up 
demand and affluence, a pool of available entrepreneurship provided by-
ex-servicemen, progress in small-scale electronic data processing 
equipment, and consumer requirements for increased levels of retailer 
accessibility all favoured the rapid expansion of franchise activity. 
Also, the ongoing attack on small business by discount houses, shopping 
centres and chain stores was a formidable catalyst. Retailers were 
looking for protection through affiliation with national marketing 
organisations. Franchise offers of comprehensive sales programmes 
and management expertise were a winning incentive with many new 
operators. 
The 'franchise boom' of the 1960s 
Franchising's heyday during the 1960s has been so poorly attended 
with accurate statistics that a comprehensive, integrated time series 
cannot be presented^^. Initial computations of the International 
Franchise Association suggested that 339,000 outlets turned over $US59 
billion in 1963 (Buckley, 1964: 37). Four years afterwards, the 
Association claimed that $US89 billion (a plausible volume) passed 
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through 513,000 sales establishments (a seemingly high estimate ). The 
turnover' levels were corroborated in a later survey which highlighted 
considerable growth in the triennium to 1971 (Table 2.3). In the latter 
year, the reported 407,000 franchised stores in the United States (about 
fifteen per cent of all wholesale and retail facilities) achieved sales 
of $US131 billion — over ten per cent of the country's gross national 
product of $US1,047 billion^^. 
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TABLE 2.3: FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY, 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1969-71 
Principal Type 
of Retailing 
Automobile/trucks 
Automotive products 
and services 
Fast foods 
a 
Gasoline stations 
General retailing 
All other industries 
Total Franchisor/ 
Franchisee 
Establishments 
(thousand) 
1969 
37.80 
18.90 
28.70 
222.20 
27.60 
48.70 
1970 
37.20 
20.40 
32.60 
222.00 
29. 30 
54.80 
1971 
37.00 
20.60 
35.60 
220.00 
31.00 
60.80 
Total Franchisor/ 
Franchisee Sales 
($US billion) 
1969 
66.40 
1.80 
3.80 
25.10 
12.10 
10.30 
1970 
53.10 
1.90 
4.60 
26.50 
13.10 
12.00 
1971 
69.00 
2.00 
5.30 
27.30 
14.40 
13.60 
Total franchising 383.90 396.30 407.00 119.50 111.20 131.60 
a Indicates industries mainly engaged in product franchising. 
Source: United States of America [Department of Commerce] (1971: 2-4). 
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An enormous variety of functions now s\ibscribes to this type of 
distribution. In the United Kingdom, Mendelsohn (1970: 25-33) lists 
some sixty-five which range from accounting services to weight control 
courses, but many more could be enumerated. Some of the best-known 
companies such as Kentucky Fried Chicken, McDonalds, and Burger Chef 
dominate the fast-foods industry and have expanded into Australia 
within the last decade. Other widely-patronised participants are 
automotive supply s tores (e.g. B.F. Goodrich), hotels/motels (e.g. 
Holiday Inns of America) and car-hiring services (Avis, Hertz, Budget). 
Slater's (1964: 20) assertion that 'just about everything is, and can 
be, franchised' apparently has been recognised by some of America's 
most sizeable non-franchising conglomerates which are now perpetrating 
a trend of acquisitions (Sherwood, 1958: 27). Typical examples are 
the takeovers of the Automation Institute by Control Data Corporation 
and of Jack-in-the-Box by Ralston Purina (Bernstein, 1968: 36; Ozanne 
and Hunt, 1971: 351-53). From many accounts, the franchise system 
appears as a conspicuously successful phenomenon of modern marketing. 
THE APPLIED PROBLEM 
The name of the system is franchising. Franchising 
is as American as Mom, apple pie, and lately Bob 
Dylan...franchising is America's answer to 
monopoly capitalism, the newest and by far the 
most secure niche carved out for that typical 
American who refuses to fade from the scene, the 
small businessman (Rosenberg and Bedell, 1969: 6). 
In a number of publications and the statements of many franchisors, the 
spectacular boom of the 1960s encouraged an unreflective bullishness, 
lack of objectivity and preoccupation with the specific to the 
detriment of the general. By no means has the system been free of 
problems. One of its chief advocates. Slater (1964: 20), laments that 
it is 'woefully misunderstood' — at best, a euphemistic evaluation. 
Franchising's expansion attracted a significant share of illegal 
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business practices which rather tarnished its reputation^^. Lengthy 
litigation and federal anti-trust action have beset several user 
industries. Moreover, for various reasons, a percentage of outlets 
have failed and their owners have sometimes complained to the press 
about conditions under which they had to operate (Lyons, 1966; Levy, 
1969). 
The iconoclasts 
In recent literature, such excesses have culminated in a timely 
undercurrent of iconoclasm, originally infused by Hewitt (1956). This 
movement, composed mainly of business lawyers^^, questions not only the 
equitability and legal rectitude of the franchise relationship but also 
whether the system achieves a l l the benefits which its proponents 
claim. Yet even these searching examinations seem to obfuscate an 
important point. Difficulties which the more radical writers and 
legislators seek to overcome have arisen in a so-called 'boom' period 
for franchise development. There has been little thought as to the 
possible ramifications of less favourable economic circumstances: 
the problem of adjustment of franchise systems 
to changing market conditions is not necessarily 
of universal concern. [It] has direct meaning 
to [long-founded] franchisors...who ... have 
undergone little or no adjustment in the 
products, the locations, the operating practices, 
and the physical style of their businesses. It 
has indirect meaning to the more-recently-
established-franchise systems insofar as they 
may fail to adjust to future... conditions (Lewis 
and Hancock, 1963: 76). 
These comments skirt an issue which, as shown by the Ford Motor 
Company's experience in the 1930s, is crucially significant to a l l 
franchisors (Palamountain, 1955: 118-19; Brown, 1970: 107). There are 
few business handbooks which outline either 'appropriate' strategies 
for survival or the effects of past setbacks on organisations involved. 
A study of economic contraction would spotlight aspects of corporate 
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decision-making (as suggested in Chapter One), and fill an urgent 
applied need in our knowledge of product distribution. The present 
operational problem, to determine the economic and spatial response to 
depressed demand of enterprises operating within a franchise system, 
thrusts into both fields with a completely fresh approach. Yet before 
any progress can be made, one of three forms of franchising must be 
selected as the focus; it is beyond the scope of this project to 
investigate them all. Although exuberant claims have not been directed 
specifically at product franchising, it is the logical emphasis for the 
current study. 
THE CASE FOR PRODUCT FRANCHISING 
In terms of either number of outlets or sales volume, product 
franchising is easily the most important variant of the general system. 
Thus, results obtained should be highly representative of franchise 
practice as a whole (see Table 2.3). Unlike their youthful counterparts 
in the 'business' and 'trade name' applications, the older product 
franchisors are precisely those who have undergone 'little or no 
adjustment' — to re-quote Lewis and Hancock (1963: 76). The problem 
is 'directly' relevant in this sector. Moreover, participant 
industries are clearly distinguishable and long-established and their 
cyclical behaviour is better recorded than that of suppliers in the 
other two areas. 
Rationale of product franchising 
To the major user organisations — those involved in automobiles, 
petroleum, electrical goods and agricultural and construction 
equipment — the rationale of product franchising rests on three 
interrelated factors (Ingraham, 1963: 56-85). 
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(i) The demands of the product. Product franchising is usually 
employed in marketing strongly-differentiated capital 
durables which exact high degrees of retailer and brand 
loyalty. Selective or exclusive distribution can be used 
to create attractive sales opportunities but these goods 
demand a concentrated pitch, technical expertise and 
a commitment towards spare parts, service and warranty. The 
manufacturer cannot economically overcome such retail entry 
barriers without independent local assistance and, often, 
substantial investment from prospective dealers (Lewis and 
Hancock, 1963: 7). 
(ii) Managerial considerations. Capitai.^durables engender high 
risks for all channel participants . Through product 
franchising, suppliers can ameliorate market forces by 
dealing with only a select group of retailers. Stock 
investment and bad debt exposure is reduced, local display 
facilitated and the company's marketing arm extended by 
motivated and well-trained entrepreneurs. 
(iii) Financial and network control needs. Firms in developing 
markets must increase their sales or lose penetration and 
court failure. Yet, capital is often unavailable for this 
purpose. The franchise system offers rapid growth prospects 
without the asset fixity of corporate distribution or the 
intangibles of horizontal marketing. A producer can regulate 
his entry through variable cost distribution. His risk is 
spread throughout the channel, from which he gains access to 
sales, working finance, service, publicity, storage and credit 
collection facilities. 
The prospective user must weigh these three considerations in terms of 
his company situation. In general, however, product franchising 
decreases uncertainty for the manufacturer and provides cheap 
distribution with substantial levels of network control. As such, it 
would appear reasonably adaptable to the stringencies of recession. 
Application of product franchising 
Use of product franchising as an aggressive marketing device has 
been most fully exploited in the American automobile industry. 
According to Hewitt (1956: 55-57), the more successful vehicle 
manufacturers found that: 
(a) selling expenses were contained by restricting the number of 
outlets, and pricing was more easily policed; 
(b) exclusive franchise territories attracted financially-stronger 
dealers and allowed better production planning; 
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(c) the intra-brand sales protection offered by product 
franchising could be used to enforce exclusive 
representation, through which dealers acquired a specialised 
investment and became subject to high levels of control; 
(d) similarly, service and spare parts operations could be 
oriented to exclude competition. 
In most present applications, at least in the United States, 
legislation has rectified excesses concerning exclusive territories 
and representation, tying agreements and resale price maintenance 
which, before, blatantly favoured the franchisor (Stephenson and House, 
1971: 39). Yet, in many respects, product franchising still affords 
a means by which a supplier can enjoy the outstanding advantages 
accruing from centralised marketing administration without undertaking 
costly forward integration -- an attractive situation since, 
entrepreneurs do seek to gain control over the 
activities of others and they realise it in 
varying degrees. They do so because their 
operations are affected, often quite significantly, 
by the activities of others in the channel 
(Little, 1970: 32). 
The practical impact of Little's argument is clear. Though the 
generally-held purpose of franchising is to allow both vendor and 
vendee to exploit the potentially-greater gains which arise from 
concerted distribution action, their channel aims can vary. Factory 
profits for the former often require increased sales, whereas this 
course may not be the most lucrative for the franchisee operating under 
a different cost structure (see Woll, 1968). In recognition of the 
frequent resolution to this apparent impasse, Ingraham (1963: 27) and 
Hewitt (1967: 1075) contend that the primary objective of any franchise 
system is to govern and expand the marketing of the producer's goods 
on a profitable basis. This goal of network authority can be fulfilled 
by employing two main techniques. The supplier's first interest is in 
managerial dominion over the operations of his dealer force without 
monetary commitment. Indeed, in many less-important aspects of 
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administration, his aim is achieved solely through the marketing 
contract. Yet, financial measures are invariably involved as a second 
form of control. They may include direct ownership or investment in 
the fixed assets of the reseller, funding equipment, stock or working 
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capital , the co-signing of notes or acquisition of master-leases on 
sales premises (Ingraham, 1963: 18). Since such provisions constitute 
direct forward integration and entail extra uncertainty, they are 
avoided if the managerial alternative is possible. 
Applied strictly, the principles of channel leadership allot 
retailers a position of low autonomy but offer the whole system peak 
efficiency from a solely technical viewpoint (Stephenson and House, 
1971: 36). However, since the vendee has too great a legal, financial 
and moral stake to permit all issues to turn to the other party's 
advantage, disputes will emerge in the absence of provision for an 
equitable allocation of income based on economic exposiare and risk 
(cf. Rosenberg and Stern, 1970: 45; Stephenson and House, 1971: 41). 
FORMATION OF HYPOTHESES 
The importance of management is underscored in times of recession, when 
the producer's existence is threatened by pressures in both his 
distribution organisation and in the market at large. Mallen (1967: 
105) lists four possible areas of contention: 
(a) among channel members (manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer); 
(b) between competitors for use of agencies (manufacturer-
manufacturer for a wholesaler); 
(c) between channel competitors (manufacturer-manufacturer, 
wholesaler-wholesaler, retailer-retailer); 
(d) between distribution systems (franchising versus corporate 
marketing in a single industry; manufacturer-retailer 
versus manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer). 
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In an integrated sales organisation, the fortunes of manufacturer and 
dealer are inextricably bound. Yet, the former bears major 
responsibility for the prosperity of all participants because 
the degree and quality of control... exercised 
by the franchisor usually is a decisive 
factor in determining the... success that the 
system achieves (Hewitt, 1967: 1076). 
The preconditions to network authority are derived from a franchising 
company's structural attributes signifying two forms of power: 
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(i) Economic force accrues from concentration of capital . For 
example, larger producers often engage corporate distribution 
systems featuring considerable vertical integration, whereas 
smaller or weaker sellers may have to seek wholesalers or 
retailers to accommodate their entire output, thus abrogating 
most of their flexibility. 
(ii) Positional strength, derived from accessibility to consumers, 
is a negotiable commodity. A strong enterprise can offset 
the effects of a marginal location by recruiting independent 
agencies — such as dealers — better placed in relation to 
its clientele. 
Therefore, depending on the positioning of his strategic facilities, 
the large franchisor should be capable of asserting greater control 
than smaller competitors. His power would be reflected in a more 
embracing franchise code, and market tactics which maintain or improve 
existing channel relationships in his favour and dispel any threat of 
undesired contraction in the sales force. In this respect, considering 
the operating costs of the establishments involved, representation 
policies in the central administrative and production, wholesale and 
retail sectors must play a significant role. Therefore, in a franchise 
system experiencing recession, an association may be hypothesized of 
company structural factors (expressed through the exercise of network 
management) and the direction of corporate spatial decision-making. 
Related to this geographic prediction is a purely financial 
postulate. If, as Hewitt (1967: 1076) has contended, a franchise 
system's fortunes depend on the degree of authority with which it is 
conducted, larger firms' operations should adapt better to market 
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contraction than those of small competitors. The differences necessary 
to test this second hypothesis will be evinced in distribution policy 
(as proxied in franchise agreements) and practice (viewed here 
principally in terms of locational representation strategies). Yet, 
ceteris paribus^ more inclusive channel management should contribute 
to superior market and economic results among large franchisors. Hence, 
these variables must also be considered in assessing the relative 
'success' of various organisations. 
Based on this structural hypothesis with its spatial and financial 
applications, the enquiry integrates the themes of corporate policy-
formation, marketing and product franchising. Yet, so broad a problem 
must be narrowed to one subject industry. Part Two, comprising 
Chapters Three and Four, centres on a select group of recession-bound 
enterprises which is differentiated into 'large' and 'small' segments. 
Part Three (Chapters Five to Eight) analyses each group's relative 
network capacities and their bearing on tactics undertaken. Conclusions 
about processes and relationships in major firms' policy formation are 
derived in Part Four (Chapter Nine). 
RESUME 
Following their segregation from all possible distribution media, the 
three forms of franchising were defined in terms of a general system. 
A review of its development pointed up serious oversights which 
pervaded the literature during the boom period of the 1950s. Most 
noticeably, the repercussions of business downturns on the performance 
of user corporations have been neglected. The specific interest of the 
project was then directed to product franchising, in which channel 
control — represented in a business' financial size and strength and 
market accessibility — was assumed a significant influence on its 
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decision-making and ultimate success. To develop these ideas, a search 
for a suitable test industry was initiated. 
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CHAPTER TWO FOOTNOTES 
1. Alternative forms of distribution have arisen in response to the 
needs of many different kinds of products (cf. Miracle, 1965). The 
rise of vertical structures is noted in Bucklin (1970a: 21) and 
Davidson (1970: 7-10). For further details, see Bucklin (1970b) and 
Blois (1972). 
2. Among other contractual systems, co-operatives do not profess the 
individual profit motive while voluntary chains (usually non-integrated 
retail alliances) lack many of the administrative and management 
controls of franchising (see Konopa, 1963) . Corporate distribution 
relies on the use of company retail outlets in contrast to independent 
entrepreneurs (see Ridgeway, 1957: 468-70). Finally, administered 
marketing operates through lessees who rent space in large stores and 
provide their own sales personnel (see Davidson, 1970: 8). 
3. Franchisees can be differentiated from three other types of 
marketing functionary: 
(a) employees, who undertake a task in the manner specified by the 
employer to achieve a stated necessary outcome; 
(b) licensees, who work under arrangements offering less vertical 
integration, fewer provisos and little of the continuing 
relationship characteristic of the franchise contract (see 
Ingraham, 1963: 21); 
(c) concessionaires, whose relationship with a host organisation 
seldom amounts to more than a lessor-lessee arrangement and 
certainly does not incorporate the usual legal vendor-vendee 
status of the franchise contract. 
General information is provided by Glickman (1972: 2/1-2/27). More 
specialised papers include Keck (1968); Rahl (1968); Baker (1969). 
4. For example. Curry et al. (1966: 17); Mendelsohn (1970: 5); 
Rosenfield (1970: 9-18); Izraeli (1972: 3-8). 
5. See Hewitt (1956, 1958); Whitney (1958); Zeidman (1967); 
Thompson (1968); Clabault (1970). 
6. Based on the United States' 'Fairness in Franchising Act', the 
Hart Bill — SR No. 2507 [A Bill Relating to Dealings between Parties 
to Franchise Agreements] and SR No. 2 321 [A Bill to Supplement the 
Anti-trust Laws of the United States in order to Prevent Anti-
Competitive Practices etc.]. See Rosenfield (1970: 9-18; Izraeli 
(1972: 3-4). For operational descriptions, see Schwartz (1959); Curry 
et al. (1966); Cameron (1970). 
7. Bellin (1970: 756-57). A complete lack of reference material 
about Australian franchising restricts the present commentary to the 
situation in the United States. Information in Table 2,3 is not 
available for Australia. 
8. Bevnavd Sussev et al. versus Carvel Corporation et al.. Commerce 
Clearing House Inc., Trade Regulation Reporter No. 5, Current Comment 
— Trade Cases 1962, quoted in Lewis and'Hancock (1963: 92). 
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9. Much detail exists on the origins of the franchise system. This 
account has been based on Hewitt (1956); Kursh (1962); Lewis and 
Hancock (1963); Slater (1964); Rothenberg (1967); Konopa (1970); 
Rosenfield (1970); Izraeli (1972). 
10. For further treatment of various aspects of franchising in the 
automobile industry, see Hewitt (1956); Koo (1959); Pashigian (1960); 
Brown et aZ. (1962: 103-26); Kessler (1962); Sloan (1964); Freed 
(1964); Phelps (1965); Brownlee (1966); Curry et at. (1966). 
11. Ridgeway (1957: 477). More information about gasoline marketing 
is found in Cross (1962); Dixon (1964); Winer (1967). 
12. See Oxenfeldt and Thompson (1968: 4). 
13. The inadequacies were first pointed out by Lewis and Hancock 
(1963: 85) and Ingraham (1963: 5), Yet, some years later, they 
remained still apparently unrectified (Best, 1968: 46); Bond (1969: 
44); Levy (1969: 37); United States of America [Senate] (1970: 17-18). 
14. Estimates recorded in Konopa (1970: 19/41) and McGuire (1971: 2). 
15. U.S.A. Statistics in Brief 1972, [Supplement to The Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, 93 (1972)], Bureau of Census, Department of 
Commerce, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972. 
16. See Wilson (1966); Mockler and Easop (1968: 28-29); Levy (1969); 
van Cise (1969); Augustine and Hrusoff (1970: 1349-51). 
17. Brown (1970); Rosenfield (1968, 1970). 
18. Alexander et al. (1963: 10) define a channel of distribution as 
'the...intra-company organisation units and extra-company agents and 
dealers, wholesale and retail, through which a commodity, product, or 
service is marketed'. Apart from the stipulation of independent 
retailers, franchising does not presume any particular distribution 
channel structure. If involved at all, wholesalers could be either 
corporate or non-corporate agencies. They might employ sub-distributors 
who could, in turn, sell to their own retailers. Dealers might rely on 
spotter or commission agents. For further general information on 
channels of distribution, see Beckman (1932); Elder (1935); Clewett 
(1954); Diamond (1963); Bucklin (1966). 
19. Supplementary financing is the most common form of franchisor 
participation at retail in capital-durable product franchising 
industries. Oil producers and those engaged in business or trade name 
applications tend to use the other alternatives. 
20. As pointed out later, 'concentration of capital' or asset strength 
can be interpreted through other financial parameters in certain 
circumstances. 
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PART TWO 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND STRATIFICATION 
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In order to evaluate this project's hypotheses, study of a product 
franchising industry under recession is required. A suitable focus 
obtains in the experience of agricultural machinery firms between 
1967 and 1972. The development of excess capacity in world equipment 
manufacturing during the 1960s and consequent saturation of the 
Australian market are examined together with the onset of the rural 
crisis as long and short-term environmental stimuli contributing to 
the demise of suppliers. Similarly, the decline in the domestic 
demand is reviewed. For practical reasons, the enquiry then narrows 
to nineteen leading companies responsible for the bulk of the 
nation's tractor and implement output; in preparation for the 
subsequent analysis, they are classified into 'large' and 'small' 
divisions on the basis of structural attributes. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE TEST CASE: THE AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL 
MACHINERY INDUSTRY 
Despite its research opportunities, the widespread Australian rural 
malaise of the late 1960s has attracted little more than press 
1 2 coverage . Centred in the wheat industry , it was born of a cost/price 
3 
squeeze , uncertainty exacerbated by unfavourable media, inadequate 
4 
credit and, most importantly, years of neglect of the need for 
consolidation and restructuring (Campbell, 1971: 68). The officially-
counternanced over-capacity and lack of adjustment in productive 
resources relative to world requirements became chronic after the boom 
of 1963-64. The years until 1968 brought economic turbulence, 
rapidly-expanding acreages^, variable seasons, rising expenses and 
falling prices, and an increasing dependence on temperamental export 
opportunities. During the financial year 1970-71, farm income 
plummeted to a postwar low of $A0.89 billion, while gross rural debt 
spiralled to $A2.10 billion (Table 3.1). Small operators and 
sharefarmers — a significant proportion of all landholders — were 
jeopardised; even big producers lacked the liquidity to effect plant 
alterations necessary in combating cost pressures^. As cut-backs 
applied by the farm community ricocheted among their suppliers, the 
demand function for producer durables left manufacturers of 
agricultural machinery among the worst affected such that, eventually, 
their plight became public knowledge: 
the primary producer [has] never been in a better 
position to buy top quality machinery at the 
keenest possible price...this [is] a direct result 
of the present recession [in which] used equipment 
inventories [have] risen to an alarming level, 
sales of new products [have] dropped drastically, 
and discounting by all major organisations...[has] 
...created a buyers' market {paraphrase of a speech. 
TABLE 3.1: THE RECESSION IN CAMERA -- SELECTED FINANCIAL STATISTICS AND INDEXES, 
RURAL INDUSTRIES, AUSTRALIA, 1961-72 
Financial Statistics ($A billion) Indexes (1960/61 to 1962/63 = 100) 
Year , a Actual a Actual , a Actual Quantum Domestic Export Prices Ending gross value total gross of rural prices prices paid'' June of rural ^ farm farm production received received 
production income debt 
1961 2.75 1.01 0.96 96 103 96 99 
1962 2.73 0.93 1.04 98 97 96 101 
1963 2.99 1.09 1.08 105 101 105 101 
1964 3.40 1.40 1.14 110 109 118 101 
1965 3.42 1.33 1.29 115 106 105 105 
1966 3.32 1.02 1.40 105 111 108 109 
1967 3.83 1.40 1.59 126 110 106 114 
1968 3.34 0.83 1.86 111 107 100 118 
1969 3.95 1. 28 1.96 137 106 102 120 
1970 3.79 1.07 2.08 131 101 97 123 
1971 3.63 0.89 2.10 128 97 88 128 
1972 3.99 1.13 2.10 135 104 95 136 
a Non-deflated series. 
b The gains in the value of rural production after 1967 were borne by increases in volume output, not 
prices received. 
c Note the relationship of prices paid to prices received. 
Source: Australia [Bureau of Agricultural Economics] (1973a: D16-D22), 
Ln 
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by Mr R.M. Cherry^ Pvesident, Tractor and Maohinevy 
Association of Australia, quoted in The Land 
[Sydney], 29 April 1971). 
Farm equipment is as essential to urbanised, twentieth-century 
life as agriculture itself. Hence, the study probes the experience of 
these merchants in the 1967-72 recession to illustrate aspects of 
corporate decision-making. Knowledge of the general and international 
economics of the industry not only addresses its diversity and 
complexity but also assists forthcoming analysis of the behaviour of 
selected member firms. After outlining the suitability of the chosen 
field, this chapter shows the contribution of demand and other elements 
to the current global arrangement of production. It then demonstrates 
the bearing of worldwide excess capacity on Australia during the 1960s 
and details the decline after 1969. This discussion acts as 
a springboard to the sampling in Chapter Four of individual companies 
for further analysis. 
CHOOSING THE TEST CASE 
Although the agricultural machinery industry was adopted for the 
investigation from limited alternatives, it offers several distinct 
advantages. 
(i) Availability of material. As the recession lifted in 1972, 
marketing documents were still to hand in firms and the 
issues fresh in the minds of policy-makers. Secondary 
sources were ai^ so well-covered by a substantial body of 
published data . 
(ii) Easily-segregated products. As farm equipment is functionally 
distinct, the complexities of substitutes and cross-
elasticities could be avoided. As a corollary, assuming 
reasonable degrees of firm specialisation, the corporate 
repercussions of economic contraction should be undiluted 
because the nominated product has no application outside 
the rural sector. 
(iii) Practicality. There is definite Applied value in examining 
this industry for, despite its small size, it is of crucial 
importance to a significant part of the national economy. 
4 7 
However, a criterion more telling than any of the above is that 
product franchising is central to the inarket conduct of ecjuipinent 
producers. 
Product franchising in the agricultural machinery industry 
The word 'FRANCHISE.means that the Dealer and 
[the Company] have joined together in a working 
partnership with the farmer, and...under this 
mutual understanding...all dealers can profit, 
grow and prosper...and serve agriculture, the 
community and this wonderful country of ours, 
Australia {dealer -prospectus of a Melbourne 
agricultural machinery producer, early to mid-
1960s) . 
Product franchising was apparently imported into Australia by 
North American companies towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
At the 1905 Royal Commission on Customs and Excise Tariffs, it was 
denounced as an exogenous 'curse' which prevented the farmer from 
obtaining his goods at a reasonable price, 
[taking] hundreds of thousands of pounds out 
of [his] pocket (Australia [Parliament], 1906: 
92) . 
Despite these accusations, the direct distribution advocated by local 
manufacturers was superseded by the prevalent use of commission agents 
(Horns, 1918: 76). These forerunners of the modern dealer held 
consigned stock for sale or hire in a rigidly-defined territory. They 
were expressly forbidden, at the risk of their own trading margin 
which ranged from five to fifteen per cent, to ask other than fixed 
prices. Though advised to demand cash or notes on delivery, the 
agents also made collections and repossessions. Any interest in 
competing lines was prohibited as was latitude to pledge the 
manufacturer's word, incur expenses on his behalf, or promise delivery 
dates. 
Real change from this principal/agent relationship was delayed by 
the Second World War and the sellers' market which followed. By the 
48 
early 1960s, in accordance with the growing intricacy and cost of 
equipment, most major companies had modified their contracts and 
8 
retreated to a completely wholesale role . Discount margins were 
raised commensurately with enlarged performance obligations, formal 
exclusivity clauses of all types gradually disappeared, consignment 
was virtually abolished, and provision was made for passing title. 
Invoicing was thenceforth directed to the retailer rather than the 
consumer, thus enforcing substantial savings to the supplier. The 
agent became a dealer under what could be construed as a legal vendor/ 
vendee association (Hewitt, 1956: 189). 
Notwithstanding such modifications, the agreements still offered 
ample scope for franchisor control. Considering the environment in 
which agricultural machinery is sold, strong centralised administration 
is probably more necessary than in most other areas of distribution. 
Indeed, its use has been allied closely with a highly-variable demand 
schedule and the development of competitive oligopoly. Such factors, 
in turn, are paramount influences on world and local markets, as 
indicated by succeeding sections. 
THE DEMAND FUNCTION 
Farm mechanisation has led a trend of increased capital substitution 
in advanced agriculture since 1945. Greatly intensified research and 
development has produced dramatic technological improvement, best 
demonstrated in the application of power take-off, assisted steering, 
sophisticated hydraulics, sensing devices, and an ubiquitous upgrading 
of capacity and motive power (Vicas, 1970: 38-44). A Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics (1969: 45-53) study of Australian wheat farms 
reveals the financial import of agricultural equipment; for the 
triennium ending 1966-67, plant and equipment represented nine per cent 
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of the assets and fifty-two per cent of the annual gross value of 
capital increments. Yet, while the quality and size of machinery has 
risen, its price relative to labour and land has fallen (Heady and 
Tweeten, 1963: 265-67). Thus, the adoption of more efficient products 
is being paralleled by emigration of rural workers and substantial 
amalgamation of properties. In Australian primary industries, change 
was initiated by the reconstruction of dairying in 1960 and has been 
since accelerating (Campbell, 1971: 68). 
The demand for agricultural machinery 
Both the growing lumpiness of equipment inputs and the need to 
achieve efficiency and scale economies have made farmers more aware 
of the relative abilities of different goods and their support 
facilities. Users are reacting to a more complicated factor market by 
assuming characteristics of the industrial buyer, requiring specialised 
economic and technical data from salesmen and assurances of readily-
9 
available after-sales and spare parts service . A survey in the 
Canadian broadacre belt suggests that the chief precursors of machinery 
buying are discussions among the farming community, magazine articles 
and demonstrations on neighbours' properties (Segall, 1969: 7-9). Yet, 
the impact of such publicity can remain latent, because purchases of 
capital durables can be frequently postponed until a decline in the 
utility of existing stock or the flow of its services prompts 
replacement action. Alternatively, the desire to improve performance 
and work capacity through a new model might stimulate sales. Given 
the price of equipment relative to other factor inputs, crop returns, 
the discount rate and current level of technology, economic theory 
contends that there exists at any time a stock position which the 
farmer considers optimum. Shifts in any independent varifible will 
necessitate an inventory movement to re-institute equilibrium. 
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Therefore, annual purchases are determined by sensitivity to changed 
conditions. 
Econometricians^*^ have used both stock-adjustment and investment-
flow regression models to identify correlates of demand. A number of 
common features have emerged. An emphasis on the price of machinery 
in relation to a perceived operating criterion (such as labour rates 
or crop prices) reflects the role of expanded educational and 
extension services in broadening the economic foundation of farm 
decisions. In isolation, however, the price elasticity of demand is 
low to moderate and, in all but times of crucial recession, competition 
on this measure is not encouraged by the oligopolists controlling 
supply. Rather, product characteristics and after-sales service are 
emphasized and engender brand conservatism as a serious barrier to 
entry in selling (Conant, 1953: 22; Wadley, 1970: 144). 
The high income elasticity of demand, first postulated by Shearer 
(1951: 412) and Phillips (1956: 93-97), has been pronounced in the 
analyses. In a setback, the relative decrease in equipment turnover 
exceeds any fall in farm revenue. Net earnings are applied initially 
to consumer-goods requirements to maintain living standards. 
Thereafter, loan repayments are met and the more divisible operating 
inputs such as fertilisers bought but, unless a complete breakdown of 
services ensues, machinery buying simply ceases until prospects 
brighten. Much also depends on the association of farm equity to the 
general interest rate and the availability of loans. In the past, 
funding has been derived mainly from accumulated assets but, now, 
commercialisation of agriculture has brought strong participation in 
liquid capital markets (Heady and Tweeten, 1963: 268-69). Since 
credit renders the product less sensitive to price and income changes, 
some major equipment merchandisers have set up finance subsidiaries 
as another form of non-price competition (see Diesslin, 1955: 22-28). 
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Several other factors affecting demand may be noted briefly. At 
least two analyses consider farm size a significant influence on 
demand, reflecting the ongoing thrust for rural rationalisation and 
the role of critical thresholds in investment. Stock levels have a 
bearing, not only in the replacement function, but also in 
precipitating the need for new components for integrated machine-
systems. Governmental subsidy programmes or investment allowances can 
also stimulate sales, as can technological innovation (Allen, 1952: 
351) . 
In sum, demand is highly susceptible to a number of institutional 
parameters, foremost of which is farm income. Its volatility is 
aggravated by structural elements. The effects of seasonality — a 
perennial problem for manufacturers — are compounded in Australia 
because farmers invariably delay purchasing until the crop and price 
outlook is known. To spread production and contain inventory, prior-
season discounts on sales and definite orders are required. Despite 
these incentives, specialised small companies can suffer troughs 
which pose problems in maintaining workloads for staff and dealers 
(Figure 3.1). Throughout the industry, a marketing programme can 
collapse at short notice because of adverse climatic influences, 
leaving retailers with substantial stock carry-over. If extra floor-
planning is not forthcoming from commercial sources, a competitor's 
only option might be a costly intercession to save key dealerships. 
Predicated upon many other fluctuations are long-term cyclical swings, 
to which agricultural industries are especially prone. Apart from the 
usual shifts in the mood of the nation, primary producers and their 
suppliers have to face the hardship caused by fire, flood, drought, 
and commodity surpluses. All these vagaries, seen in relation to the 
complexity and expense of equipment, make the industry one of the 
riskier fields of business endeavour. Two main counters — franchising 
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FIGURE 3.1: Seasonality in wholesale sales, seven selected firms^, 
agricultural machinery industry, Australia, various annual 
observations over period 1967-72. 
a Selected on grounds of data-availability from participant companies in 
Appendix One. 
Source: Fieldwork. 
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in the marketing sector, and product and functional diversification 
in manufacturing — have contributed much to the size and structural 
differentiation critical to the performance of machinery companies 
in recession. 
GLOBAL MARKET STRUCTURE: THE BACKGROUND TO 
CORPORATE OLIGOPOLY 
Technological innovation, in addition to demand inconsistency, has 
been significant in shaping the current form of worldwide production. 
Major development in agricultural equipment began in North America 
in the 1830s with McCormick's reaper and Deere's steel plough^^. In 
the ensuing expansion, patent acquisition was emphasized as a means 
of broadening output ranges; early 'patent pools' gave way to formal 
merger which, by the 1890s, was happening on a massive scale. This 
strategy, which accomplished diversification to cope with the whims 
of the market and realised economies of scale, was seen most spectacularly 
in the emergence of Massey Harris in Canada in 1891 and International 
12 
Harvester in the United States in 1902 . 
After 1900, the advent of the internal combusion engine raised 
entry thresholds in the production and distribution of all major 
machinery groups. By the 1930s, when Ford had pioneered the lightweight 
farm tractor (Conant, 1953: 35) and the combine harvester had been 
developed, only companies with superior reserves were in a position to 
exploit all the benefits of market leadership. Thus, before the 
Second World War, the evolution of the North American industry was 
virtually complete with Massey Harris, International Harvester, Case, 
John Deere, Allis Chalmers, Cockshutt, Oliver, and Minneapolis-Moline 
pre-eminent in the field. Since 1945, despite the strides of long-
line firms such as Ford and New Holland in the United States and 
Leyland, David Brown, Fiat and Claas in Europe, no other company has 
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joined the full-line set. Therefore, postwar free-world trade has 
been ruled by a small clique of oligopolists. For two major lines, 
tractors and harvesting equipment, exactly forty-seven per cent of 
1966 output emanated from the three largest firms; four-fifths came 
from about a dozen enterprises (Table 3.2). Tight concentration 
reduced opportunities to expand penetration or production; combined 
with wavering aggregate demand, it encouraged a multi-national and 
conglomerate disposi tion among the principal undertakings. 
The recoiling world market 
The aggregate value of world exports of farm equipment — 
comprised mainly of higher-priced items — rose by only three per cent 
per annum from 1967 to reach $US2.16 billion in 1971 (Table 3.3). The 
rather desultory progress is reiterated in United Nations production 
statistics. Only one category — seeding and planting implements — 
exhibited any appreciable uplift during the 1960s (Table 3.4). 
Technological issues and agricultixral rationalisation in advanced 
lands (the major consumers) now point to slow growth in the dollar 
volume of total sales but an absolute decrease in the number of goods 
required (Barber, 1971: 76). In many countries including Australia, 
static or declining stocks of machinery on rural holdings augur poorly 
for long-term replacement demand. Similarly, contractors who can 
operate equipment at near-maximum efficiency are playing a greater role 
in the developed lands so that, unless vast new acreages are opened up, 
prospects for the industry in traditional markets are limited. 
Although hopes are held for the emerging nations, their relative 
purchasing power is presently low. In 1966, for example, they received 
only one quarter of the world's equipment exports (Barber, 1971: 259). 
The depressed state of global demand throughout the last decade 
TAIiLt; 3.2: MARKET CONCKNTKAT IONS , MAJOR AGR ICUI/I'U KAI, t-lACll HJl-RY LINKS, 
UNIT PRODUCTION ACTUAL ANU LSTIMATLD, NOtJ-COWlUN I ST COUtlTR I KS , I'JGO 
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Firm Country 
of 
Origin 
Unit Production 
Wlieeled tractors Combine harvesters 
Number 
(tliousands) Percentage 
tlumlier 
(tliousands) Percentage 
Allis Chalmers U.S.A. 15.50 1 .91 9.00 7.31 
Bolinder-Munktoll Sweden - - 4 .90 4.00 
Brand n. a. - - 3. 30 2.68 
David Brown Britain 18.00 2.22 - _ 
Case U.S.A. 17.50 2.16 4 .80 3.90 
Claas Germany - - 22 .00 17.87 
Clayson (New Holland) U.S.A. - - 10.00 8.12 
John Deere U.S.A. 78.00 9.64 15.00 12.18 
Deutz Germany 17.00 2.11 - -
Fiat Italy 41 . 50_ 5.13 - -
Ford U.S.A. 118.40'^ 14.63 - -
International Harvester U.S.A. 108.00 13.34 11 .00 8.94 
Leyland Britain 15.00 1.H5 a -
Massey Ferguson Canada 153.80 19.00 21 .40 17.38 
Minneapolis Moline U.S.A. 7.00 0.86 -
Oliver (Cockshutt) U.S.A. 15.00" 1 .85 4.00 3.25 
Renault/Porsche France 19.00 2. 35 - -
Valonet Fi 111 and 4 .00 0.49 - -
Versatile U.S.A. - - 0.50 0.40 
Volvo Sweden 14.70'' 1 .82 - -
Other (known companies) u. a. 9.40'' 1 . 16 - -
Other (unidentified) n. a. 157.20 19.50 17.20 13.97 
Total non-communist 809.50 100.00 123.10 100.00 
countries 
a Actual figures, remainder cstimales. 
Source: Barber (1971: 132, 144). 
TABLE 3.3: EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY Al-iD TRACTORS, I-IAJOR TRADING NATIONS, 1967-71 
($US billion) 
Year 
Ending 
December 
Canada United States Japan E.E.C.^ Britain 
Other ^ 
E.F.T.A. 
Other 
Europe 
O.E.C.D.*^ 
Total 
O.E.C.D. 
Nations 
Australia 
and , d Otners 
Estimated 
VJorld® 
Total 
Exports 
1967 0.17 0.61 0.05 0.53 0.34 0.11 0.02 1.83 0.01 1.84 
1968 0.15 0.63 0.05 0.63 0.33 0.12 0.02 1.93 0.01 1.94 
1969 0.16 0.64 0.05 0.69 0.38 0.14 0.02 2.08 0.01 2.09 
1970 0.16 0.63 0.07 0.76 0.38 0.15 - 2.15 0.01 2.16 
1971 0.18 0.60 0.09 0.69 0.43 0.16 
1 
- 2.15 0.01 2.16 
a • EEC: Belgium, Luxembourg, Genriany, France, Italy. 
b Other EFTA: Norvay, Sweden, Denmark, Finland (after 1969), Austria, Switzerland, Portugal, Iceland, Ireland, Spain, 
Greece, Turkey. 
c Other Europe OECD: Yugoslavia. 
d Rounded estimate. 
e Including countries as defined. 
Sources: (i) Trade by Commodities, Market Summ.aries, Series C, Volume 3, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Paris (years 1967-71). 
(ii) World Trade Annual, Voliime 5, [Statistical Office of the United Nations], Walker & Co., New York 
(years 1967-70). 
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TABLE 3.4: PRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY BY TYPE, NON-COMMUNIST 
COUNTRIES, 1961-70 
(Million units) 
Year P]oughs 
Other 
Tillage 
Equipment 
Seeders 
Planters 
Combine 
Harvesters Threshers 
Milking 
Machines 
Tractors 
over 10 hp. 
1961 0.85 1.39 0.20 0.10 0.35 0.17 0.60 
1962 0.91 1.21 0.20 0.11 0.34 0.15 0.61 
1963 0.78 1.23 0.25 0.12 0.35 0.13 0.63 
1964 0.77 1.28 0.32 0.14 0.36 0.14 0.66 
1965 0.85 1.25 0.40 0.15 0.40 0.14 0.67 
1966 0.91 1.35 0.40 0.17 0.42 0.12 0.73 
1967 0.90 1.39 0.44 0.15 0.44 0.12 0.67 
1968 0.66 1.22 0.51 0.13 0.44 0.11 0.69 
1969 0.67 1.35 0.66 0.12 0.35 0.10 0.72 
1970 0.65 1.25 0.70 0.15 0.26 0.09 0.73 
Source: The Growth of World Industry 1970 Edition [Volume 2, Commodity 
Production Data 1961-70], Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
United Nations, New York, 1972, pp. 375-82. 
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resulted in a drive for operating efficiencies which impinged on 
Australia even before the immediate rural crisis. 
The struggle for economies of scale 
Significant economies of scale attend the manufacture of most 
classes of agricultural machinery and form an distinct barrier to 
13 14 entry . A recent Canadian Royal Commission revealed that, as 
volume i n a specialised plant climbs from twenty to ninety thousand 
tractors per year, unit production costs fall by nineteen per cent; 
header supply offers comparable savings as a factory's output rises 
from five to twenty thousand deliveries. In both cases, return on 
investment is greater in the more sizeable operation (Barber, 1971: 
85-107). Thus, from the Canadian evidence, larger installations appear 
to maximise efficiency. In theory, only nine establishments would 
have been necessary to make the 809,500 tractors required by the 
non-communist regions in 1966 assuming that all the available scale 
economies were utilised (Table 3.2). However, not even the largest 
concern (Massey Ferguson) had a works of the supposedly-optimal ninety 
thousand unit annual throughput. Only five firms achieved the twenty 
thousand level which the Commission held to be the lower limit for 
a •plant of 'efficient' size. Header manufacturing afforded even more 
scope for rationalisation. In 1966, the German Claas enterprise alone 
reached the twenty thousand annual unit output determined as the 
minimum for 'efficiency' (Schwartzman; 1970: 83). Hence, in both these 
major product areas, substantial worldwide economies were realisable, 
but were precluded by excess capacity, prevailing competition and lack 
of expansion in demand^^. 
In this dilemma, three courses were open to participating 
corporations, depending upon their structure, needs and age (cf. Steed, 
1971c: 55). 
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(i) Functional diversification. As an example of the many 
organisations which adopted a conglomerate disposition, 
Massey Ferguson increased its participation in industrial 
and construction lines from ten to fourteen per cent of 
aggregate sales turnover in the ten years after 1957 
(Martinusen and Barry, 1970: 9; see also Mautz, 1968). 
(ii) Manufacturing and administrative rationalisation. During the 
1960s, centralisation of production was required as much by 
a proliferation of models and options as by the move for 
economies of scale — it simply became infeasible to 
duplicate all product varieties at every plant. Control in 
the industry was also focused by a series of takeovers such 
as that of Oliver (1960), Cockshutt (1962), and Minneapolis-
Moline (1963) by the White Motor Corporation (Barber, 1971: 
46). In addition, co-operative distribution arrangements 
were established by non-competing firms in certain countries. 
(iii) Geographical expansion. Through this policy, enterprises 
acquired a multi-national role (cf. Steed, 1971d: 90). Local 
operations-units thus became responsible for domestic 
production and marketing but were subject to head-office 
co-ordination in other matters. The search for new outlets 
made Massey Ferguson and its peers the foremost influences 
in machinery supply in both North America and Europe and 
also in most other non-communist areas. 
All these strategies reflected the weight of scale factors in an 
over-subscribed market. Yet, postwar Australian supply was most affected 
by the third (geographical expansion), since an influx of overseas 
corporations between 1955 and 1965 changed the nature of competition 
and paved the way for some of the more drastic repercussions of the 
rural setback. These impacts are examined after consideration of 
pertinent features of the domestic situation prior to 1967. 
THE AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY: 
A TALE OF DIVERSITY 
Wide variations in the corporate and geographical characteristics of 
equipment suppliers at the beginning of the recession can be ultimately 
traced to the industry's antecedents among the blacksmiths and 
wheelwrights of a pioneer economy (cf. Wheelhouse, 1966). Three main 
chronological phases distinguish the foundation and spatial decision-
making of the major manufacturers of farm machinery — one of the 
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country's oldest forms of secondary production (Bernasek and Kubinski, 
1963: 463). 
The first stage was one of initial expansion and lasted until 
about 1900. Through innovative adaptation to large scale and, often, 
rugged conditions, Victorian and South Australian entrepreneurs 
engineered the rise of several prominent factories. In response to 
a location offering ready access to the expanding Mallee cereal-growing 
areas, the industry gravitated towards Victoria. By 1910, the State 
was delivering nearly half the nation's value of machinery output. 
The interwar period, constituting the second era, was marked by 
consolidation and expansion within the existing framework (Table 3.5). 
Despite the economic turbulence of the time, significant policies 
which virtually determined postwar patterns of heavy manufacturing were 
made. Tariff variations prompted the merger of Massey Harris with 
H.V. McKay of Melbourne in 1930, thus linking a Canadian giant with 
Australia's largest seller (Neufeld, 1969: 148). Further, the 
completion of the International Harvester works at Geelong (Victoria) 
in 1939 allowed the first integrated production of tractors in 
Australia. 
Following the Second World War, excess demand for machinery 
stimulated the entry of small manufacturers and repairers whose 
sporadic location and siabsequent growth compounded such diversity as 
already existed. Together with the spate of distributorships negotiated 
by international concerns, they caused a proliferation of establishments 
which became the hallmark of the industry's third phase of development 
(Table 3.5)^^. In the mid-1950s and early 1960s, the lull in the 
world market, Australia's benign political climate and favourable 
long-term sales prospects encouraged foreign corporations to convert 
these outlets into branches. Most new entrants took up light 
industrial operations and assumed administrative control from former 
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TABLE 3.5: GROWTH ON SELilCTED PARAMETERS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
AUSTRALIA, 1910-68 
Year 
Ending 
June 
Factories^ Employees Value of Output 
Value of 
Production 
(Value 
Added] 
Commentary 
(nun iber) ($A millJ deflatec 
[on, non-
i series) 
1910 150 4868 3.12 1.64 
1915 153 3606 2.60 1.27 
1920 141 3116 2.56 1.39 
1925 153 5535 6.57 3.28 
1930 140 4463 4.79 2.82 General depression 
1935 139 4202 3.94 2.07 
1940 108 6379 5.67 2.52 Wartime production 
1945 146 9149 13.18 7.17 
1950 208 10454 28.37 13.97 Postwar sales boom 
1955 308 12182 57.65 29.11 
1960 404 11359 70. 35 33.69 
1961 450 11307 69.86 33.74 
1962 497 11317 74. 34 36.32 
1963 533 11785 80.18 39.63 
1964 566 13786 102.93 49.62 Short-term boom 
59.17 in rural 1965 615 15582 117.37 industry 
1966 671 15069 105.08 56.02 
1967 725 15280 126.93 69.66 
1968 764 15759 131.81 69.41 
a See Footnote Sixteen. 
Sources: (1) Australia, Conunoiiwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 
Official Year Book of the Comm(.)nwealth of Australia, various 
issues, 19iO-G8. 
(ii) Unpublished data for 1962-68 supplied by the Manufacturing 
Industries Division, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 
Canberra. 
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assembler/distributors. Leyland (formerly Nuffield), Case, Allis 
Chalmers, David Brown and Fiat selected head-office sites in Sydney. 
By contrast, John Deere and New Holland chose Melbourne — the latter 
acquiring a substantial fabricating plant at Dandenong. 
Aftermath of the influx 
Australian machinery demand is deceptively small by world 
standards, despite this country's vast areal expanse. Although 
overseas products had been on sale since the end of the Second World 
War, the insurgence of actively-competing organisations caused 
a si±)stantial degree of market fragmentation^^. In the late 1950s, 
three contestants — Ferguson, Ford and International Harvester — 
were dominant. By 1966, companies less than fifteen years old accounted 
for well over one quarter of tractor turnover and enjoyed appreciable 
success in haymaking and harvesting deliveries. 
In all sectors of the industry, returns were generally low over 
the 1960s apart from the peak year of 1963-64 (Table 3.6). Given 
their poor profit record, the tenacity of fledgling subsidiaries 
could be explained in three ways. 
(i) To large corporations, marginal results were insignificant 
and could be offset against anticipated long-term 
profitability and the advantages of entry into 
a politically-safe market in the face of declining world 
demand (cf. Hunter, 1963: 15). 
(ii) Import prices were so adjusted as to create factory profits 
in areas with more favourable taxation. (Several other 
intra-organisational reasons could have contributed to 
a decision to limit returns to Australian operations.) 
(iii) Many new businesses perform badly until the overheads of 
establishment are taken up in sales volume. 
Whatever the reason — and, probably, the first had strong relevance 
in a majority of cases — the addition of two more distributorships 
18 and absence of any notable amalgamations between 1963 and 1968 
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TABLE 3,6: SELECTED INDICATORS OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY AND AGGREGATE MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1964-65 TO 1966-67^ 
Measure 
Median of Seventeen Large 
Agricultural Machinery 
Manufacturers 
Aggregate 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 
Operating profit/ 
funds employed 
(per cent) 
10.10 9.10 12.10 11.50 10.20 10.60 
Sales/funds 
employed 
(ratio) 
1.25 1.09 1 . 30 1.50 1.45 1.35 
a The only period during the 1960s for which this type of data is available. 
Sources: (i) Agricultuial machinery industry: 
Australia [Tariff BoardJ (1970: 80-81) 
(ii) Aggregate manufacturing industry: 
Australia [Tariff Board](1972: 14). 
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pushed the number of available international tractor brands to 
fifteen. Twelve header lines were actively promoted. As sales of 
1 Q 
each product in 1967 were 17,871 and 4,424 units respectively , it 
is obvious that the supply/demand equation was precariously balanced 
even before the recession. Thus, through a combination of short and 
long-term causes, global excess capacity began to pressure inventory 
into the constrained Australian market and created an explosive 
situation in which certain companies were finally overwhelmed. 
The broad impact of market recession 
The agricultural equipment industry is going 
through the biggest discounting period in its 
history, as manufactiarers and distributors seek 
to maintain their share of a shrinking market 
...there are no signs of an early resumption to 
more normal production levels (The Australian 
Financial Review, 17 September 1970) 
Before analysing the corporate behaviour of selected organisations, 
the overall effects of the farm crisis on the agricultural equipment 
industry should be summarised. 
(i) Tractor and machinery imports (f.o.b. port of shipment) into 
Australia peaked at $A72.43 million in 1968, suggesting 
a high level of inventory formation before the recession. 
Over the next three years, the value of overs^gs receipts 
tumbled sixty-one per cent to $A28.02 million . Only 
a marginal recovery occurred as conditions improved in 1972. 
(ii) Wholesale machinery deliveries, on a unit count, fell by an 
average of forty-five per cent in every major class between 
1967 and l^p (Table 3.7). Sectoral effects assumed great 
importance . In accordance with the income elasticity 
hypothesis, higher-value items such as seeding and grain-
harvesting machines were the hardest hit. Tillage needs 
declined in concert with the total fall but haymaking lines, 
in response to diversification into livestock, performed 
relatively well. 
(iii) Machinery stocks, though perhaps a less reliable indicator 
of change than deliveries, show a decisive pattern over the 
study period (Table 3.8). Maximum inventory was attained 
before 1970; minimum holdings were recorded in 1972. The 
lag in movements in 1969-70 shows that a certain amount of 
hedging as to the outcome of the downturn took place as 
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TABLE 3.7: DELIVERIES OF NEW AGRICULTUI^L MACHINERY, UNITS BY YEAR, 
AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Type of Product Year L:iiding June Simple 
Equipment Percentage 
ChaiiQe 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1967-72 
Tillage Disc ploughs 4878 5279 4798 2169 1773 1867 -63.66 
Rippers a 1810 1505 1431 1091 1123 -39.73^ 
Chisel ploughs 1123 a 823 676 498 490 -55.56 
Mouldboard ploughs 827 957 771 694 650 416 -21.41 
Tine harrows 63322 62645 50115 22541 20598 30805 -67.47 
(sections) 
Disc and other harrows a 5532 4269 4610 3872 3992 -30.Ol'^ 
Tine cultivators 8060 7886 7355 4054 3677 4597 -54.38 
Rotary cultivators 4181 4094 4038 3578 3435 4351 -17.85 
Average -43.77 tillage 
Seeding Drills (all types) 5341 6223 5091 2197 1353 1877 -74.67^ 
Fertilizer spreaders a 4514 3834 3507 2695 3306 -40.30 
Average -57.49 seeding 
Haymaking Pick-up balers 2907 2075 2354 1828 1080 1088 -62.85 
Forage harvesters 742 620 382 490 316 188 -57.41 
Mowers (rotary) 4855 4532 3666 4912 4621 5190 -4.82 
Mowers (other) a 3279 3425 2363 1766 1269 -46.44 
Hay rakes 3689 2336 2744 2201 1817 a -50.75 
Windrowers a 80 a a 59 25 -26.25^^ 
Bale loaders a 1369 a 1448 1155 922 -15.63 
Bale elevators a 918 1388 922 797 541 -13.18^ 
Average -34.67 
haymaking 
Harvesting Headers (auto) 1873 2156 2028 812 461 531 -75.39 
Headers (drawn) 2552 a 1964 675 382 538 -85.03 
Average -80.21 
harvesting 
Other Cane harvesters a 248 242 315 218 216 -12.10^^ h 
Grain augers a 4630 4920 5459 1585 2069 -65.77 
Posthole diggers 2773 2481 2173 1924 1180 1180 -57.48 
HajTimer mills 1410 1240 1010 1066 910 970 -35.46 
Average -42.69 
other 
All -44.73 
machinery 
a Not available in original data, 
b 19G8-72 change. 
Source: Australia, ConHtionwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, New Agricultural 
Machinery Statistics, [Ref. 12.1], various issues, 1967-72. 
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TABLE 3.8: STOCKS OF NEW AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, UNITS BY YEAR, 
AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Type of Product Year Ending June Simple Equipment Percentage 
^ 1 ICtl c 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1967-72 
Tillage Disc ploughs 2516 2583 1921 1841 1504 630 - 4 0 . 2 3 ^ 
Rippt rs a 4 0 3 236 415 326 218 -19.ll'' 
Chise], ploughs a a a a a a n.a. 
iMoulcll,;oard ploughs 651 708 533 450 314 151 - 5 1 . 7 7 
Tine harrows 6157 7965 8695 20299 9768 1839 - 3 6 . 9 7 
(3t!Cl:ions) 
Disc and other harrows a a a a a a n.a. 
Tine cultivators 4724 4201 3661 3777 2613 1577 - 4 4 . 6 9 
Rotary cultivators 1606 2086 2173 1611 1139 1371 - 2 9 . 0 8 
Average 
- 3 6 . 9 8 tillage 
Seeding Dj-ills (all types) 475 a a a a a n.a. 
Fertilizer spreaders a 1733 1484 1049 646 a n.a. 
Average 
seeding n.a. 
Haymaking PLck-up balers 713 812 680 760 478 244 - 3 2 . 9 6 
Forage harvesters 161 264 159 134 69 41 - 5 7 . 1 4 
Mow( r;3 (rotary) 541 1908 2901 1601 1271 1008 + 1 3 4 . 9 3 ^ 
Mowf ra (other) a 2412 1995 1344 1264 671 - 4 7 . 6 0 ^ 
IKiy rakes 885 1683 1378 1112 724 a - 1 8 . 1 9 ^ 
Windcowers a 61 66 88 64 50 + 0 . 0 5 ^ 
Bale loaders a 367 151 273 138 a - 6 2 . 4 0 ^ 
Bale elevators a 272 214 374 138 94 - 4 9 . 2 6 ^ 
Average 
- 1 6 . 5 7 haymaking 
Harvesting Headers (auto) 400 744 549 905 655 322 + 6 3 . 7 5 
Headers (drawn) 261 415 593 636 421 174 + 6 1 . 9 9 
Average 
+ 6 2 . 8 7 harvesting 
Other Cane harvesters a a 31 13 a a n.a. 
Grain augers a 1230 1400 626 580 303 - 5 2 . 8 5 ^ 
Posthole diggers 385 545 338 430 397 147 +0 .03 
Hainmer mills 393 342 369 179 103 112 - 7 3 . 8 0 
Average 
- 4 2 . 2 0 other 
a Not available in original data, 
b 1968-72 change. 
Source: Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, New Agricultural 
Machinery Statistics, [Ref. 12.1], various issues, 1967-72. 
67 
distinct f^^m the normal long cycle of production 
scheduling . Nevertheless, stock run-down by 1972 was 
considerable. 
While the above measures point out difficulties in the machinery sector, 
they say little of the tractor market. Here, optimism appears to have 
been the keynote. Just after the 1964 boom, W.F. Baillie, writing in 
The Australian Financial Review (12 February 1965), had predicted 
agricultural requirements of twenty thousand units per annum in 
a total market of twenty-four thousand with a three per cent growth 
rate. Simultaneously, International Harvester had estimated that, 
subject to 'normal' economic circumstances, demand would climb from 
23 
twenty to twenty-six thousand units by 1969-70 . Such hopes were 
dashed as sales failed to recover from the 1967-68 drought and, over 
the following two years, crashed thirty-one per cent to their lowest 
since 1956 (Figure 3.2). The severity of the situation warranted 
a doubling of the 1966 bounty rate on domestic farm tractor production 
by the Commonwealth Government as an 'urgent short-term measure in the 24 face of overseas competition' . A full-scale hearing on this segment 
of industry was conducted in May 1971, in which grim forecasts of the 
25 
future of local suppliers were made . Ford's predictions indicate 
the general gloom of the period (Figure 3.2). The halcyon days of 
1963-64 were long past as some companies came into dire financial 
straits, with forced closure of wholesale facilities and atrophy in 
dealer networks commonplace. In this manner, the incipient crisis 
began to impinge on spatial decision-making, as shown in the later 
analysis of the recession's ramifications on sample firms selected in 
Chapter Four. 
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FIGURE 3.2: Tractor market, actual and 
estimated, Australia, 1960-75. 
Sources: (i) Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics, Receipts, Sales and Stocks of New 
Tractors, [Ref: 12.18], various issues, 1960-73 
(ii) Ford data from The Australian Financial Review, 
21 May 1971. 
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RESUME 
A rural market contraction in the late 1960s prompted this study of 
the Australian agricultural machinery industry. Product franchising 
is well ensconced as a shield against the vagaries of the demand 
function. In manufacturing, producers have diversified their ranges 
to smooth seasonal and cyclical influences. This long-held strategy 
has been largely responsible for the conglomerate, oligopolistic 
nature of world supply, within which a niimber of major corporations 
dominate the trade of most countries. By the mid-1960s, the global 
market for farm equipment had been static or declining for some time. 
Many new enterprises saw good sales possibilities in Australia and 
established branches throughout the period 1955-65. Within the local 
industry, demand was over-estimated and the resulting excess capacity, 
fragmentation, and stock accumulation left an open flank for the 
economic attack. An account of the effects on company distribution 
policy and practice must await the necessary grouping of chosen 
combatants in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER THREE FOOTNOTES 
1. Newspaper articles are drawn upon heavily in this Chapter. 
Often, they are the only reference source available. They also 
influenced much producer and consumer decision-making during the 
recession era. See also Campbell (1969, 1971); Committee for the 
Economic Development of Australia (1971); Davidson (1971); Australia 
[Bureau of Agricultural Economics] (1973a, 1973b). 
2. For more information on the wheat industry, see Campbell (1969). 
There is also a prophetic series of fortnightly articles by E.J. Donath 
in The Australian Financial Review, commencing 2 October 1964. Annual 
reports of the Australian Wheat Board advance further information. 
3. Campbell (1971: 72); Irwin (1971: 31). 
4. In 1971, the rural gross debt/liquid asset ratio reached 2.51 
(Table 3.1). Trading banks, pastoral houses and other financiers 
became concerned at the number of farmers who could not service their 
debts, let alone repay the principal. They reacted by applying 
stringent conditions on loan applications. See The Australian 
Financial Review, 22 July 1970; also Australia [Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics] (1972). 
5. As shown in various issues of Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of 
Census and Statistics, Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, the area under wheat in Australia had climbed from 4.93 
million hectares in 1959-60 to 8.43 million in 1966-67. Following 
further moves into climatically-marginal regions and intensification 
of landuse on existing farms, it rocketed to 10.85 million hectares 
in 1968-69, only to be cut to 6.48 million by the rural crisis of 
1970-71. PusVied by the wheat expansion, aggregate areas under crop 
exhibited a similar movement — from 10.57 million hectares in 1959-60, 
to 16.02 and 18.99 million in 1966-67 and 1968-69 respectively, and 
then back to 15.96 million in 1970-71. 
6. The concern of farmers culminated in a ten thousand strong 
protest march in Melbourne. See The Sun [Melbourne], 24 March 1970; 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 March 1970. 
7. About a dozen major studies of the recent Canadian Royal Commission 
on Farm Machinery are referenced in Barber (1971) . Several theses are 
available — Shearer (1951); Eckles (1953); Schwartz (1966); Wadley 
(1970). Published works include those of Phillips (1956), Wheelhouse 
(1966) and Neufeld (1969). Significant articles have been prepared 
by Zimmermann (1951: 156-75); Conant (1953); Phillips (1958); 
Whitney (1958: 227-56); Slater (1960); Bernasek and Kubinski (1963); 
Phillips (1966); Staiger (1970). A report by Pothecary (1970) offers 
an interesting outside view on the Australian market during the 
recession. Finally, papers by Lier (1971) and McLean (1973) reflect 
a growing concern with agricultural mechanisation. 
8. A search was conducted nationally through tiie rural press for old 
franchise agreements. It was unsuccessful and most material in this 
section was compiled from documents in company archives. Assistance in 
historical research proffered by Mr C. Crennan of John Crennan and Co. 
of Henty, New South Wales, and by Mr O.M. Gainger of International 
Harvester is particularly appreciated. 
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9. See Industrial Marketing Committee Review Board (1954); Wilson 
(1965, 1968: 12-14). 
10. Cromarty (1959); Griliches (I960); Heady and Tweeten (1963); 
Rayner and Cowling (1967, 1968). See also a resume in Wadley (1970: 
18-27). 
11. See Shearer (1951); Eckles (1953); Schwartz (1966). 
12. For the merger of Massey Harris, see Neufeld (1969: 19); that of 
International Harvester is described in United States of America 
[Department of Commerce and Labor] (1913: 39-93); Eckles (1952: 
97-109); Barber (1971: 38). 
13. Bain (1954, 1956); Whitney (1958: 238-39). 
14. See the reference in Footnote Seven. 
15. Australia's domestic production of tractors and headers is highly 
fragmented. Tractor manufacturing, with an output of less than five 
thousand units per year, is a high-cost operation despite its 
horizontal integration with other lines. Its viability depends on 
a government bounty which approximates five to fifteen per cent of the 
retail value of the average product. Concerning headers, an enquiry 
in 1970 noted: 
manufacture of [self-propelled] headers involves 
considerable investment in plant and large 
expenditure on research and development. The 
level of output... achieved by local producers... 
is small in relation to that...of most overseas 
manufacturers...The limited scale of local 
production constitutes the greatest basic 
disability facing local manufacturers (Australia 
[Tariff Board], 1970: 11). 
16. The 'factory' statistics portrayed in Table 3.5 include both 
manufacturers and repairers of agricultural machinery (including 
tractors). It could be assumed that about two-thirds of these entries 
were of minor production importance. In 1968-69, statistical 
collection was undertaken with the new Census of Eoonomia Activity for 
the first time. A.S.I.C. category 3331 — 'establishments mainly 
engaged in manufaotuving agricultural machinery or equipment including 
tractors for agricultural purposes (except crawler tractors)' — 
covered only 267 facilities at 30 June 1969. This break in the 
statistical series is unfortunate but unavoidable. See Australia, 
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Classification and 
Classified List of Industries, Canberra, 1966; Australian Standard 
Industrial Classification (Preliminary Edition), Canberra, 1969; also. 
Manufacturing Establishments: Details of Operations by Industry Class, 
Australia, Economic Censuses 1968-69, [Ref. 12.29], Canberra, 1973. 
17. See The Australian Financial Review, 21 November 1968. 
18. In 1968, Thiess Equipment Distributors took over the Oliver and 
Minneapolis-Moline lines from another firm and imported SAME tractors 
and Arbos headers from Italy; in the same year, Australian Motor 
Industries began distribution of the Czechoslovakian Zetor and British 
Muir-Hill tractor ranges. 
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19. See Figure 3.2; Table 3.7. 
20. Australia, CommonwealtJi Bureau of Census and Statistics, Overseas 
Trade, Major Groups of Countries, [Ref, 8.14], Canberra, (various 
years, 1967-72). 
21. See The Australian Financial Review, 11 December 1969. 
22. See The Australian Financial Review, 12 May 1970. 
23. See The Australian, 30 June 1955. 
24. See The Australian Financial Review, 17 September 1970. Subject 
to certain qualifying conditions, the manufacturer of a locally-
sourced agricultural tractor over twenty horsepower could claim between 
$A1,040 and $A1,600, (or about twenty per cent of the retail value of 
the product) as bounty reimbursement under the Agricultural Tractors 
Bounty Act 1970 [No. 86, 19 70]. More information about the bounty and 
its recipients is detailed in Chapter Five. 
25. Australia [Tariff Board] (1972). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SELECTION AND CLASSIFICATION OF FIRMS IN 
A HETEROGENEOUS INDUSTRY 
In 1967, the 725 listed farm equipment establishments in Australia^ 
engaged over fifteen thousand workers (Table 4.1). Though still more 
labour-intensive than the secondary sector as a whole, the industry 
had seen its ratio of employees per factory fall from sixty-three in 
1945 to twenty-one at the beginning of the study period (cf. Table 
3,5). To compensate, capitalisation had risen sharply and the average 
plant was able to deliver goods to the value of $A0.18 million. 
Nonetheless, an aggregate output of $A126.93 million left machinery 
merchants a distinctly small segment of national manufacturing — 
their contribution on this measure represented only about 0.08 per cent 
of the total. 
This broad picture, however, conceals the high degree of 
heterogeneity which characterised the major suppliers. Indeed, any 
attempt to consider the part of company structural attributes 
expressed through channel management capacities in affecting the spatial 
representation and market and financial performance of franchising 
corporations in recession must first overcome this obstacle. The 
course adopted here restricts the enquiry to a sample of nineteen 
firms, which are allocated into 'large' and 'small' sets using 
computer-based techniques. Then, in a commentary on the classifications' 
results, a brief background to each group is given in preparation for 
the forthcoming analyses of their behaviour between 1967 and 1972. 
TABLE 4.1: II.'TERSTATE DIFFERENTIALS, AGRICULTURAL MACHIK^RY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1966-67 
Measure Unit 
State or Territory 
Total 
Australia New 
South 
Kales 
Victoria Queensland 
i 
1 
South 
! Australia 
Ivestern 
Australia Tasmania 
Northern 
Territory 
Australian 
Capital 
Territory 
Number of factories Number 236 205 127 84 61 11 n.a. - 725 
Number of employees NuiTiber 2728 6879 2778 2146 759 n. a. n.a. - 15360 
Value of production SA thousand 13630 32240 10510 9800 3270 n.a. n.a. - 69660 
Value of output $A thousand 22950 59170 21620 16190 6600 n. a. n.a. - 126930 
Value of plant and SA thousand 2160 10190 2790 2320 610 n.a. n.a. 18120 
machinery 
Value of land and SA thousand 8110 12740 4900 2860 1710 n.a. n.a. _ 30530 
buildings 
1 
Source: Unp-oblished data from the Annual Factory Census 1966-67; computer tabulations held at Manufacturing Industries Division, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra. 
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A COUNTER TO THE HETEROGENiaTY (PROBLEM 
On the eve of the rural crisis, machinery production in Australia 
displayed an unusual degree of concentration and dispersion. In one 
sense, it was manifested in the inter and intra-regional distribution 
of factories. On a count of fixed assets, Victoria was the premier 
State with an investment double that of its nearest rival. New South 
Wales (Table 4.1). But a few large metropolitan organisations were 
pre-eminent in both regions. Queensland, whose sizeable concerns 
served lucrative opportunities in the sugar fields, ranked third while 
South Australia, in which three leading brand-names predominated, was 
in fourth place (see Kelly, 1962: 124-29). Further localisation was 
prescribed in Western Australia, where one supplier — Chamberlain — 
accounted for more than half the output. 
A parallel to these physical differentials lay in the 
oligopolistic structure of manufacturing. As a consequence of initial 
advantage and the stimulus of foreign capital, three per cent of 
establishments engaged fifty-six per cent of the industry's workforce 
and delivered almost fifty-nine per cent of the value of both 
production and output (Table 4.2). Such concentration, slightly more 
exaggerated than in the rest of Australian secondary production, was 
itself a prime cause of heterogeneity; yet, it was abetted by the 
widespread horizontal integration through which major companies 
accommodated unreliable demand schedules. Although no formal statistics 
on the multi-faceted interests of the 725 member firms are available, 
interview discussions and empirical observation revealed that many large 
sellers, like their counterparts overseas, had assumed conglomerate 
status. Thus, at first sight, the marketing of farm equipment in 1967 
affords a somewhat bewildering situation. . 
TABLE 4.2: STRUCTURAL MEASURES OF CONCENTRATION BY FACTORY SIZE, AGRICULTURAL 
MACHINERY AND AGGREGATE I-IANLTACTURING INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1966-67 
Industry 
Factory Size (Employees per Establishment) 
measui e 
Less than Twenty-one Fifty-one to Over one Total twenty to fifty one hundred hundred 
Agricultural Percentage of establishments 86.07 8.55 2.62 2.76 100.00 
machinery Percentage of employees 22.61 12.95 8.73 55.71 100.00 
Percentage of value of 20.59 12.40 8.34 58.67 100.00 
production 
Percentage of value of output 19.66 13.16 9.87 57.31 100.00 
Aggregate Percentage of establishjnents 83.71 9.30 3.57 3.42 100.00 
manufacturing Percentage of employees 21.57 13.92 11.87 52.64 100.00 industry 
Percentage of value of 17.46 12.84 11.50 58.20 100.00 
production 
Percentage of value of output 15.39 12.06 11.42 61.13 100.00 
Source: Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Manufacturing Industry, [Bulletin No. 4, 
1966-67], Canberra, 1969, various pages. 
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Since the bulk of an oligopoly's deliveries is handled by a few 
principal marketers, the core of its experience in an economic 
contraction can be distilled among a small sample of its high-echelon 
members. The procedure's inherent bias can be overlooked in this 
instance because the concern here is not with representing the 
agricultural machinery industry per se; the topic constitutes a test 
case set within a framework of product franchising in order to 
spotlight processes and relationships of business spatial decision-
making. Selectivity is not only a pragmatic course given present 
constraints; it also tackles heterogeneity from the outset by 
reducing the chances of variance among companies under review. 
Operational sampling 
Conventional sampling procedures could not be employed in this 
study because it is impossible to -identify, let alone obtain 
individual information on the producers which the Commonwealth Bureau 
of Census and Statistics claimed to constitute the equipment sector. 
Moreover, published data would not indicate which employed franchising 
as their main form of marketing. The circumstances called for a more 
practical approach — the recognition of nineteen firms which, 
according to industry intelligence, collectively sold the majority of 
2 
output (Table 4.3). The threshold for inclusion of any organisation 
into the sample was that it: (a) acted within a recognisable corporate structure; 
(b) purported to be a franchisor or adhered to a definable 
product franchising system; 
(c) was represented in at least New South Wales, Victoria and 
South Australia (the intensive retail study area); 
(d) had average annual machinery sales of $A0.50 million or more; 
TABLE 4.3: SELECTED ATTRIBUTES OF SAMPLE FIRMS, AGRICL'LTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967 
Operating Firm Head Office Location Origin 
Longevity 
i n 1 9 6 7 ® 
(years) 
Style of Production j Farm Equipment Product Range 
j 
Alfarm Distributors Pty Ltd Albury, N.S.W. Australia 1 2 Importer 
1 
Claas harvesting machinery 
Allis Chalmers Australia Pty Ltd Sydney United States 2 1 
1 
Importer Tractors, tillage and 
harvesting equipment 
Australian Motor Industries Ltd .Melbourne Australia 1 Importer Zetor, Muir-Hill tractors 
J.I. Case (Australia) Pty Ltd Sydney United States 6 7 Importer/manufacturer Tractors 
Chamberlain Industries Pty Ltd Perth Australia 2 0 Importer/manufacturer Tractors, all major machinery 
Connor Shea £. Co. Pty Ltd Melbourne Australia 1 5 Manufacturer Tillage, seeding equipment 
Fiat of Australia Pty Ltd Sydney Italy 2 2 
1 
1 Importer Tractors 
Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd .Melbourne United States 4 2 Importer Tractors, selected equipment 
Horwood Bagshaw Ltd Adelaide j Australia 1 3 0 Manufacturer Fiat tractors (S.A. only), 
major eq-jipment 
Howard Rotovator Pty Ltd Sydney 
1 
: Britain j 1 7 Importer/manufacturer | Tillage, seeding and hayrr.aking 
equipment 
International Harvester Co. of i Melbourne 1 United States 6 5 Importer/manufacturer ! Tractors and all lines of 
Australia Pty Ltd machinery 
Leyland of Australia Ltd Sydney 
i 
j Britain 1 7 Importer Tractors 
Ralph McKay Ltd Melbourne j Australia 3 5 Manufacturer Tillage, seeding, specialised 
machinery, corpone.'-.ts 
Massey Ferguson (Australia) Ltd Melbourne 
i 
Canada 8 2 
j 
Importer/manufacturer ' Tractors and all lines of 
machinery 
Mobilco Ltd Melbourne Australia 2 2 j 
1 
Importer/manufacturer | ] Tractors, general, and r.ay-m.akinc lines 
.New Holland Division of Sperry .Meibourne United States 2 2 Import er/m,anufacturer Ha\—.aking, harvesting machinery 
Rand Australia Ltd i 
i 
1 
j j 
David Shearer Ltd 1 .''annuiT'., s.A. Australia 9 0 i 
I 
-Manufacturer j Tillage, harvesting equipment 
John Shearer Ltd Adelaide Australia 
1 
9 0 i 
1 
.Manufacturer ! Tillage, seeding equipment 
Thiess Equipment Distributors Sydney Australia | 1 Importer t Tractors, harvesting equipment 
Pty Ltdt^  i 
! 
a Longevity of agricultural machinery distribution in Australia, 
b Chamberlain Industries and John Deere Ltd merged October 1970. 
c Dissolved in 1972 within Thiess Holdings Ltd. 
Source: Fieldwork. 
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(e) ran the risk of being affected in some way by tfie market 
recession. 
Yet, the nineteen chosen enterprises epitomised the prevailing 
complexity. Though all were market leaders, their product 
specialisations and ranges varied considerably; many had undertaken 
such extensive functional expansion that agricultural equipment formed 
only a small part of their ambit. Aggregate turnover from Australian 
operations varied from $A2 million to over $A200 million; the 
international sales of some members ran into billions of dollars. More 
specific attributes such as longevity, head-office location, country 
of ownership and level of manufacturing integration could only be 
described as fissiparous. In this dilemma, classification helped 
overcome the impediment of diversity and provided a means for testing 
the structural hypothesis outlined in Chapter Two. Discussion of 
firms en masse breeds circularity of argument; in contrast, an 
alignment of the field on various criteria at the start of the 
recession offers a useful baseline against which subsequent economic 
and spatial changes in policy can be gauged. 
A STRUCTURAL CLASSIFICATION 
The importance of geographical aspects in the current problem precludes 
the use of earlier qualitative, uni-dimensional, economic 
classifications of the machinery industry^. In terms of the main 
argument, a grouping of firms should ideally consider structural, 
operational, and a range of financial elements. But scale factors in 
measurement complicate the issue. Since conglomerates rarely provide 
much detail of single products, their interests cannot be related 
easily to those of more specialised suppliers; the application of 
aggregate balance sheet and profit and loss data merely obfuscates the 
4 
picture of competition in a specific industry . Obviously, as a first 
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step, a bridge must be found between a corporation's total size (which 
can influence the behaviour of individual divisions) and that of its 
farm equipment trading. 
Input 
Such a link is provided by sales turnover, often the only parameter 
computed in similar ways in both sectoral and consolidated accounts. 
It is probably a quite satisfactory indicator of business stature 
since, according to Samuels and Smyth (1966: 3) and Sheridan (1974: 81), 
most company size attributes are inter-correlated. Sales are not only 
highly apposite in a marketing project, but their selection avoids 
many known dangers in industrial analysis promoted by the exclusive 
use of employment statistics (Townroe, 1972: 265). Moreover, the 
reliability of revenue figures is naturally improved by including other 
variables in a multi-dimensional matrix. As Fisher et at. (1967: 576) 
point out, the intrinsic subjectivity of grouping procedures for 
particular purposes can be offset by the infusion of qualitative and 
multi-state data. Much information of this type is interrelated and 
so broadens the basis of classification. Selection for this study 
sought parameters which, while emphasizing participation in the 
agricultural machinery industry, also reflected a company's overall 
pattern of activities. 
The input for the present grouping can be seen in terms of the 
two types of statistics involved (Table 4.4). 
(i) Quantitative. The first data employed were 1967 consolidated 
and farm machinery sales which, in concert, indicate the 
place of equipment in a firm's repertoire and its relative 
corporate standing vis-a-vis that of other competitors. 
Equipment volume broken down by product lines exemplifies 
size, structural, and functional criteria by showing areas of 
specialisation. The attack was augmented by figures on 
companies' estimated workforce in agricultural operations and 
the longevity of any form of machinery distribution in 
Australia. Employment is primarily a size measure, whereas 
T M L E 4.4: PARAyXTERS INCLUDED IN CLASSIFICATION OF SATIPLE FIRKS, AGRICULTURAL MA.CHIKERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967 
Variable 
Variable 
number Type Measure Possible States 
Sales aggregate corporate 
total agricultural machir.erv 
acricultural tractor 
tillage equipment 
seeding equipment 
hayrr.aking equipment 
harvesting machinery 
general equipment 
specialised equipment 
components 
spare parts 
Actual (or 
estiiTiated) 
SA value 
8 
9 
10 
11 
'uantitative : Absolute numerical 
Criterion 
Size, structure 
Function, size, structure 
Longevity of company's m,achiner\- ' 
distribution in Australia | 12 Years to 1967 
[ i Size 
(Proportional) emplov'm.ent in j 
agricultural machinery operation 
13 
From the 30 June 
1967 headcount 
1 statistics 
i 
1 
j 
Degree of manufacturing integration ' 14 
I 
i 
i 
Fully integrated/fabricator/assembler j Size, structure 
Head-office location 15 
1 
j 
1 
Ordered 
F.ultistate 
i 
Sydney/yielbcurne/AdelaiQe/Ferth/Ctr;er | 
Structure 
Country of ownership 16 Qualitative ' Australia/Eritain/United States/Italy/Other 
Total corporate product line 
(functional diversification) 17 Disordered 
multistate 
Agricultural machinery (wholesaling)/ 
industrial equipment/construction macliinery/ 
trucks/automobiles/encines/engineering/ 
agricultural machinery (retailing) 
Function, size, structure 
Source: Fieldwcrk. 
CD 
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the length of market representation probably siibsumes a wide 
range of correlates (see Mueller, 1972). 
(ii) Qualitative. The first two items, head-office location and 
country of ownership, are structural characteristics oriented 
to the spatial postulate of the central hypothesis. Two 
other multi-state variables, degree of manufacturing 
integration and extent of corporate product line, concern 
both functional and size-based facets of behaviour. To 
represent the latter, it was considered unnecessary to engage 
more than presence/absence recording. 
Classification techniques 
A simultaneous evaluation of all the above elements with equal 
weighting requires a computer technique which can give useful solutions 
in a reasonable time. Because the available methods create general-
purpose classifications, no unique grouping should be assxamed; rather, 
the value of any sorting strategy lies in its applicability to immediate 
ends. A number of pilot runs were therefore conducted with varying 
forms and combinations of data until one emerged which was judged 
suitable for the needs of the investigation. 
The programmes used are derived from a battery of grouping and 
diagnostic routines first designed by ecologists^. The same or related 
6 approaches have since been engaged in general geographic situations 
7 and, more specifically, in urban/industrial research . The particular 
8 set involved are as follows . 
(i) MULTBET, through a centroid strategy, produces a polythetic, 
agglomerative, hierarchical classification. Similarity 
measures are advanced in the form of non-factorial information 
statistics. 
(ii) GROUPER, dissects the relationships between the groups 
generated by MULTBET and states for each comparison the 
variable means and contributions to the similarity measure 
employed. 
(iii) GOWER, an ordinatio| sub-routine, undertakes a principal 
components analysis on data from the similarity matrix 
advanced by MULTBET and offers latent roots and vectors. 
Yet, in the development of a computer taxonomy, three basic decisions 
are presumed to determine a suitable methodology. 
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(i) The type of prograimnes. The package selected was considered 
most appropriate given the variety of data. MULTBET 
proposes a discrete grouping of hierarchical sets and GROUPER 
(which, in essence, puts forward a continuous classification) 
indicates the grounds for the allocation of sample members. 
Opportunities for both classification and ordination are 
provided. 
(ii) Use of classification or ordination. The former procedures 
assume that the material submitted is discontinuous and are 
geared to find the most informative arrangement of groups. 
Ordination, in contrast, presupposes a discontinuous series 
and attempts to plot the configuration efficiently in 
Euclidean space. This enquiry, having a small number of 
observations, followed accepted practice and worked through 
both avenues to explore the structure of the data fully. 
Each returned useful results. 
(iii) Intensity of clustering in classification. A specification 
of four groups in the MULTBET computation was aligned to 
the restricted sample and intuitive suppositions about the 
nature of the data. 
Ordination 
In order to research rigorously for patterns and relationships 
between sets of companies and attributes, the principal components 
analysis (GOWER) was applied to compress the seventeen original 
variables into a few primary factors which, it was hoped, would account 
for a high degree of the noted variance. In fact, only 21.99 per cent 
was explained by the first eigenvalue and 60.15 per cent by the first 
five, thus suggesting substantial disaggregation among the selected 
producers. This expected, though disappointing, outcome allowed 
identification of only two components on loading plots obtained from 
GOWER (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). 
(i) The first vector, differentiating large and small machinery-
interests, segregated firms with a full product line from 
more specialised ones which deliver only a limited range. 
The diversified concerns had adopted more vertical integration 
in their manufacturing. Massey Ferguson and International 
Harvester were clearly in front with respect to machinery 
sales size and other issues covered by the first component. 
Examples of 'small' organisations appearing on the opposite 
pole are Thiess Equipment Distributors and Australian Motor 
Industries. 
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Vector 1 
• 9 H o r w o o d b - t y - J i H ^ 
R j l p h M c f x l y 1 4 • 
• 1 1 J u h n S h n . i r t i f 
C M . ' i i n b e f l d i n b * 
Vec to r 2 
t J fa C o n n o r S h H d 
• 1 6 D d v i d S l i B d i u r 
S u l i b o i | i i t i n I l y C I c l ' j S i f i b i J 
A f u l l l i n u 
A l o n g l i n e 
• s h o r t l i n o l u t . l u r 
a b h o r t I t n u i n i p l r t M i o n t 
A u i j l r d l i a n M u t o r 
A l f . i r t n D i : . l n b u t o r s 1 • 
Vector 1 
M a r / . o v 1 3 A 
r o f y u ' . o i l 
Q 1 & Hb<v H o l l a n d 
^ n i n i r i l i o i i J I 
A 8 F o r d 
Vector 2 
7 F i a t 
• 4 C a s e 
r - l o w d r d H o t o v d t u r 1 0 i 
l n d u £ - t n e . i • 
• 2 A l h s C h a l f T i e r s 
1 1 2 1 o / l a n d 
l a I l i i e r . - j e q u i l j i r i H i i t D i s t i i t l u l o r s 
FIGURE 4.1: Principal components analysis (GOWER) 
Vectors One and Two. 
Source: Author's computations, 
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U 13 Massey 
Ferguson 
Internat ional 11 ^ 
Harvester 
Vector 3 
Vector 1 
Connor Shea 6 • 
David Shearer 16 ° 
Ley land 12 
Aust ra l ian Motor Industr ies 3 • 
a 1 A l fa rm 
Dist r ibutors 
• 9 Norwood Bagshaw 
Chamber la in 5 ^ 
John Shearer 
• 15 New Hol land 
I 7 Fiat 
4 Case 
• 2 Alhs Chalmers 
10 Howard Rotovator 
I 18 Thiess Equ ipmen t Distr ibutors 
Vector 1 
Ford 8 * 
• 14 Ralph McKay-
Vector 3 
Subsequent ly c lass i f ied 
A fu l l l ine 
A long l ine 
• short l ine tractor 
o short lir,e imp lement 
FIGURE 4.2: Principal components analysis (GOWER) 
Vectors One and Three. 
Source: Author's computations. 
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(ii) The second component, concentrating on corporate product 
mix, distinguished uni-functional and conglomerate 
businesses. The former, which specialised in the production 
and distribution of implements and machinery, included 
predominantly Austral ian—owned undertakings such as Horwood 
Bagshaw, John Shearer and Connor Shea. In comparison, those 
in the multi-functional area were strongly represented in 
the tractor market and were mostly foreign-controlled. Since 
they included the largest and smallest merchants, the second 
component does not suggest any size scaling of either 
corporate or agricultural machinery revenue. 
The analysis was terminated at this point because the remaining three 
eigenvalues contributed only 23.64 per cent of the variance among the 
observations and were not susceptible to meaningful interpretation. 
The plot around the tliird principal component permits no definition 
of the dimens ion involved (Figure 4.2). Rather than obtain rotated 
solutions, hierarchical grouping techniques were called upon to bring 
some order into this most unstandardised sample. 
The discrete classification 
Scaling by the information statistic, MULTBET allocated the 
agricultural machinery enterprises among four classes (A,B,C,D) which, 
at a higher level of aggregation, were fused into pairs (AB,CD). The 
two divisions thus represented consisted of four large and fourteen 
small firms respectively (Table 4.5). With the aid of the diagnostic 
programme GROUPER, the basis of the various categories became clear 
and they were named after reference to the terminology of previous 
classifications. 
(i) Class A consisted of fult-line companies engaging in all 
forms of agricultural machinery production. 
(ii) Class B, with two members, offered a more restricted range 
which straddled the tractor and equipment markets. Hence, 
they were called long-line firms. 
(iii) Class C, the first 'small' group, was comprised of shovt-line 
traotoT suppliers engaged in the importation and assembly of 
tractors within a highly diversified corporate functional 
structure. 
(iv) Class D denoted short-line implement manufacturers, 
specialising in the tillage, seeding, haymaking and harvesting 
fields . 
TABLE 4.5: A HIERARCHICAL CLASSIFICATION OF EIGHTEEN SELECTED FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967 
Value of 
Information Statistic 
100 50 
3 5 
8 k 
50 
Division 
Large 
firms 
Small 
firms 
Class 
Letter Class 
Full-line 
Long-line 
Number 
of Firm.s Firm 
International Harvester 
Massey Ferguson 
Chamberlain 
Ford 
Short-line 
tractor 
Short-line 
implement 
Allis Chalmers 
Australian Motor 
Industries 
Case 
Fiat 
Howard Rotovator 
Leyland 
Thiess Equipment 
Distributors 
Alfarm Distributors 
Connor Shea 
Horwood Bagshaw 
Ralph McKay 
New Holland 
David Shearer 
John Shearer 
Firm 
Number 
11 
13 
5 
8 
2 
3 
4 
7 
10 
12 
18 
1 
6 
9 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Sample Firm 
Massey Ferguson 
Chamberlain 
Fiat 
John Shearer 
a Mobilco excluded for lack of information. 
Source: Author's computations. CO 
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DIFFERENTIATION AMONG SAMPLE FIRMS 
Fuller description of the various classes -- a necessary background 
to the coming account of structural factors in corporate behaviour — 
ensues from a comparison of firm characteristics within and between 
the major divisions (A-B, AB-CD, C-D). In the evaluation, relevant 
points of differentiation are extracted from GROUPER'S ranking of the 
seventeen company attributes according to their contribution to 
inter-group fusion (i.e. by descending order in tJie value of the 
information statistic). 
Full versus long-line firms (A-B) 
Class A companies were termed 'full-line' in acknowledgement of 
their response to all areas of farm machinery demand. They diverged 
from the long-line firms on the basis of their comparative tractor 
sales, amplified by performance in the seeding, haymaking, harvesting, 
and general agricultural equipment markets (Table 4.6). Although 
disparity in the tractor turnover of both groups was not pronounced, 
they varied widely on other indicators. For example, whereas the 
former sold substantial volumes of harvesting, general, and specialised 
products, the latter distributed virtually none at all. Further 
discrepancies become apparent by considering in more detail the 
situation of individual members in 1967. 
The two full-line suppliers were Melbourne-based, North American 
corporations established an average of seventy-three years in Australia. 
Both maintained complete manufacturing facilities but preferred to 
receive certain items from overseas. International Harvester was 
already active in industrial and construction equipment, while Massey 
Ferguson had a minor but growing penetration. The first recorded 
farm machinery sales of $A21.84 million in a total budget of $A83.77 
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TABLE 4.6: RANKING OF FIRST TEN ATTRIBUTES ON WHICH GROUPER 
DISTINGUISHED FULL-LINE (A) FROM LONG-LINE (B) SAMPLE FIRMS, 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967 
Ranked 
Attributes 
Ratio of the Average Value of 
Full-line Firms (A)/Average Value 
of Long-line Firms (B^ on Ranked 
Attribute 
Agricultural tractor sales 1.28 
Seeding equipment sales 4.11 
Haymaking equipment sales 5.40 
Harvesting machinery sales b 
General equipment sales 15.62 
Specialised equipment 
sales 
b 
Components sales 7.07 
Spare parts sales 4.94 
Total agricultural 
machinery sales 
2.54 
Aggregate corporate sales 0.56 
a This format used to maintain confidentiality, 
b Long-line firms did not participate in this market. 
Source: Author's computations. 
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million composed mainly of trucks, vehicles and engines^*^; by 
comparison, Massey Ferguson's smaller total revenue ($A42.65 million)^^ 
was far more specialised, making it the leader in the subject industry. 
For the long-line firms, an emphasis on tractors, backed by 
limited supplementary goods, produced turnovers of $Al0-20 million, 
12 
well above that of the most prominent small participants 
Chamberlain, an Australian-owned, fully-integrated Pertli maker of 
tractors and tillage ranges, was founded in 1947 and thereafter 
received significant government assistance (Hutton, 1966: 252). Ford, 
the largest corporation in the equipment industry, entered the 
Australian market in 1925 and became the principal assembler/importer. 
Its coverage included tractors and siib-contracted machines and 
implements. In contrast to all other major concerns, the company was 
purely a marketing force and required relatively few employees in its 
Melbourne-focused operations. Its uniqueness accentuated the many 
differences which existed among large sellers. Yet, as a group, they 
stood out quite clearly from the short-line sample. 
Large versus small firms (AB-CD) 
At the start of the recession, relative sales of tractors, the 
most important single product category in the Australian market 
(Bernasek and Kubinski, 1963: 460), were the chief point of distinction 
of large and small suppliers (Table 4,7). The former, as the key 
tractor distributors, enjoyed a premier role throughout the industry. 
Their dominance in several fields — spare parts, seeding, general, 
tillage and harvesting — coincided not only with longevity but also 
with a headcount in farm machinery production nearly six times that of 
smaller organisations. Whereas they averaged equipment sales of 
$A22.21 million in a corporate account of $A87.75 million, their 
counterparts achieved only $A3.89 million within $A8.49 million 
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TABLE 4.7: RANKING OF FIRST TEN ATTRIBUTES ON WHICH GROUPER DISTINGUISHED 
LARGE (AB) FROM SMALL (CD) SAMPLE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
AUSTRALIA, 1967 
Attributes Ranked Measure 
Possible States 
or Average for 
Large Firms 
(AB) 
Possible States 
or Average for 
Small Firms 
(CD) 
Agricultural tractor sales $A tliousand 10846 842 
Spare parts sales $A thousand 2675 372 
Total agricultural 
machinery sales 
$A thousand 22213 3889 
Seeding equipment sales $A thousand 1001 259 
General equipment sales $A thousand 532 61 
Employment in agricultural 
macliinery operations 
number 1714 303 
Tillage equipment sales $A thousand 1591 669 
Head office location n .a. Melbourne/Perth Sydney/MeIbourne^ 
Adelaide/Other 
Harvesting machinery sales $A thousand 3500 661 
Longevity years 53 40 
Source: Author's computations. 
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respectively. There were few sub-markets in which any large 
contestant was topped by small competitors. Yet, the latter, offering 
one machine or a restricted range, performed a valuable economic task 
by attaining levels of specialisation barred to their opposition and 
by mitigating against oligopolistic collusion and cartel practices. 
Beside these positive contributions must be weighed their disadvantages 
in research and development, product distribution, and a higher level 
of establishment change^^, all potential sources of instability. For 
this reason, short-line suppliers warrant specific attention in an 
enquiry into the impact of recession. 
Small tractor versus implement firms (C-D) 
The categorisation of small firms devolves upon whether the 
corporate product line is uni-functional or diversified (Table 4.8). 
This primary, GROUPER-inspired distinction can then be expanded to 
separate tractor organisations, on one hand, from implement and 
machinery makers on the other. Ttie former had integrated horizontally 
to such an extent that only $A2.64 million of their average $A13.58 
million output accrued from agricultural machinery. Their volume 
consisted mainly of tractor sales ($A1.60 million) -- a strange case 
of product specialisation within a conglomerate structure. In contrast, 
the implement producers' mean corporate turnover of $A5.53 million was 
composed almost entirely of equipment revenue (ninety-three per cent) 
and a far wider range of goods was offered. This situation can be 
explored more adequately in independent examinations of group 
characteristics. 
In 1967, the average tvaotov distributor had been established 
twenty-four years in either a Sydney or Melbourne location. Since it 
acted essentially as an importer, assembler and wholesaler, it required 
only a restricted workforce of one hundred employees. Machinery 
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TABLE 4.8: RANKING OF FIRST TEN ATTRIBUTES ON WHICH GROUPER DISTINGUISHED 
SHORT-LINE TRACTOR (C) FROM SHORT-LINE IMPLEMENT (D) SAMPLE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL 
MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967 
Attributes Ranked 
Corporate product line 
Head-office location 
Employment in agricultural 
machinery operations 
Tillage equipment sales 
Seeding equipment sales 
Degree of manufacturing 
integration 
Country of ownership 
Longevity 
Harvesting equipment sales 
Agricultural tractor sales 
Measure 
n.a. 
number 
$A thousand 
n.a. 
years 
$A thousand 
Possible States or 
Average for Short-
line Tractor Firms 
(C) 
7 possible states' 
Sydney/Melbourne 
100 
248 
Fabrication/ 
assembly 
Australia/U.S.A./ 
U.K./Italy 
24 
501 
1597 
Possible States or 
Average for Short-
line Implement Firms 
(D) 
5 possible states 
Melbourne/Adelaide/ 
Other 
448 
1092 
518 
All degrees 
Australia/U.S.A. 
56 
822 
87 
a Farm machinery wholesaling,industrial equipment, construction machinery, trucks, 
automobiles, engines, engineering. 
b Farm machinery wholesaling, industrial equipment, engines, engineering, farm 
machinery dealing. 
Source: Author's computations. 
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operations in the range of $Al-8 million were generally an adjunct to 
high corporate sales of up to $A100 million in the automotive 
(Australian Motor Industries, Fiat, Leyland) or construction and 
equipment industries (Allis Chalmers, Case, Thiess Equipment 
Distributors). Most of the tractor firms were overseas-owned. 
By comparison, the typical implement company was either an old, 
Australian specialist producer situated in Melbourne or Adelaide or 
a more recent importer of haymaking and harvesting aids. Since few 
had outside interests, total and agricultural machinery turnover were 
fairly synonomous within the range $A2-10 million. Though these 
organisations were the smallest in the sample, they showed extensive 
vertical integration and required over four times the labour force of 
the small tractor group. As a result, they were somewhat more exposed 
during the rural setback. 
RESUME 
A variety of techniques was employed to broach the intrinsic 
heterogeneity of the agricultural machinery industry. The investigation 
was narrowed to nineteen major corporations, from which seventeen key 
functional, size, and structural attributes were elicited. The 
attempt to stratify the sample first employed ordination procedures; 
finally, a more successful discrete classification was performed. The 
resulting fourfold grouping and, in particular, the dichotomy of large 
and small machinery companies, provides the necessary tools for Part 
Three's examination of the role of structural factors in the economic 
and spatial repercussions of market recession on franchising 
enterprises. 
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CHAPTER FOUR FOOTNOTES 
1. See Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 
Manufacturing Industry [Bulletin No. 4, 1966-67], Canberra, 1969, for 
details of the various statistics quoted here. It must be noted that 
they suffer the same disabilities as those referred to in Chapter 
Three. Principally, they include sundry machinery repairers. For 
comparative purposes, the 1968-69 Census of Eoonomio Aotivity shows 
the 267 farm equipment establishments in Australia as employing 13,858 
workers and achieving a total tuvnovev of $A161.48 million. See 
Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Manufacturing 
Establishments; Details of Operations by Industry Class, Australia, 
[Economic Censuses, 1968-69], Canberra, 1973. 
2. Combined equipment sales of the nineteen sellers in 1967 
approximated $A145 million. Although this figure cannot be related 
satisfactorily to any data collected by the Commonwealth Bureau of 
Census and Statistics, it is estimated that the subject firms accounted 
for between sixty and eighty per cent of the industry's total turnover. 
Their amalgamated corporate revenue appeared in the range $A550-600 
million or about two and a half per cent of Australia's gross national 
product of $A22.76 billion (Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census 
and Statistics, Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
58 (1972), p. 473) . 
3. Bernasek and Kubinski (1963: 479); Barber (1971: 43-55). 
4. It is not entirely satisfactory to make inter-company asset 
comparisons; holdings might not be valued properly, the bases of 
valuations can vary and some firms are more capital intensive than 
others. 
5. See, for example. Lance and Williams (1966); Williams et at. (1966) 
Webb et at. (1967). There is also a discussion by Rimmer (1969: 162-70). 
6. Scott and Austin (1971). 
7. Rimmer (1969, 1972); Townroe (1972). 
8. More details on the Canberra taxonomic programmes can be obtained 
from the Division of Computing Research, Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation, Canberra. Present runs were conducted 
on their CDC 3600 computer. 
9. Principal components analysis is used to determine the minimum 
number of independent dimensions needed to account for most of the 
variance in a set of variables. Its basic task is to establish, first, 
an axis in m-dimensional space along which the variance is at a maximum; 
then a second axis, orthogonal to the first which covers as much of the 
remaining variance as possible; next, a third axis orthogonal to the 
first two, and so on. Each new axis handles a smaller proportion of 
the original variance. Further details of the technique and 
mathematics involved can be found in Cooley and Lohnes (1962: 151-85). 
10. Annual Report 1967, International Harvester Company of Australia 
Pty Ltd, Melbourne, 1967, p. 2. 
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11. Annual Report and Notice of Meeting 1967, Massey Ferguson 
Holdings (Australia) Ltd, Melbovirne, 1967, p. 1. 
12. For supplementary information, see Annual Report and Financial 
Statements 1968, [Review of the Chairman of Directors], Chamberlain 
Holdings Ltd, Perth, 1968; Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd, 
[Company Review F69], Research and Statistical Bureau, The Sydney Stock 
Exchange Ltd, Sydney, 1971, p. 3. 
13. Bernasek and Kubinski (1963: 479); Barber (1971: 49). 
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PART THREE 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
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As a means of highlighting divergences in spatial decision-making 
between the enterprise and entrepreneur, this project centred on the 
role of scale effects, establishment mobility and policy substitution 
in the processes and relationships of corporate behaviour. A focus on 
marketing in conditions of recession maximised opportunities for 
observation of geographical change and yielded an applied problem: 
to determine the economic and locational response of leading businesses 
to depressed demand within a product franchise system. It was then 
argued that, under such circumstances, company structural attributes 
representing competitive powers should assist larger and stronger 
franchisors to more comprehensive network authority. This advantage 
would allow the selection of market representation courses which would 
maintain or enhance their relative market position and thus permit 
more satisfactory financial adaptation to adversity. In order to test 
these contentions, nineteen selected farm machinery producers were 
classified into 'large' and 'small' divisions. 
Part Three seeks evidence of channel control differentials in 
the distribution policy and practice of these firms. Chapter Five 
examines the constitution and implementation of franchise contracts — 
the marketing code of producers. Next, Chapters Six and Seven distil 
relative network capacities of major and minor suppliers respectively 
through an emphasis on tactical alterations among administrative, 
production, wholesale and retail facilities. The results of their 
varying strategies are integrated in Chapter Eight's assessment of the 
spatial and financial postulates of the main argument. Interpretation 
of the situation of the equipment industry and performance of the 
franchise system in a depression enables Part Four to forge conclusions 
on the queried aspects of business policy-formation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NETWORK CONTROL THROUGH DISTRIBUTION POLICY: FRANCHISE 
AGREEMENTS OF LARGE AND SMALL FIRMS 
This study's first analysis deals with variations in large and small 
machinery franchisors' network control as exhibited in their marketing 
policies over the recession. The topic is tackled after reviewing 
the trading situation of each group in 1957. As a preliminary, 
however, it is necessary to give a critique of the source material 
used in this and later discussion. 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS IN SPATIAL APPLICATIONS 
Geographical surveys of single-plant firms seldom need probe the 
intricacies of their internal documents. In contrast, corporate 
decision-making, relying on pecuniary factors and codified procedures, 
demands a distinct orientation to company ledgers, agreements, 
statistical returns and the administration manual. The approach is 
facilitated by consideration of accounting statements which, while 
revealing much about the goals and strategies of selected businesses 
in the light of their ensuing economic performance, also entail 
difficulties of acciiracy, standardisation, disclosure and diversified 
reporting. 
Despite eclectic successes, financial appraisal is frequently 
criticised on grounds of accuracy. Of principal concern is the lack 
of adjustment in annual reports for price level changes, the influence 
of extraordinary items or holding losses and gains in distorting net 
income over a period, and inconsistencies attending estimates of 
future provisions (Beaver, 1970: 5/10) . Many commentators have argued 
further that fixed asset and depreciation charges should reflect 
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current replacement rather than historical cost. 
Insufficient standardisation in compilation techniques compounds 
these problems and complicates inter-firm comparison of issues such as 
inventory valuation (e.g. FIFO Versus LIFO), or the correct assessment 
of net worth (cf. Graham et al. , 1962: 234). For example, on the 
question of income determination, Standish (1972: 148) comments that 
in practice, given the many asset and liability 
valuation methods used, measurement of profit 
or loss is the result of a set of procedures 
probably individual to each company. 
Computation debates devolve on the concept of 'true' economic returns 
(i.e. changes in wealth position). Yet, empirically, even on an ex-post 
basis, it is impossible to specify the 'real' lonearned increment — or 
the error in its estimation. Therefore, the establishment of accuracy 
criteria now centres on the predictive ability of indicators employed. 
Monetary statistics substitute for parameters of decision models and 
measurement verisimiltude refers to the precision with which such 
information depicts elements in the policy-making process. 
Since corporate structuring can vary, with divisional status 
being resolved on a product or organisational basis, it is often 
infeasible to interrelate figures on large firms' component interests. 
While Mautz (1968: 150-51) has found some executives unwilling to 
disclose disaggregated data because certain factors cannot be reliably 
allocated within the conglomerate, some non-American enterprises have 
been observed to prefer secrecy by apparently capitalising on haphazard 
international disclosure codes (Arpan, 1971: 67-70). A third 
criticism of this type of analysis is therefore that total company 
measures conceal a concern's participation in different industries and 
the contributions of its various segments to aggregate activity (cf. 
Cramer and Iwand, 1968: 49-50) . 
Given the divergences in modern accounting opinion, a particular 
methodology can scarcely expect to accommodate all viewi^oints . The 
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present avenue was first to allot all income and balance sheet details 
from the nineteen selected organisations' 1967-71 annual reports to 
standardised categories in a computer-based, time-series matrix. 
Published amounts were altered as little as possible. Among the 
profit and loss declarations, biases arising from appropriations, 
extraordinary adjustments and capital movements were identified and 
substantially overcome. Notably, fixed asset sales were excluded from 
trading results; stock writedowns, assumed a direct effect of the 
recession, were treated not as an abnormal (below the line) fluctuation 
as would usually obtain, but as part of a company's operating 
performance. A complicated situation arose with regard to income from 
institutional sources. Under the Agricultural Tractors Bounty Act 
1966-72, substantial governmental assistance was afforded manufacturers 
of farm tractors which exceeded fifty-five per cent local content. The 
principal beneficiaries among the chosen sample were two large members 
(Table 5.1). As observed before, the bounty rate was doubled in 1970 
and, despite reduced output, payments spiralled in 1971. Although 
reimbursements were neither universally-received nor constant over the 
recession, they were available to any entrepreneur prepared to 
contemplate tractor fabrication in Australia. On these grounds, they 
were included in subsequent calculations and bear quite noticeably on 
profitability comparisons between the two machinery groups. 
Although many of the nineteen firms' balance sheet entries could 
be equated with relative ease, it was beyond the scope of this project 
to draw fixed asset valuations to a single base year or to estimate 
current worth^. Evaluation of financial and trading condition through 
asset accounts is therefore avoided. Alternative measures centred on 
sales not only improve precision in inter-company comparisons but 
assist once again in the problem of diversified reporting by allowing 
an integration of corporate and sectoral results. Their main 
application is in the following ratio computations. 
TABLE 5.1: RETURNS UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL TRACTORS BOUNTY ACT 1966-72, 
CORPORATE NET SALES AND PROFIT (LOSS) AFTER TAX, SAMPLE FIRMS, 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
($A thousand) 
Firm 
Year 
Ending Chamberlain International Harvester 
J-jne Returns 
under bounty 
act 
Corporate 
net sales 
Corporate net 
profit after 
tax 
Returns under 
bounty act 
Corporate 
net sales 
Corporate net 
profit after 
tax 
1967 1198 15774 590 1023 83770 3882 
1968 1662 18140 815 818 85167 3113 
1969 1602 19301 587 64 8 88177 3257 
1970 922 10939 (700) 764 90278 2061 
1971 1631 15557 319 1119 84547 1201 
1972 2181 24665 757 979 82387 (2736) 
Sources: Published annual accounts of both firms and Australia, Parliament, Agricultural Tractors 
Bounty Act 1966-72, Returns to Parliament (years 1966-67 to 1971-72). 
o IV 
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Accounting ratio analysis 
Since their inception in the 1890s, ratios have become 
indispensable in profitability and solvency determination (Horrigan, 
1968: 285). Here, as a means of examining the economic position over 
time of merchants with widely-differing strengtlis, interests and sizes, 
the most appropriate quotients are those tapping liquidity within the 
balance sheets and the comparative levels of net returns in the profit 
and loss accounts (cf. van Home, 1968: 507-26) . Liquidity, the 
degree to which assets represent or can be converted to ready money 
without appreciable loss of value, represents the extent of 
agricultural machinery franchsors' short-term solvency over the 
recession. As a gross indicator, the current ratio (current assets/ 
current liabilities) shows the ability of a business to meet its 
immediate commitments. Though a quotient of 2:1 has been classically 
regarded as safe, a healthier position is now favoured in many 
businesses (Graham et at., 1962: 218). Yet, this ratio has recently 
drawn criticism for its failure to acknowledge the relative 
convertability of holdings. A finer tool, the 'quick' ratio (current 
assets less stock/current liabilities), compares direct monetary 
equivalents against existing obligations (Graham et at., 1962: 219, 
fn. 11). Ordinarily, a firm's current assets less inventory should 
equal or exceed its immenent debts. However, since agricultural 
equipment is rather slow-moving and heavily-financed with the cost 
being carried among current liabilities, ratios of less than unity are 
not uncommon. 
Among many potential income ratios (return on net worth, total 
tangible assets and so forth), net profit after tax over consolidated 
net sales is used most extensively in later inter-firm comparisons. 
This quotient relates directly to the elements of machinery trading and 
is applicable to analyses over short periods (Sheridan, 1974: 83). 
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Returns of about five per cent have characterised many Australian 
industries during the 1960s and 1970s, depending on their value of 
sales, capital employed, inventory and receivables turnover (see 
Sanzo, 1970: 11-12; Australia [Tariff Board], 1972: 14). 
To foster valid inter-group comparisons, the ratio investigations 
must focus on specialists. Only suppliers avevaging over seventy-five 
per cent of their aggregate annual sales volume in tractors and 
implements during the years 1967-71 were taken for this purpose 
(Table 5.2). Massey Ferguson and Chamberlain represent each class of 
Division AB, while nine competitors in Division CD combine to form 
2 
a synthetic 'small' company . The approach facilitates an enquiry 
into the role of structural influences in moderating the downturn's 
impact, concentrating first on the competitive situation in 1967. 
THE ONSET OF THE RECESSION, 1967-68 
The Australian agricultural equipment market of the late 1960s 
deteriorated rapidly in relation to extenuated lead times attending 
the manufacture and procurement of major product lines^. Though 
movements in sales usually postdate those of rural income by several 
4 months , the lag was absent on this occasion. Indeed, Massey 
Ferguson's annual report of 1969^ recorded that 
it was not possible to predict the extent and 
dramatic suddenness of the market contraction. 
The setback therefore highlighted the importance of a producer's 
initial economic standing in governing his attainment of network control 
through franchise and spatial policy and, hence, in partly determining 
his viability after 1967. 
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TABLE 5.2: SAMPLE FIRMS USED IN CALCULATION OF FINANCIAL RATIOS 
(THE SPECIALIST RATIO SAMPLES) 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-71 
Division 
Large 
Class 
A 
B 
Firms 
Massey Ferguson 
Chaimberlain 
Small 
D 
Howard Rotovator 
Alfarm Distributors 
Connor Shea 
Horwood Bagshaw 
Ralph McKay 
Mobilco 
New Holland 
David Shearer 
John Shearer 
Source: Corporate and agricultural machinery dollar sales of 
sample firms, 1967-71. 
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The large and small firm in 1967-68 
A cross-sectional, inter-firm analysis of key ratios reveals 
that in 1967-68 the typical large machinery distributor was in 
a somewhat better situation than its small counterpart (Table 5.3). 
Liquidity (averaged between the current and quick ratios) was higher, 
trade receivables were being turned over more quickly and inventory 
was proportionately lower in relation to net working capital. Record 
corporate turnover enjoyed by Massey Ferguson, Chamberlain and 
6 
International Harvester assisted an upturn in income; on all ratios 
but net return on sales, major organisations eclipsed their opposition. 
Despite localised operating difficulties, their directors' reports 
optimistically mirrored the health of their accounts. 
In contrast to this fairly homogeneous, above-average status, 
small suppliers spanned a wide range of financial contingency. At 
least three^ exhibited such exemplary soundness that, in terms of the 
structural hypothesis, their management policies would have been 
expected to approximate those of bigger concerns (Table 5.4). Apart 
from this trio, most others displayed only a poor-to-average position 
because of the endemic droughts of 1965-67 and malaise in horizontally-
related industries. Many entered the recession in unfavourable straits 
which generally persisted for the next six years and, in some instances, 
led to withdrawal. This early background polarised the nature of 
corporate goals — primary forces in economic and spatial action (cf. 
Stern, 1966) — between large and small manufacturers. 
Corporate goal-formation under uncertainty 
The aims of small enterprises varied both among firms and over 
time. At first, new entrants sought expansion to build up product 
populations, spare parts and service demand. Several stressed, 
diversified members were more concerned to maintain the viability of 
TABLE 5.3: A:;D TFADING CONDITION DURING THE ONSET OF THE RECESSION, SPECIALIST RATIO 
SA-'-'J'LES, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-68 
(Averace 1967-68 measures) 
Financial Condition Trading Condition 
Division Current j 
ratio^ 
.... .J . 
Juick. ! Receivables . C I j; 
ratio • turnover 
! 
Inventory to 
met working 
capital^ 
Sales/total 
tangible 
assets 
(Net) 
return on 
assets 
(Net) 
return on 
net worth® 
(Net) 
return on 
sales 
Large firms i 2.50 
1 
i 
i ! 
0.67 ; 12.12 
1 
j 
1.22 
1 
1.34 0.07 0.14 0.05 
Snail firrr.s | 
(CD) 1 
1 ~ • " • 1 1 . . • 
0.71 6.26 
1 
1 j 
1 
2.20 
! 
1.14 
1 
1 
0.05 0.11 0.05 
Current r=tio; current assets/current liabilities, 
b Quick ratio: current assets less inventory/current liabilities, 
c Receivables turnover: trade debtors/consolidated net sales. 
d Inventory to net working capital: inventory/'current assets less current liabilities, 
e Return on net worth: net profit after tax/'shareholders' funds and reserves. 
Source: Published annual accounts and internal financial docuir.ents, specialist ratio san-.ple firr.s. 
TASLi r:;.'A;:CIAL A.\D TFATING CONDITIO?-: DUiUIiG TK£ ONSET OF THE PXCESSION, RANKING ON SELECTED INDICATORS, 
ALL SA:-SLF f i r m s , a g r i c u l t u r a l yiACHINEP.y INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967 -68 
{Averaae 1967 -66 measures) 
Financial Condition 
Division Class Firr- Current 
ratio" 
; Intra-saiTiple 
! rank^ 
tuick 
ratio 
Intra-sample 
ranX^ 
Trading Condition 
Net return 
on net worth 
Intra-samfle 
rank^ 
[International Harvester 
^Full-line (A) I IMassey Fercuson 
2 . 7 2 
2 . 2 9 
Large 
(AE) 
1 . 0 6 
0 . 7 8 
0.08 
0 . 1 3 
12 
I Long-line (E) ! jChanberlain 
'Ford 
2 . 7 1 
1 . 9 6 
0 . 5 5 
0 . 3 9 
8 
13 
0 . 1 5 
0 . 1 5 
'tractor (C) 
Sr.all 
(CD) 
;A11i£ Chalrers 
: Australiari «otor Industries 
'case 
iFiat 
:Howard Rotovator 
'Leyland 
^Thiess Equipment Distributors 
1 . 9 1 
2 . 3 4 
2 . 5 8 
0 . 9 6 
1.88 
1 . 6 3 
b 
9 
6 
5 
17 
10 
13 
0 . 7 6 
0 . 3 7 
1.28 
0 . 1 7 
0 . 4 7 
0 . 4 9 
t 
6 
15 
1 
17 
11 
9 
b 
- 0 . 3 4 
0.18 
0.16 
0.08 
0.10 
0 . 0 4 
b 
17 
2 
3 
12 
9 
15 
b 
! 'Alfarr, Distributors 
j jconncr Shea 
i 'Horwood Bagshaw 
.Short-line i Ralph .-^ cKay 
irpler-ent (D) i 
; MobilCO 
; iNew Holland 
, ;David Shearer 
I ' 
! I.'ohn Shearer 
1 . 0 7 
1.61 
1 . 8 7 
3 . 1 9 
1 . 4 6 
c 
1 . 4 5 
3 . 2 1 
16 
12 
15 
1 
0 . 4 8 
0 . 5 8 
0 . 3 0 
1 . 2 8 
0 . 3 9 
c 
0 . 4 5 
1 . 1 7 
10 
7 
16 
1 
13 
12 
3 
0 . 2 9 
0 . 1 5 
0 . 0 0 
0.11 
0 . 0 9 
c 
0.06 
0 . 0 9 
1 
4 
16 
8 
10 
c 
14 
10 
a Seventeen possible total. 
L ing company, init;.^! iml-alance ir, accounts would create distortions, 
c Divisional accounts withheld for conllaentla1ity. 
Source: Published annual accounts, returns to State Registrars of Companies, reports of the Sydney stock Exchange Investment 
Service and unpublished internal financial documents, sample firms, 1 9 6 7 - 6 8 . 
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their machinery trading by stabilisation or reduction of operations. 
Certain specialised equipment marketers were attempting to recover 
from setbacks of previous years. Finally, the more robust suppliers 
could overlook immediate financial considerations to some extent and 
concentrate on their trading performance. Yet, as circumstances 
worsened in 1969-70, initial disadvantage and lack of resources forced 
g 
many of the minor competitors to preserve their liquidity by all 
available means, a necessity underscored by several failures. 
The leading organisations, on the other hand, apparently 
recognised their ability to remain in the machinery market throughout 
9 
the rural crisis . Shielded by their overall size and contemporary 
prosperity from its immediate exigencies, their problem was rather to 
anticipate its duration and severity and adjust accordingly. The task 
was confounded by long-term planning needs and the inflexibilities of 
heavy overhead commitments: 
[Prior to January 1969], there were men... recommending 
caution, but they weren't heard. One of the things 
we must take into account in any management decision 
...is that...it's very easy to criticise and project 
[action] on the possibility of a falling market. But 
a manager also has to estimate the opportunity cost 
of not meeting a potentially-higher market. This can 
be very expensive on a long-term marketing budget for 
a company like this {large Melhourme supplier, 8 May 
1972) . 
The risks of not 'meeting the market' seemingly exceeded the dislocation 
of short-term losses. The main organisations had always attached great 
significance to any attrition of penetration, appreciating that 
market share can be dropped almost overnight. The 
road to recovery is a long and arduous one (The 
Australian, 2 January 1971). 
A slip in competitive position would not only prejudice turnover of 
spare parts and service during the projected life of all 'lost' 
machinery sales, but also destroy future brand loyalty and replacement 
demand. Further, the few outstanding retailers available would only 
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accept and operate franchises on the strength of local volume 
potentials derived from the overall share of the franchisor^^. 
Unwilling to handicap themselves in a subsequent upturn, large 
corporations predicated — or perpetuated — their strategy mainly on 
the issue of penetration. Their stance encouraged, first, a forceful 
attitude to franchise policy and locational behaviour and, as will be 
seen later, a stock accumulation which deflated their financial condition, 
NETWORK CONTROL IN THE CONSTITUTION 
OF FRANCHISE POLICY 
Although farm equipment franchisors' printed contracts spell out 
a formal modus operandi, practical procedures may vary, particularly 
under the duress of recession. Thus, even though dealer cancellation 
rates between 1967 and 1972 were pronounced, many more outlets would 
have been eliminated had manufacturers chosen to assert their rights. 
Both the constitution and implementation of policy must be investigated 
to portray the relative distribution control of various companies. 
Analysis of the 1967 agreements of three large and thirteen small 
producers^^ derived four main topics from thirty-nine distinguishable 
12 subject areas (see Table 5.5 and Appendix Two). 
(i) Introductory clauses, apart from non-assignability of 
contract, were rarely more than legal formalities. 
(ii) General provisions offered the franchisor opportunities for 
a high degree of vertical integration — especially those 
relating to design changes, sales restrictions, exclusivity 
and definition of territory (cf. Milinowski, 1965). 
(iii) Operating requirements also had significant ramifications. 
If stated at all, the vendor's obligations concerned the 
supply of technical and sales assistance and provision of 
retail margins; in comparison, those of the vendee usually 
appeared voluminous. Though they might have created 
efficiencies, they again afforded the manufacturer 
a substantial voice in aspects of retailers' housekeeping 
and marketing. 
(iv) Termination clauses allowed the franchisor to cancel the 
franchisee for a variety of reasons. Frequent grounds 
included the latter's death or disability, his insolvency or 
T A B L T : 5 . I : C O M H A H A T I V I : A N A I . Y S I s " OF ' F K A M C I I I S I : I ' R U V I S I O N S , S I X T L K N : . A M M , T : F I W - ! : , ' ' , 
A G H I C U I . T U P A L M A C H I N K K Y I N D U S T R Y , A U S T R A I . L A , 1 9 C 7 . 
Ill 
t'roviaion Percentage of I'lrms 
i;xhibiting Pxovisn/n 
Nuflil er •IVpe Content Netwoik Large firms Sma11 t1rms 'I'otal firms 
cont rol 
potential 
1 Introduct-ory Purpose of aqreetnent bb 3H 44 
2 I'revious agreements cancelled 33 62 , 56 
3 Interptetat ions 66 3H 44 
4 Jurisdiction stared 3 3 46 44 
5 I^roducts covered Cb 54 56 
6 Cotitract non-asslgnal.le 100 69 75 
7 Franchise granted bb 4b 50 
a General Design changes, product exclusions 100 46 56 
9 i'asslng of title to goods 0 3b 31 
10 Non-agency franchise 100 77 81 
11 Use of trade marKS 66 23 31 
12 Definition of territory 100 100 100 
13 Kxclusivity of territory 66 100 94 
14 Types of proiiiblted sales 33 85 75 
15 Policy on sui^-dealers 0 23 19 )(, Instructions to dealers 33 38 38 
17 St;rvice of notices 66 38 44 
IH Variations of contract 100 62 69 
19 Policy on competing products • 66 46 50 
20 Powers of waiver 100 46 56 
21 Operatinij Policy on acceptance of orders 33 31 31 
22 Terms of payment 33 62 56 
23 Used equipment dealing 33 31 31 
24 Delivery and financial procedure 66 69 69 
25 Non-fulfilment of orders 100 69 75 
26 Consignment conditions 6b 2 3 31 
27 Retail pricing policy 100 85 88 
28 Policy on wi'tten orders 100 62 69 
29 Spare parts policy 100 69 75 
30 Product insurance 66 31 38 
31 Pioduct alterations 66 23 31 
32 Warranty 66 85 81 
33 Collateral and set-off 33 38 38 
34 Tenure of franchise • 0 15 13 
35 Dealer obligations • 100 100 100 
36 Company obligatiotis 66 77 75 
37 Termindtion Termination by notice * 100 85 88 
38 Termination by event • 100 69 75 
39 Obligations on termination 100 85 88 
a See also Appendix TW<J. 
b Three large, thirteen small firms. 
• High netwurk control potential, see text. 
Sourcei 1967 franchibe agreementa, sample firms. 
112 
bankruptcy, assignment or hypothecation of contract, 
unnotified changes in the legal structure of the dealership, 
and inadequate sales performance. Some suppliers threatened 
annulment for any breach; for most, however, payment, the 
supply of collateral and securing of goods were the sensitive 
areas. All large and several small firms withheld the 
privilege of waiver, thus potentially introducing a measure 
of arbitrariness into their administration. 
Surprisingly, the network authority implicit in the sixteen franchise 
agreements cannot be satisfactorily compared. Many feature exactly 
the same wording^^ because of an oligopolistic exchange scheme and 
thus confound any presumptions of the structural hypothesis about the 
composition of written policy in companies of different sizes. Even 
though later atrophy in retail forces indicated otherwise, all 
competitors apparently aspired to roughly the same quality of 
co-ordination over the recession. 
Coverage of the contracts offered more scope — those of large 
organisations averaged twenty-six of the thirty-nine topical areas, 
whereas the mean for small producers was twenty-one. Nine of the 
twelve key issues of channel management (marked with asterisks in Table 
5.5) were specified more frequently by the former. Beyond these 
observations, a structural differential in the constitution of franchise 
documents cannot be pursued. Their degree of enforcement therefore 
assumes great importance: corporate and machinery trading size, 
economic power and managerial philosophies exercised a marked effect. 
NETWORK CONTROL IN THE APPLICATION 
OF FRANCHISE POLICY 
Declining retail volumes forced many dealers into what, under normal 
circumstances, would have been seen as infringements of marketing 
policy^^. In particular, stockholding and sales performance clauses 
were broken^^. Most enterprises reacted in low-key, recognising that 
undue pressure would have merely exacerbated problems, eroded 
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co-operation and led to unwarranted closure; the industry entertained 
a fairly universal exercise of waiver. Although over the 1960s minor 
suppliers had never enjoyed as penetrating control as their 
counterparts, some were now required to retreat further from printed 
procedures into an administration of expediency. The extent to which 
franch ise practice was liberalised (or network administration weakened) 
can be gauged best with respect to two issues, dealer assistance and 
maintenance of competitive exclusivity. 
Dealer assistance 
A manufacturer's field services normally aim to augment his 
distribution authority and sales, while simultaneously avoiding 
exposure (cf. Chapter Two). Yet, the recession sometimes necessitated 
extraordinary measures. Large companies maintained their wholesale 
role and shepherded retailers to the limits of pre-recession criteria, 
using managerial as opposed to monetary techniques. Credit extension 
was prolific at all levels of supply as were raised or floating wholesale 
discount margins, but these firms seldom offered direct aid in 
consignment stock, customer invoicing or used equipment marketing. 
Their seemingly conservative stand, reflecting an unwillingness to 
dissipate the benefits of franchising or to compound existing 
uncertainties with those of the retail sector, relied upon a close 
association with well-established, high-volume and, mostly, viable 
dealerships and also the ability of principal brands to attract scarce 
new appointees if necessary. 
Smaller and newer companies frequently fell into a circle of 
network and policy decay. When their resellers — mainly low-turnover 
operations — decreased their service and performance, they were 
obliged to accept greater financial involvement or lose authority. 
The application of internal liquidity to formal, ailing systems created 
risky investments with inequitable short-term returns. On the other 
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hand, laissez-faire marketing was equally unattractive. Some 
competitors reacted by relegating dealers to spotter agents, paying 
concomitantly lower discounts and undertaking limited corporate 
distribution. Over the study period, several agreements served only 
to cloak fairly unstructured arrangements, as reflected in the following 
discussion of non-exclusive forms of franchising. 
Competing and supplementary franchises 
The average Australian country town supports only a few businesses 
capable of handling any of the dozen or so makes of automobiles, trucks, 
agricultural machinery and fuel available. Ideally, every equipment 
producer would prefer exclusive representation (cf. Whitney, 1958: 
241-42) . In practice, fragmented markets determine that the majority 
of retailers accept a number of non-competing brands in each product 
field. Moreover, functional diversification is used to spread risk 
and create sufficient total revenue to cover overheads from these 
often minor interests. A fine balance therefore exists between 
monopolistic advantage and the cost of sales and inventory; agents 
must choose carefully to avoid over-commitment or the displeasure 
of prejudiced franchisors. This critical arena of distribution 
administration again differentiated the attitudes of machinery 
corporations, of which the largest and strongest could alone exercise 
any firm jurisdiction over cross-franchising. The whole industry's 
bargaining power in relation to complementary lines reached a low ebb 
during 1967-72. 
Though large concerns universally opposed external influence in 
their dealerships (cf. Barber, 1971: 251), full-line companies probably 
demonstrated the greatest network control. Both were backed by leading 
market shares and, additionally, International Harvester agencies had 
viable options in trucks and industrial equipment. In 1967, few 
.15 
retailers handled competing products and, hence, tlie issue of cross-
franchising was contained by a want of both precedent and rationale. 
Supplementary merchandising was less equivocal since, in many depressed 
areas, a sole machinery range was an inadequate trading base. With 
apparent reluctance^^, full-line corporations permitted the adoption 
of approved outside stock by their resellers as a cheaper and safer 
means of preserving sales forces than horizontal manufacturing 
integration. The strategy was also timely, given prolonged trends in 
the rural service economy^^. 
The inability of long-line organisations to offer a complete array 
of equipment or immediate avenues of diversification exposed their 
sellers to overtures from small manufacturers seeking new replacement 
18 
outlets . The assumed capacity of competing or overlapping products 
to offset risk and spread overheads created attractive incentives. 
Further, long-line dealers feared trade-in battles and erosion of 
penetration and trading margins if producers unable to find local 19 
representation introduced corporate stores . With surprising success, 
their suppliers spoke against extra franchising on the grounds that 
the return from added lines did not justify the investment in goods, 
parts and service; the purpose of a dealership was to promote one 
trademark actively rather than adopting an air of impartiality between 
competing models. They also pointed out that the annexation of 
'unstable' short-line ranges would not only increase their franchise 
turnover but also curtail competition to a level unacceptable to the 
20 consumer 
Large and small firms negotiated from positions of different 
economic power. In the absence of comparable 1967 and 1972 franchise 
21 
mix data , interview evidence suggests that the former accepted 
restricted supplementary merchandising and resisted any proposed 
cross-franchising with threats of termination. Such control eluded 
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the majority of small enterprises which, in most retail establishments, 
could not claim the main brand let alone an exclusive operation. 
Complementary franchises were the norm in this sector and only the 
more significant producers could oppose competing products, especially 
in the bigger outlets (cf. Whitney, 1958: 244). Several manufacturers, 
22 
troubled with high dealer loss rates and the restrained appeal of 
their franchise, clearly stated a preference for shared facilities as 
distinct from a complete lack of coverage. Their low market share 
precluded much selectivity. 
The erosion in small firms' limited authority gave retailers 
greater economic and positional muscle in the sales relationship. 
A number serving marginal participants apparently refused to be bound 
by allegedly-onerous contracts. In a more extreme case involving an 
unsuccessful attempt to clinch a new agent, a branch manager lamented 
to head office: 
he had torn [our agreement] to pieces, had his 
solicitors dissect it and has stated...he does 
not like the compilation of it. He refuses point 
blank in having pressure applied to his business 
in the manner of... [a large automobile franchisor] 
...and will sign only when he is positive he will 
be treated in a fair manner {veoovds of a small 
Sydney supplier, letter dated late 2969) . 
To avoid such hostility and the frequent inequalities of conventional 
bonds, one successful small franchisor from 1969 dispensed with the 
usual lengthy list of provisions and instead substituted a succinct, 
annually-updated, two-page joint agreement. Other less fortunate or 
progressive companies were simply forced to market through unaligned 
. . 23 
agencies and thereby relinquished many securities of franchising . 
Much of their recording and forecasting fell away, while their own bulk 
or direct selling advanced hybridisation of distribution practice and 
the dissolution of standard franchise policy with its low-cost market 
control. 
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Maintenance of franchise policy: summary 
Apart from credit extension and the revision of trading margins, 
principal firms were generally able to avoid extraordinary forms of 
assistance in the maintenance of their original marketing codes during 
the recession; they achieved satisfactory co-ordination mainly through 
mccnagerial techniques. In comparison, some minor businesses were forced 
into (or continued) a more embracing finanoial commitment to preserve 
their wholesale role and the viability of dealer forces. Ones unable 
or unwilling to meet these demands often had to turn to other expensive 
selling methods, sometimes involving forward integration. Such results 
support the predictions of the structural hypothesis. 
RESUME 
A critical appraisal of issues in accounting prefaced an assessment 
of the financial situation of the selected franchisors in 1967. Early 
advantages and extensive corporate resources enabled large firms to 
pursue more authoritative goals and marketing policy than short-line 
competitors during the recession. Chapter Six now examines the 
interaction of spatial strategy with the large corporation's network 
control; contrasts are provided in a similar review of small concerns 
in Chapter Seven. The analyses of both groups are fused in Chapter 
Eight by an evaluation of the combined contributions of franchise and 
geographical tactics to relative economic performance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE FOOTNOTES 
1. Some of the difficulties are attributable to the need to conduct 
an ex-post analysis. Long-term ex-ante programmes (notably those of 
the Australian Industries Assistance Commission or the sophisticated 
inter-firm comparisons of the Department of Secondary Industry) can 
set up standardised reporting systems over a number of years and thus 
derive such advantages as collecting asset figures on a non-published, 
current valuation basis. It was considered more appropriate in this 
work to adhere closely to published data which, in spite of their 
inaccuracies are presumably important in any corporate decision-making. 
Moreover, they are readily available and maintain the criterion of 
reproducabi1ity. 
2. The numerical bias of these comparisons, a function of 
classification procedures, cannot be avoided. 
3. 'Shaping the Future', transcripts of a long-term projection 
conference held by Massey Ferguson on 30 May 1966, suggests that up 
to seven years might be required for the research and development, 
production and amortisation of investment in major new product lines. 
Normal manufacturing is scheduled up to a year in advance because of 
domestic supply restrictions in certain sections of steel. Depending 
on the source and the goods involved, even importers must accommodate 
three to twelve month indent cycles. 
4. Phillips (1956: 93-97, 200); Bernasek and Kubinski (1963: 469). 
5. Annual Report and Notice of Meeting 1969, Massey Ferguson Holdings 
(Australia) Ltd, Melbourne, [December] 1969, p. 2. Other firms such 
as Ford and Connor Shea also stated that, after the introduction of 
wheat quotas on 30 April 1969, sales dropped dramatically. 
6. See the 1967 and 1968 annual reports of all three firms. 
7. Ralph McKay, New Holland and John Shearer. Also, Howard 
Rotovator demonstrated strong finances throughout the recession. 
8. Certainly, all suppliers with an aggregate annual turnover of less 
than $A10.00 million could be construed in this class. 
9. As explained in interviews. 
10. Evidence on this point is derived from franchise advertisements 
during the upswing of 1973. See, for example. Chamberlain-John Deere 
in The Sun Herald [Sydney], 18 November 1973. 
11. The other three agreements were unavailable. 
12. Contracts analysis based on van Cise (1968: 325-46); Rosenfield 
(1970: 67-130); Ozanne and Hunt, (1971: 199-256). 
13. Thus, the attraction of an agreement is derived not from its 
content, or even the attached discount schedules which are fairly 
similar throughout the industry but, rather, from a cost-based 
translation of the market share of the franchisor into a local volume 
potential. 
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14. Since many manufacturers enjoyed fairly informal relationships 
with dealers, it would be erroneous to imply that a major crisis 
in franchise policy overtook the equipment industry during the 
recession. The more significant changes described here should be 
regarded as a response not only to the immediate pressures of the 
economic situation but also to longer-term forces in machinery 
marketing over the 1960s. 
15. With respect to some agreements, this infringement was not 
surprising. Two of the most 'unilateral' statements were: 
(i) Stockholding. [The Dealer will] maintain a stock of the 
said products as considered adequate by the Company for the 
sales requirements of his territory {franchise agreement of 
a large Melhoume supplier) . 
(ii) Sales performance. The Dealer shall be held responsible... 
for the selling of a reasonable percentage of the product 
market in his territory. What constitutes a 'reasonable 
percentage' shall be decided from time to time by the 
Company (franchise agreement of a small Sydney supplier). 
16. This reluctance was put in the comment of one executive: 
A lot of our dealers have put on car franchises. 
We don't like this...because, basically, we then 
have to share his...time. Except, you've got to 
be realistic; sometimes they've needed this extra 
volume to carry them and...the car really isn't 
in conflict with our own equipment (large 
Melbourne supplier, 12 July 1972) . 
17. One franchisor, recognising the complementary pressures of 
numerical contraction among farm machinery outlets and the drive for 
economies of scale throughout all retailing, saw in supplementary 
franchising a pathway to the principal role in anticipated one-stop 
farm supply supermarkets: 
As a company, if we want to stay with this dealer 
vertical franchising system as against the retail 
vertical business [i.e. corporate distribution]... 
it's going to be essential for us to tie up with 
other franchising organisations ... chemicals... 
fertilisers...stock type companies (large 
Melbourne supplier, 8 May 1972). 
18. with a range and, quite possibly, volume below that of a full-line 
dealership, the undiversified long-line outlet would have had greater 
incentive to expand its product fields over the recession. Such 
pressures can occur at any level. For example, Massey Ferguson's 
concern in 1963-64 at the attack on its franchise strength caused by 
the lack of a large tractor was strong motivation for the company to 
enter the high-horsepower sub-market. 
19. Paraphrased from correspondence. 
20. Paraphrased from interviews. 
21. Within the industry, such complex and exhaustive information 
became a victim of recession cut-backs. However, many small companies 
had never collected franchise mix data at all. 
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22, See Chapter Seven, 
23. By the end of the setback, at least a quarter of the small firms 
had reverted to informal (unsigned order basis) dealers or laissez-faive 
methods of marketing (sales to any casual bidders). A study in the 
United States some years ago noticed the greater reliance on such 
channels of minor franchisors vis-a-vis larger competitors (Jessen 
et al.i 1951: 53-54). However, use of unaligned retailers by national 
equipment suppliers has been less common in Australia, where more 
extensive network control has been the norm. 
12.1 
CHAPTER SIX 
NETWORK CONTROL THROUGH DISTRIBUTION PRACTICE; 
SPATIAL REPRESENTATION OF LARGE FRANCHISORS 
I think a distribution policy is usually developed 
by a need moreso than a want. If we feel, and we 
have done this in the past, that there's a certain 
problem developing, well, we just have to change. 
But we're fairly loath to change (large Melbourme 
sup-plier, 12 July 1972). 
The interaction of network control and corporate spatial decision-
making suggested by the structural hypothesis can be examined in the 
distribution practi ce of recession—bound machinery enterprises. The 
project's second main analytical thrust is undertaken by Chapters Six 
and Seven which consider the incidence of locational change in the 
selling networks of large and small franchisors respectively. At the 
earliest channel levels — central administration, production, and 
wholesaling — the emphasis is nation-wide, but in retailing only the 
position in southeastern Australia is considered (Figure 6.1). This 
restricted region both reduces the number of dealers under observation 
to manageable proportions and also affords unique opportunities for 
ascertaining inter-metropolitan alternatives in supply and the influence 
of producers' positional power. Case histories are employed to overcome 
the difficulties of confidentiality and disclosure, and those posed by 
massive (but often incomplete) data banks. Inter-class comparisons 
highlight establishment mobility, scale effects, and the substitutability 
of geographical tactics. Integration of specific findings from major 
and minor firms facilitates Chapter Eight's overall evaluation of the 
structural viewpoint: company attributes representing competitive 
powers are expressed as management potentialities in franchise conduct 
and thus vary representation, and market.and economic performance. The 
enquiry commences with a review of the sales facilities for farm 
equipment in 1967. 
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FIGURE 6.1: Location diagram, southeastern Australia . 
a The Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics Divisions portrayed 
existed for most of the recession (i.e. 1967-70). 
Source: Author. 
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GEOGRAPHY OF MACHINERY MARKETING IN 1967 
In response to relatively small and highly-localised demand, the 
Australian agricultural machinery industry in 1967 exhibited a fairly 
simple marketing pattern. Older, North American-inspired regional 
wholesale depots had all but disappeared in favour of a more direct 
factory-^branch or independent distributors-dealer arrangement (cf. 
Appendix Three). Factories and corporate head-offices were normally 
sited together so that processing, fabrication, assembly and initial 
despatch occurred alongside general management functions such as 
accounting, labor relations and research and development. Branches or 
non-aligned distributors undertook final assembly to save intra-company 
transport costs. Their responsibilities, confined mainly to selling, 
included the collection of economic material, observation of 
competition, logistics, local advertising and franchisee sales/ 
profitability analysis (see Butt, 1969: 46-47). Finally, dealers 
handled the retail business of most firms although some relied as well 
on a few corporate stores. 
By the start of the recession, all large competitors had adapted 
the above schema to individual States. Unlike some small counterparts, 
they had long experience in domestic conditions and frequently 
adjusted their behaviour to changing cycles. Extensive production and 
distribution networks established since the Second World War gave solid 
representation in all parts of Australia except Tasmania, where the 
requirements were limited and evoked little interest (Table 6.1). 
Of the leading makers, only Massey Ferguson fabricated at more than 
a single location. Its experience offered the sole instance of spatial 
change in the large sector's manufacturing and administration^. 
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TAULE 6.11 CORPORATE REPRESENTATION, LARGE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINtBV INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967 
Class Firm State Location Type of Facility Yeura of Opeiation 
Full-line® International 
Harvester 
N.S.W. Sydney 
Gunnedah 
Wholesale adr.itnlutrat.ion'"' 
Retail store 
1953-67 
1964-67 
Vic. Melbourne 
Geelong 
Head office, wholesaling 
Manufacturing, distribution 
1939-67 
1939-67 
Qld Brisbane 
Cairns 
Wholesaling 
Retail store 
1966-67 
1967 
S.A. Adelaide 
Port Adelaide 
WholesalIng 
Warehouse 
1951-67 
195a-67 
W.A. Perth Wholesaling 1956-67 
Tas. Hobart Independent wholesaler 1965-67 
Massey 
Ferguson 
N.S.W. Sydney 
Orange 
Wholesaling 
Retail store 
1937-67 
1960-67 
Vic. Melbourne 
Ballarat 
Bendigo 
Head-office, manufacturing 
Retail store 
Manufacturing 
1930-67"^ 
1958-67 
1965-67 
S.A. Port Adelaide Wholesaling 1959-67 
W.A. Perth (Maylands) 
Perth (Sublaco) 
Wholesaling 
Retail store 
1956-67 
1964-67 
Tas . Hobart Wholesaling 1963-67 
Long-line Chamberlain N.S.W. Sydney Wholesaling 1965-67 
Vic. Melbourne Wholesaling 1955-67 
Old Brisbane Wholesaling 1959-67 
S.A. Adelaide Wholesaling 1960-67 
W.A. Perth (Welehpcml) 
Perth (Guildford) 
Head-office, manufacturing 
Retail store 
1947-67 
1960-67 
Ford N.S.W. Sydney Wholesaling 1963-67 
Vic. Melbourne Head-office, assembly 1967'^ 
tild Brisbane Wliolesaling 1951-67 
S.A. Adelaide Independent wholesaler 1960-67 
W.A. North Fremantle Wliolesaling 1951-67 
a Note the more numerous facilities of full-line firms, 
b Administration only since 1965. 
c Inception taken as the merger of H.V. McKay Pty Ltd with Massey H a m s Ltd, 1930. 
d Ford relocated in 1967 from North Coburg. 
Sources: (i) Interviews and internal documents, sample firms. 
(ii) (index to Illustrated Tractor Specifications!, Technic'al Annual, Power Farming in Australia 
and New Zealand, various issues 1946-67. 
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CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION AND PRODUCTION 
Shifts in central facilities of subject franchisors signify the most 
striking repercussions of the rural contraction because of the asset 
fixity and heavy transference expenses involved. While several plant 
closures and one massive relocation characterised short-line merchants, 
action by the four major companies was light — as supposed in the 
elaboration of the structural argument. Certainly, they were 
affected by the universal decline in the machinery trade. Workforce 
downturns^ in response to excess inventory and high overheads were 
considerable, while curtailment of expansion plans^ was also 
significant in regard to the industry's longer-term development. 
However, the only physical alteration to existing patterns was the 
shut-down of Massey Ferguson's spare parts operation at Bendigo 
(Victoria). The decision to retrench most of the one hundred employees 
and retract to Melbourne was announced after consideration of stock and 
finance problems (The Australian, 3 December 1969). Later, the firm's 
4 
1970 annual report noted the disposal of the premises in order to 
improve liquidity and profitability prospects. In 1972, further sales 
were made of redundant land and buildings at the Melbourne factory 
site (The Australian Financial Review, 26 May 1972). Similar property 
realisation and centralisation also appeared in the next stage of the 
main equipment suppliers' channels. 
WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION 
At the wholesale level, large producers reacted to both long-term 
market forces of the 1960s and the more pressing demands of the rural 
downswing by undertaking two primary representation policies, 
rationalisation and stability. The backing provided by their firm 
franchise code and constancy in the production sector permitted these 
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courses to be pursued without significant loss of control. Yet, 
a smooth transition to new strategies presumed ancillary change in 
other areas of the distribution sub-mix which indicated the 
interrelationships and potential substitutability of geographical 
decisions in the corporate arena. 
Market representation: rationalisation 
Positional power, asserted through the location of company outlets 
and, especially, head-offices markedly varied the ability of machinery 
enterprises to adapt their marketing structures to dynamic conditions 
throughout Austral ia between 1967 and 1972. Its role among large 
organisations was pronounced since, initially, rationalisation was 
possible for only the three Melbourne-based concerns which enjoyed 
a high degree of network control from a centre offering superior 
accessibility (Table 6.2). As illustrated in Figure 6.2 for tractors — 
the most important and representative individual product category^ — no 
other Australian capital city afforded such concentrated demand within 
a relatively confined area well served by transport connections. 
As early as 1965, International Harvester ceased Sydney-based 
distribution of spare parts and all equipment except direct imports. 
Components supply accrued to the South Melbourne warehouse and Brisbane 
branch, while whole machines were directed from the Geelong (Victoria) 
factory to most parts of New South Wales^. In 1967-68, the Adelaide 
branch and an old depot at Port Adelaide were closed for farm equipment 
wholesaling. A comparable course was undertaken by Ford which, after 
segregating its vehicle and tractor interests in 1965, removed the 
latter from Sydney and Adelaide in 1967-68. In contrast to these moves 
throughout the late 1960s, Massey Ferguson's cut-backs were inspired 
more by the short-term pressures of the rural crisis. Only in 1970 
did it relinquish its Sydney assembly plant; the Adelaide office was 
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TABLE 6.2: WllOLESALf: REPRESENTATION STRATEGIES, LARGE FIRMS, 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1965-72 
Wholesale 
Strategy Participants 
Locational 
Repercussions 
Impact on 
Total 
Distribution 
Network 
Year 
Rationalisation Ford Closure of wholesale 
branches at: 
Adelaide 
Sydney 
a 
Major 
Major 
1967 
1968 
International 
Harvester 
Cessation of wholesale 
operations^ at: 
Sydney 
Adelaide 
Closure of warehouse 
at: 
Adelaide 
a 
Major 
Major 
Minor 
1968 
1968 
1970 
Massey 
Ferguson 
Closure of wholesale 
brandies at: 
Sydney 
Adelaide 
a 
Major 
Major 
1970 
1972 
Stability Chamberlain Intrametropolitan re-
location of Melbourne 
wholesale branch 
Minor 1968 
a Operative factor in classification. 
b The branches continued to distribute trucks. See also Footnote Six. 
Source; Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms. 
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AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF AUSTRALIAN 
UNIT TRACTOR MARKET 1967-70 
BY STATISTICAL DIVISIONS 
FIGURE 6.2: Distribution of agricultural tractor sales, 
southeastern States and total Australia, 
average for years 1967-70. 
Source: Australia, C o m m o n w e a l t h Bureau of Census and Statistics, Receipts, Sales and Stocks of New Tractors, [Ref: 12.18], 
various issues, 1967-70. 
129 
run down to handle parts and was finally sold in 1972^. Gains in the 
firm's cost and asset accounts speak for the tangible economic 
benefits which rationalisation bestowed on its adherents (Table 6.3). 
The strategy reversed wholesaling attitudes held by large (and 
many smaller) machinery manufacturers since the Second World War. The 
generally-accepted objective of corporate coverage in all mainland 
States had conferred considerable prestige, publicity, positional power 
and overall control in an era when transport linkages were less 
developed. Branches or independent State distributors were essential 
to the speedy delivery of components and equipment. Their inventory-
holding enabled domestic manufacturers to use inexpensive coastal 
shipping, while importers could receive goods into immediate markets 
and thus avoid extra handling. However, since franchise agreements 
made no stipulation about the complement or deployment of a supplier's 
forwarding outlets (cf. Appendix Two), vendors were not legally 
hindered in completely reassessing the efficiency of their arrangement 
between 1965 and 1970. As evident in the temporal spread of closures, 
both long and short-term forces started to attack their traditional 
orientation. 
As a result of the former, manifested in improvements in office 
procedures, communications and travel, branches and distributors began 
to duplicate administrative functions which could be handled more 
expeditiously at head-offices. Centralisation gave top executives 
access to a greater field of information and fostered economies in use 
of valuable installations such as computers. Other factors also began 
to challenge the depots' primary stockholding role. The increasing 
reliability of freight forwarding services and expanded applicability 
of overnight road and air cargo for emergency deliveries offered 
manufacturers a chance to focus and contain inventory. Concurrently, 
models of finished products were proliferating to such an extent that 
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TABLE 6.3: EB^FECTS OF WllOLESAIJi RATIONALISATION AND ASSOCIATED 
REDUCTIONS ON COST AND ASSET ACCOUNTS, MASSEY FERGUSON 
HOLDINGS (AUSTRALIA) LTD, ] 965-73"^ 
Cost Ratios (per cent) Asset Accounts (yA million) 
Year 
Ending 
October 
Marketing admini-
strative and 
general costs / 
total expenses 
Marketing admini-
strative and ^ 
general costs / 
consolidated net 
sales 
rjet book value 
of fixed asset 
disposals 
Profit on 
sale of 
capi tal 
assets 
1965 9.13 8.21 0.04 -0.01 
1966 8.48 7 .87 0.05 0.01 
1967 8.61 7.76 0.04 0.00 
1968 8.08 7.38 0.05 0.10 
1969 10.51 10.36 0.05 0.00 
1970^ 12.72 13.98 0.02 -0.08 
1971^^ 9.97 10.32 0.15 -0.01 
197 2 8.58 8.16 0.73 2.05^ 
197 3 8.65 7 .84 0.03 4.89 
a Longer period taken to show extraordinary nature of asset realisations and 
to counteract lag el feet. 
b Greater detail unavailable from puld ished sources. However, this measure 
is sufficiently specialised for present purposes. 
c Note the changed relationsliip of cost ratios. 1970 and 1971 were years of 
corporate loss. 
d Effects of asset realisation whicli commenced in 1970 become apparent. 
Source: Consolidated profit and loss acco»u»t, Annual Report and Notice of 
Meeting, Massey Ferguson Holdings (Australia) Limited, Melbourne, 
19G5-7 3. 
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it became infeasible to maintain either parts or machine—options in 
every outlet (cf. Barber, 1971: 64-67). Concentration allowed better 
warehousing and handling techniques to be applied to a reduced amount 
of merchandise. Indeed, all three suppliers regarded their 
post-rationalisation patterns as more 'efficient' on a cost service 
basis. 
The more acute incentives of the contraction added to these 
pressures. Branches — at considerable expense — were fulfilling 
a role rendered less relevant by falling sales volumes and altered 
environmental and technological conditions. By the mid-1960s many of 
the previous inducements of complete national representation had 
dissipated and rationalisation emerged as a means of curbing current 
expenditure and redeeming fixed assets to improve liquidity (Table 
6.3). New advantages opened in supply from the factory or port of 
original receipt. Yet, as will be shown among small firms, the 
adoption of the policy was contingent upon market strength, positional 
power and corporate situation. Indeed, the latter influences 
prevented the fourth large concern. Chamberlain, from revising its 
8 network in southeastern Australia until late 1973 . 
Market representation: stability 
Interstate distribution by Perth-based Chamberlain has been 
reviewed at several Tariff Board hearings involving the Agricultural 
Tractors Bounty. The 1971 case, for example, posited that 
the company does not appear to have any significant 
disadvantages accruing from its location in 
Western Australia...interstate delivery charges 
...amount to only about two per cent of...[the] 
cost to make and sell (Australia [Tariff Board] 
1973: 17). 
However, in broader marketing terms, the site of the firm's head-office 
and works appeared to lessen its flexibility over the recession. In 
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eastern States, Chamberlain faced logistical difficulties comparable 
with those of Adelaide manufacturers whose prospects for rationalisation 
were limited until the forging of the Indian-Pacific rail link in 
1970. This geographical impediment and the extra length of 
communication lines coalesced with three other elements in forwarding 
continuation of the company's pre-crisis coverage. 
(i) Functional diversification. Reduced activity at branches 
was offset by diversification into industrial lines (Australia 
[Tariff Board] 1973: 7). Yet, this re-orientation furthered 
existing distribution modes since most equipment was 
purchased in capital cities. 
(ii) Modern premises. Chamberlain operated up-to-date 
facilities suited to farm machinery marketing. The Sydney 
office, for example, had been acquired only in 1965, while 
an intra-metropolitan relocation took place in Melbourne in 
1968 (Table 6.2). Depots were well located for transport 
and posed little cause for dissatisfaction. 
(iii) Amalgamation. Chamberlain's merger with John Deere in 
October 1970 raised some complex issues (The Australian 
Financial Review, 30 September 1970). By 1972, the newly-
formed Chamberlain-John Deere Pty Ltd had closed all former 
Deere plants in preference for those of Chamberlain. Apart 
from the substantial decision-making involved, the role-
change from a domestic manufacturer to an international 
importer/manufacturer limited new marketing initiatives. 
Despite these considerations. Chamberlain's 'stability' was transient 
because, in a long-planned move, the Sydney branch shut down in late 
1973. Rationalisation therefore appears to be the wholesale strategy 
characteristic of large businesses and accentuates the use of spatial 
action towards specific corporate economic aims. Significantly, its 
introduction was facilitated by further reassessment in parts of the 
distribution sub-mix covering product supply boundaries, price-basing 
structures and sales administration territories which helped forestall 
any contrary effects of depot closure. 
Ancillary wholesale action 
For major Melbourne companies, rationalisation homogenised the 
delivery of most product groups in southeastern Australia. Previously, 
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high-value, bulky or heavy articles such as headers and large tractors 
had been shipped direct from factory to dealer or client to avoid 
double-handling while cheaper, non-seasonal items had been held at 
branches for immediate despatch (Figure 6.3). Under the new 
arrangements, product-based differentiation disappeared — the majority 
of all goods emanated from Melbourne with support being provided by 
Brisbane offices. Former lines of demarcation in New South Wales were 
replaced with a border which, depending on availability and the 
urgency of the order, could vary latitudinally by up to three hundred 
kilometres; South Australia and Victoria became continuous in 
a corporate region which transcended political boundaries (cf. Krumme, 
1970: 319; Wadley, 1970: 156). Despite the limited sources of supply, 
control was still possible in the post-rationalisation phase through 
distribution flexibility and improved road and rail connections. 
9 
Spatial price-basing policy was also used to ease in the new 
arrangements. The general pre-1967 formula among large franchisors — 
f.o.b. capital city — represented a partial freight equalisation 
scheme designed to cover differentials of up to twenty per cent in the 
landed cost of various classes of equipment within Australia^*^. 
Strictly, the removal of branches and shifts in forwarding zones made 
the quotation of these rates anachronistic. Yet, the unequivocal 
application of Melbourne-based mill or ex-works pricing^^ would have 
prejudiced parts of South Australia and central-western New South Wales 
and so eroded sales authority and penetration. In spite of locational 
alterations, two large firms therefore did not change their price 
strategy and bore the transport costs to any dealers adversely 
affected by branch closure, arguing: 
[It is] an industry pattern... manufacturing plants 
are...in different cities...so you [have] to keep 
your prices reasonably competitive in tJiose areas. 
Otherwise, you would tend to lose your shave in 
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FIGURE 6.3: Pre and post-rationalisation product 
distribution boundaries, large Melbourne firms, 
agricultural machinery industry, southeastern 
Australia, 1967-72. 
Source: Fieldwork. 
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areas you pulled out of [italics added] , {large 
Melhouvne supplier, 20 April 1972) . 
The dilemma of a third firm illuminated the role of inter-divisional 
negotiation in corporate spatial decision-making insofar as its desire 
to bring most products from an ex-capital city to ex-works 
specification generated conflict between finance and marketing 
personnel. The former recommended the new proposal for its simplicity 
and diminution of direct variable costs, while the latter favoured 
freight equalisation for the reasons outlined above. The upshot was 
that, although the printed ex-works statement was widely recognised 
by clients and those dealers who benefited from the change, freight 
subsidisation to disadvantaged retailers continued for many months 
after depots were shut down. The case indicates not only the 
heterogeneity of the actors in an enterprise's locational policy-
formation and their modifying influence on tactics taken, but also the 
coercive impetus of industry practice in the pursuit of market control. 
Hence, by one means or another, all large firms adapted their price-
basing to offset the negative points of rationalisation. 
Similar moderation was apparent in factory-to-dealer field 
representation. The four companies were reluctant to retrench 
travellers because of the need for ongoing high-level network 
administration and the difficulty of recruiting reliable and experienced 
territory staff. A typical instance in which coverage zones were 
simply re-defined to compensate for market declines in cereal-growing 
areas suggests that the principal enterprises were prepared to 
sacrifice little of this most direct form of co-ordination during the 
recession (Figure 6.4). Each in fact retained ten to fifteen zone 
managers throughout southeastern Australia. 
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FIGURE 6.4: Pre and post-crisis arrangement of sales 
representatives' territories, sample large firm, 
agricultural machinery industry, southeastern 
Australia^, 1967-72. 
a Data for South Australia unavailable. 
Source: Fieldwork. 
137 
Evaluation of wholesale representation 
Principal agricultural machinery merchants drew on initial economic 
resources, substantial equipment and corporate turnover, franchise 
integrity, established dealer forces and positional power to attempt 
wholesale rationalisation between 1967 and 1972. Borne of ongoing 
changes in supply relationships and, in one case, the strictures of 
the rural blight, the course uplifted internal finances and was 
considered to augment all-round efficiency. Unlike some other forms 
of contraction, it was pursued without serious dislocation. Related 
actions in wholesaling and decisive retail policies, discussed in the 
next section, enabled participants to attain the cost advantages of 
reduced coverage without suffering excessively from losses of channel 
authority. To this extent, rationalisation appears to be a highly 
adaptive course in the face of a market downturn. 
RETAIL REPRESENTATION 
Decreasing sales and the overhead burden forced most equipment suppliers 
to review their retail representation between 1967 and 1972. From the 
outset, management problems arose in the range of market conditions 
over space and also from year to year. The extent of these spatial 
and temporal uncertainties must be appreciated to facilitate analysis 
of the strategies and dealer change of large versus small franchisors 
as reflections of their relative control. Spatial sporadiaity can be 
demonstrated in a simple measure of throughput movements at retail 
outlets — the ratio of mean annual equipment volume in the 1969-71 
crisis, divided by average revenue in the two previous years 1967-68 
(subtracted from one hundred per cent and expressed as a sales 
19 
increase or decrease ). Temporal oscillations, a function of delay 
over wheat quotas and gloomy rural forecasts, can be ascertained in 
the coefficient of variation^^ of 1967-71 turnover by dealer point. 
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The statistic, a fairly common tool of marketing analysis (cf. Greene, 
1968: 50), is applied as the standard deviation over the mean of sales 
at each outlet over the five-year period (see Freund, 1967: 69-70). 
When mapped, these two quotients encapsulate the contraction from 
the suppliers' viewpoint by affording a total perspective on revenue 
disparities and fluctuations over the intensive retail study area of 
New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia. The analysis was 
14 
operationalised with information from two large firms (A and B) 
whose product range and market coverage spanned most possible 
contingencies withi n the industry. Data from 359 dealers were included 
in the computations^^. 
The recession's impact on retail sales 
Spatial contrasts in retail activity for the two subject 
franchisors are portrayed in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. 
(i) Machinery sales growth, achieved by an average of only 
thirteen per cent of dealers in each firm, enhanced parts of 
the Adelaide and southern Central and Murray-Mallee zones of 
South Australia and the West Central Division of Victoria. 
While Company A performed well around Melbourne and in the 
southeast of New South Wales, Company B stood out in 
Victoria's Wimmera, Mailee and North ^gstern Divisions and 
along the New South Wales North Coast 
(ii) Machinery sales losses of up to sixty per cent predominated 
across southeastern Australia. Areas lightly touched by 
the setback included the Adelaide-Renmark strip in South 
Australia, Victoria's eastern Wimmera and sections of the 
New South Wales tablelands and coast. 
(iii) Machinery sales losses of sixty to one hundred per cent 
were frequently associated with low-volume outlets, but also 
debilitated other well-constituted businesses in scattered 
districts of South Australia and Victoria and, in particular, 
central and northern New South Wales. 
Apart from these widespread revenue losses and the prevaricating 
influences of local market conditions and individual dealer motivation, 
the formulation of consistent representation policy among vendors was 
also hampered by turnover fluctuations during the period under 
review. The experience of Companies A and B is displayed in terms of 
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FIGURE 6.5: Retail machinery sales movements, large firm A, agricultural 
machinery industry, southeastern Australia^, 1967-71. 
a Shading based on estimated dealer trade areas to the approximate margins of 
agricultural activity. 
Source; Unpublished sales accounts, sample firm, 1967-71. 
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FIGURE 6.6: Retail machinery sales movements, large^firm B, agricultural 
machinery industry, southeastern Australia , 1967-71. 
a Shading based on estimated dealer trade areas to the approximate margins of 
agricultural activity. 
Source; Unpublished sales accounts, sample firm, 1967-71. 
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the coefficient of variability in Figures 6.7 and 6.8. 
(i) Extreme variability (coefficients of over eighty per cent) 
beset the Eyre and Northern Divisions of South Australia, 
Victoria's Wimmera and central/northern New South Wales. 
Although these high quotients were often related to low 
equipment turnover, many sizeable dealers were also gravely 
affected. 
(ii) Moderate to high variability (coefficients of forty to 
eighty per cent) was characteristic of both organisations 
throughout most of southeastern Australia. 
(iii) Low to moderate variability (coefficients of up to forty 
per cent) favoured only limited areas in the Mount Lofty and 
Murray Divisions of South Australia, the Western, Melbourne, 
East Central and North Central Divisions of Victoria and the 
New South Wales coastline. 
Spearman rank correlation was applied to test the relationship of 
sales movements and oscillations for the 359 dealer points^^ (Siegel, 
1956: 202-13). High positive results of 0.68 and 0.61 for Companies 
A and B probably reflect some autocorrelation but, given the total 
context, could also imply that overall declines were teamed with 
annual variability in revenue at the average dealership. Agents' 
consequent management problems invariably became those of the franchisor 
— the uncertainty in trading returns was frequently sufficient to 
elicit franchise movement within selling forces. 
The concept of franchise movement 
Ozanne and Hunt (1971: 34-36; 92-98) enter a strong cvi de ooeuP 
for refinement of the concept of franchise movement. The possible ways 
in which change may appear in the retail sector are presented in 
Figure 6.9. Over a certain period, a system can incorporate three 
possible conditions producing: 
(a) a maintenance rate based on stability of outlets; 
(b) a cancellation rate, involving the termination of franchises; 
(c) an addition rate, derived from the placement of new 
dealerships in towns not previously represented. 
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FIGURE 6.7: Temporal variability of retail machinery sales, large firm A, 
agricultural machinery industry, southeastern Australia , 1967-71. 
a Shading based on estimated dealer trade areas to the approximate margins of 
agricultural activity. 
Source: Unpublished sales accounts, sample firm, 1967-71. to 
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FIGURE 6.8: Temporal variability of retail machinery sales^ large firm B, 
agricultural machinery industry, southeastern Australia , 1967-71. 
a Shading based on estimated dealer trade areas to the approximate margins of 
agricultural activity. 
Source; Unpublished sales accounts, sample firm, 1967-71. 
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In recession, cancellation assumes critical importance and can occur 
in either of two guises: 
(a) the replacement rate results from alterations in 
representation within the same town; 
(b) the deletion rate refers to the termination and 
non-replacement of franchisees. 
Next, as part of network performance, the rationale of cancellation 
must be considered. It can occur for entrepreneurial reasons, such 
as the dealer's ill-health, death, voluntary sale of business, or 
dissolution of partnership. On the other hand, it is also instigated 
by market-based causes — lack of local sales potential or achievement, 
failure to pay accounts, liquidation, insolvency, or breaches of 
marketing code. For the franchisor, the prevalence of the latter form 
of cancellation (whether or not replacement subsequently ensues) can 
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be termed a failure vate since it negates the acquisition of local 
market authority and sales volume increases -- his original aims in 
appointing the franchisee. Finally, the net effect over time of 
maintenance, cancellation and addition produces a closing-period 
retention vate. 
This schema is applied best with reference to the initial retail 
disposition, objectives and financial condition of subject companies 
since coverage policies of one might be quite inappropriate for 
another member of the same class. Relative levels of channel control 
can be inferred only after detailed consideration of strategies and 
the magnitude of the various dealer change ratios listed above within 
a given span of time. Two, however, provide especially cogent 
indicators. Because all suppliers should disdain the inherent loss 
of revenue and profits and extra risk involved in financially-inspired 
cancellation, the degree of failure becomes a primary benchmark in 
evaluating the retail performance of machinery concerns. Second, the 
maintenance rate is a significant reflector of the expense and 
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inconvenience incurred by a producer in iJursuing distribution; it 
19 
also portrays a vendee's chances of continuation under franchise 
during the study period. The structural hypothesis would argue tiiat 
greater economic power should aid large franchisors to lower failure 
and to attain higher maintenance than small competitors during 
a business contraction. 
Retail strategies of large firms 
Many differences pervaded the market presence of the main 
organisations in 1967 (Table 6.4). Though full-line companies had 
reduced their outlet numbers over the 1960s, both still retained most 
comprehensive networks. Although Massey Ferguson dealers usually 
handled a greater equipment turnover, those of International 
Harvester, with their diversified interests, were the larger business 
ventures. Agencies of long-line enterprises were somewhat less 
prolific. Ford's representation was spread throughout the mixed-farming 
regions but Chamberlain, with more specialised, large-capacity 
machinery, confined itself to the cereal-growing areas in a localisation 
unique among the leading firms. 
Two overriding strategies, rationalisation and stability, 
characterised those large competitors for which requisite material was 
accessible (Table 6.5). The former, signified by moderate cancellation 
and failure, relatively high deletion, low addition and middling 
retention rates, was undertaken in a fairly passive manner by two 
producers. By 1972, their forces had fallen by an average of eighteen 
per cent — a rather mild outcome compared to the definitive actions of 
smaller corporations adopting this course (cf. Appendix Three). The 
spatial impact of rationalisation is detailed by a case study in Figure 
6.10. Over the recession, the dealer force of the subject competitor 
fell by twenty-two and sixteen per cent in New South Wales and Victoria 
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TABLE 6.4: NUMBER OF RETAIL OUTIJ-TS, LARGE FIPJ^S, AGRTCULTUiy*.L 
MACHINERY INDUSTRY, SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1962-72 
Class Firm State 
Year 
1962-63 1966-67 1971-72 
Full-line N.S.W. 95 95 87 
C Vic. 90 74 64 
S.A. 63 50 44 
Total 248 219 195 
N.S.W. 74 92 72 
Vic. 86 75 63 
D S.A. 54 49^ 50 
Total 214 216 185 
Long-line N.S.W. n.a. 33 29 
Vic. n. a. 25 16 
E S.A. n.a. 31 23 
Total 150^ 89 68 
N.S.W. n.a. 65^ 58 
F 
Vic. 
S.A. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
35^ 
3 5^ 
26 
29 
Total 200^ 135^ 113 
a Estimate. 
Sources:- (i) Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms. 
(ii) Tractor and Implement Guides, Australian Country Magazine, 
various issues, 1968-71. 
TABLE 6.5: RETAIL STRATEGIES, LARGE FIRMS , AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA^, 1967-72 
Retail 
Strategy Firm 
Effects on 1967 Dealer Network 
(cercentaqe rate of) 
Maintenance Cancellation Replacement Deletion 'Failure' Addition Retention 
Commentary 
Rationalisation G" 60 40 17 23 29^ 4 81 Fairly 
passive 
rational-
isation, 
low dele-
tion rate 
H 69 31 12 20 17^ 3 84 Borders on 
stability 
Stability I 79 21 9 12 1 89 Note high 
maintenance 
low addition 
rate 
a Data for fourth firm inaccessible. 
b New South Wales, Victoria and South Australian operations only, 
c New South Wales and Victorian dealers only, 
d Estimate. 
Sources: (i) Dealer lists 1967-72, and personal interviews in sample firms. 
(ii) Australian Country Magazine, Tractor and Implement Guides, 1968-71. 
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FIGURE 6.10: Franchise movement in retail rationalisation, sample large firm, 
agricultural machinery industry, southeastern Australia^, 1967-72. 
a Data for South Australia unavailable. 
Source; Dealer lists 1967-72, sample firm. VD 
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respectively. Terminations, generally centred in cereal-growing 
areas, arose mainly from sales declines and vari£ibility in central 
and north-western New South Wales and Victoria; in other districts, 
entrepreneurial causes were more pronounced. In the most depressed 
regions, dissolution prevailed over replacement, the north of New 
South Wales in fact experiencing serious gaps in representation as 
a result of financial difficulties in five chains. By contrast, 
deletion in the South Western Slopes and Riverina Divisions and 
Victoria's Mallee was caused by retirement among the proprietors of 
several old, marginal outlets. An alternative to such passive 
rationalisation occurred in Victoria's highly-competitive Western 
Division where swift moves were made to replace unsatisfactory 
operators. In comparison, the Gippsland, and Southern Tablelands and 
South Coast of New South Wales were places of relative quiescence. 
In sum, the patterns of franchise change strongly resembled those of 
sales movements and oscillations. 
Stability, indicated by high maintenance, low cancellation, 
deletion, failure and addition rates, was displayed among vendees of 
the third and, probably, fourth firms. A maintenance rate of seventy-
nine per cent, combined with a remarkably low number of additions, 
produced a net decrease in numbers of eleven per cent by 1972. 
Geographical manifestations of the policy are shown in Figure 6.11. 
The subject concern's resellers in broadacre areas — particularly the 
turbulent north-west of New South Wales -- showed surprisingly little 
movement. Most market closure took place in central/northern Victoria 
and foreshadowed a trend of dissolution. Several managers also 
retired in these districts. In general, the majority of alterations 
were seen in areas featuring turnover losses of more than fifty per 
cent and, elsewhere, dealers struggled through the crisis. 
FIGURE 6.11: Franchise movement in retail stability, sample large firm, 
agricultural machinery industry, southeastern Australia, 1957-72. 
Source: Dealer lists 1967-72, sample firm. U1 
Consonant with wider trends in tiie rural service economy, the 
relationship of franchise change to town size was similar in each of 
the retail representation strategies undertaken by large producers 
(Table 6.6). Replacement was generally necessitated in bigger centres, 
whereas deletion characterised the less significant agglomerations. 
Though new additions among the major firms were few in number, they 
were usually situated in somewhat more populous foci than those in 
which deletion occurred. The recession typically favoured economies 
of scale and, in this respect, hastened the by-passing of villages in 
the growing push towards higher-order settlements in country regions. 
The results also suggest that economic forces were trimming excess 
capacity and marginality by raising thresholds in machinery 
distribution. 
Despite such pressures, the solidarity of large franchisors' 
channel authority was underlined by their avoidance of greater 
involvement in corporate marketing between 1967 and 1972 (Table 5.7). 
As heralded in Chapter Five, they were reluctant to risk exposure to 
the vagaries of retailing. While existing stores were sometimes used 
to force markets and shift inventory, new outlets were not established 
solely for this reason (as may have been the case among several 
smaller firms). Rather, the facilities positioned during the study 
period usually pointed up an inability to find adequate replacement 
dealers in important localities or dissatisfaction with the performance 
of current franchisees. Overall, the infrequency of new activity 
mirrored the economic power of the principal organisation and the 
resilience of franchise systems operating with high output levels; 
thus, it accords with both the spatial and financial postulates of the 
structural argument. 
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TABLE 6.6: POPULATION OF RURAL TOWNS EXPERIENCING DEALER CHANGE, 
LARGE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Retail Strategy Firm State 
Average (1971) 
of 
Town Population by Type 
Dealer Change 
Replacement Deletion Addition 
Rationalisation G N.S.W. 10257 1653 2069 
Vic . 6982 4491 6681 
S.A. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
H N.S.W. 4235 9739 971 
Vic. 7080 3156 560 
S.A. 3692 1113 1122 
Stability I N.S.W. 8574 1827 20901 
Vic. 14722 2499 16827 
S.A. 7544 2462 — 
Sources: (i) 
(ii) 
Unpublished dealer lists, sample firms. 
Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Census 
of Population and Housing, 30 June 1971, Field Count Statements 
Nos 3, 4, 6; Canberra, 1971. Also, unpublished data on 
unbounded localities and bounded localities under two hundred 
population supplied by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Canberra, January 1974. 
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TABLE 6.7: ESTABLISHMENT OF CORPORATE RETAIL OUTLETS, 
LARGE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Division Firm Location Date 
Full-line International Horsham (Vic.) 1968 
Harvester Dubbo (N.S.W.) 1969 
Massey Northam (W.A.) 1968 
Ferguson Shepparton (Vic.) 1968 
Long-line Chamberlain Innisfail (Qld) 
Mackay (Qld) 
1971 
1971 
Ford - -
Source; Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms, 
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Evaluation of retail representation 
Among the three large corporations for which data were available, 
325 of the original complement of 475 retailers emerged from the 
recession, indicating a 68:32 probability of continuation during the 
phase under discussion (Table 6.8). An estimated eighty-five of the 
150 cancellations were market-induced, such that the failure rate 
over the full six years ran at eighteen per cent. Fifty-seven 
terminated outlets were replaced and, since new additions were scarce, 
the strength of the three forces had decreased by sixteen per cent by 
1972. The major equipment houses' movement statistics reflect their 
ability to maintain distribution control. Indeed, the downturn 
scarcely accelerated the adjustive long-term contraction which they 
had experienced during the 1960s (Table 6.4). As the farming malaise 
lifted, executives were unanimous in their support of product 
franchising as a means of marketing because, with intensive throughput, 
it had shown its capacity to spread risk and handle sudden declines 
in sales volume. 
RESUME 
Channel authority advantages inherent in decisive franchise policy 
were compounded by those attending the spatial representation of the 
leading machinery merchants. General stability in production and 
administration allowed controlled rationalisation in the wholesale 
sector. Strongly dependent on the influence of positional power, this 
course brought extensive savings and was apparently accomplished without 
undue loss of network or market authority. As a consequence of both 
long and short-term trends in supply conditions, it occasioned substantial 
establishment mobility within distribution forces and afforded a case 
study in the substitution of spatial action for broader corporate ends. 
TABLE 6.8: RETAIL REPRESENTATION, THREE LARGE FIRMS , AGRICULTURAL MACHIITERY 
INDUSTRY, SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA,^ 1967-72 
Condition Aggregate Number of Dealers 
Percentage of 
1967 Dealers Terminology 
Existing 1967 475 100 1967 base 
Existing 1967-72 325 68 Maintenance rate 
Cancelled 1967-72 150 32 Cancellation rate 
Replaced 1967-72 57 12 Replacement rate 
Deleted 1967-72 93 20 Deletion rate 
Failed 1967-72 85^ 18^ Failure rate 
Added 1967-72 16 3 Addition rate 
Existing 1972 398 84 Retention rate 
a Data for the fourth were inaccessible. Names of the present three are suppresse-
for confidentiality. For one firm, only New South Wales and Victorian data 
were available. 
b Nev; South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. 
c Estimate. 
Source: Dealer lists 1967-72, and personal interviews in sarriple firms. 
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At the retail level, further rationalisation and stability was 
evinced, admitting high maintenance and retention rates and only a low 
incidence of failure. In sum, the behaviour of the leading merchants 
corresponds with the hypothesized situation. Chapter Seven contrasts 
the present results with those of small enterprises to permit an 
assessment of the two groups' capacities in sales management and their 
spatial tactics. The fusion of both sets of findings in Chapter Eight 
allows an interpretation of the performance of a product franchise 
system under recession and, in Part Four, leads to conclusions about 
the processes of corporate decision-making. 
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CHAPTER SIX FOOTNOTES 
1. No Other firm had ancillary production units which could be 
closed. 
2. For example, it is estimated that in International Harvester and 
Massey Ferguson, direct farm machinery employment dropped by about 
fifty per cent. Annual reports reveal that the total workforce for 
the latter during the six years after 1967 ran: 2,338; 2,472; 
2,512; 2,060; 1,457; 1,504. Huge lay-offs in the latter half of 
1970 shook both the industry and the press. See The Age [Melbourne], 
22 August 1970, 12 October 1970; The Herald [Melbourne], 11 December 
1970; The Sun [Melbourne], 12 December 1970. 
3. In 1966, International Harvester had purchased a forty-two 
hectare site for a farm machinery factory at Werribee, Victoria. Plans 
were shelved by the recession. See History and Development of the 
International Harvester Company of Australia Pty Ltd, Company 
Publication, Melbourne, n.d., p. 8. 
4. Annual Report and Notice of Meeting 1970, Massey Ferguson 
Holdings (Australia) Ltd, Melbourne, 1970, p. 4. 
5. Bernasek and Kubinski (1963: 461). 
6. International Harvester's Sydney branch -- a truck service and 
retailing depot -- continued the administration of wholesale machinery 
distribution throughout New South Wales. Apart from minor difficulties 
in parts supply, the company perceived its post-rationalisation 
arrangements as more satisfactory. See also Appendix Three. 
7. Larger machinery tliroughput probably perpetuated these branch 
functions longer in Massey Ferguson than in the case of International 
Harvester or Ford. Awareness of service obligations and the 
difficulties of transport connections in the Eyre and Yorke peninsulas 
influenced Massey Ferguson's slow withdrawal from South Australia. 
See also Appendix Three. 
8. For a discussion of Chamberlain's history, see Hutton (1966: 
251-52). 
9. A useful background to aspects of pricing behaviour may be found 
in Guthrie (1950) , Alton (1962) , Gould and Preston (1966) and Knox 
(1966) . 
10. As observed in freight rate books and differentials in interstate 
price lists among the chosen companies. 
11. For commentary on locational implications of other forms of 
price-basing, see Greenhut (1964: 179-84). 
12. The appropriate equation could be written: 
fMean sales (1969-71) 
Percentage sales movement 1967-71 - 100 - Mean sales (1967-68) 
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13. Use of this statistic was determined by its ability to abstract 
from raw data and thereby accord with disclosure provisos. Its 
formula can be expressed: 
Standard deviation of 1967-71 sales „ _ -, ^^^  
Mean of 1967-71 sales 
n(n-l) 
1 
E X 
n 
14. To preserve confidentiality in detailed discussions of individual 
companies' strategies, letters are adopted in the text of Chapters 
Six and Seven and i n Tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 7.7, and 7.10. Allocation 
of letters and ordering of firms' appearances in the tabulations was 
randomised. 
15. The figure of 359 dealers is incompatible with any combination 
listed in Table 6.4 because it includes only outlets for which adequate 
data was available for the period 1967-71. Nonetheless, over ninety 
per cent of the two firms' 1967 retail complement was covered. 
16. All Statistical Divisions mentioned are those construed under 
the old Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics nomenclature 
which pertained until 1970. This terminology was selected because 
it applied throughout a longer phase of the recession. Some changes 
were made by the Bureau in 1971. 
17. Values of the percentage of sales movement were correlated with 
those of the coefficient of variation with the individual dealer point 
as the unit of observation. 
18. In this sense, the definition of failure is probably more 
stringent than would appear in other franchise literature. 
19. The maintenance rate does not portray the dealer's probability 
of 'survival' in the recession, since most outlets have a number of 
supplementary lines. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NETWORK CONTROL THROUGH DISTRIBUTION PRACTICE: 
SPATIAL REPRESENTATION OF SMALL FRANCHISORS 
The differing backgrounds of small equipment franchisors infused 
marked diversity into their representation over the recession. Some 
had scant assurance of survival and were mainly concerned with 
improving their short-term economic condition. Others apparently made 
little adjustment to networks despite unfavourable financial straits. 
Finally, competitive power enabled stronger members to emulate 
strategies previously discussed. Such heterogeneity is confusing, 
since synthetic examples and case studies cannot be used to good 
effect. Yet, a counter is available in inter and intra-class 
comparisons, for which the original grouping is well-equipped. Based 
on these distinctions, this Chapter again examines spatial developments 
at the manufacturing and administrative wholesale and retail levels and 
tests the structural contention that minor firms should have experienced 
greater difficulty in maintaining proper channel authority between 1967 
and 1972. The parameters of recession — sales losses and variability 
— can be assumed from Chapter Six; the incidence of failure, 
breakdown of wholesaling and atrophy of dealer forces now become more 
pertinent indicators of the ramifications of the rural crisis. 
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION AND PRODUCTION 
Variation to the short-line pattern of administration and production 
occurred in isolated instances of centralisation and through closure 
occasioned by takeover or failure. Though, in all, only five companies 
were concerned, they exhibited a high level of activity vis-a-vis that 
of large counterparts and so accorded with the predictions of the main 
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hypothesis. Operational upheaval generated by t?ie change not only 
reflected more stringent repercussions of the setback, but also 
underlined the mobility of corporate facilities. 
Manufacturing centralisation 
Two out of three minor machinery suppliers which manufactured at 
more than a single plant in 1957-68 made locational alterations (Table 
7.1). Case's situation demanded the complete withdrawal of equipment 
fabrication from a recently-opened factory at Murray Bridge (South 
Australia) to the focal Sydney assembly point. Horwood Bagshaw, 
however, combined new centrifugal planning with a programme of asset 
disposals in order to upgrade its liquidity. By 1969, it had 
concentrated the functions of three Melbourne businesses acquired 
since the late 1950s^ on one premises at West Footscray (Melbourne). 
The economic malaise prompted further contraction — at a cost of $A0.18 
million — to keep the Adelaide head-office factory in top gear. The 
expense of the move, completed in 1971, was offset by plant sales in 
Victoria and the redemption of a sizeable Adelaide site once intended 
for expansion. In 1971 and 1972, recoveries on surplus property 
benefited Horwood Bagshaw's cash flow — and loss position — by nearly 
$A1.00 million . Spatially, the case highlighted three issues: 
(a) the intimate relationship of geographical action to commercial 
goals; 
(b) the possibility that major locational investment or 
disinvestment decisions are taken as a last resort in the 
face of extreme financial pressure; 
(c) the potential role of high movement costs in inhibiting 
industrial relocation and promoting inertia. 
The intensity of Horwood Bagshaw's adjustment was paralleled by the 
outcome of takeover or failure in the administration of other minor 
sellers. 
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TABLE 7.1: CHANGES IN CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION AND PRODUCTION, 
SMALL FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Class Firm Event Locations Affected 
Corporate 
Impact Date 
Small 
tractor 
Allis Chalmers Cessation of 
machinery 
production 
Newcastle 
(N.S.W.) 
Major 1968 
Case Cessation of 
machinery 
production 
Murray Bridge 
(S.A.) 
Minor 1970 
Thiess 
Equipment 
Distributors 
Cessation of 
machinery 
importing and 
assemlily 
Sydney Major 1970-72 
Small 
implement 
Horwood 
Bagshaw 
Cessation of 
machinery 
production, 
centralisa-
tion 
Melbourne/ 
Adelaide 
Major 1971 
Ralph McKay Product-line 
manufacturing 
shifts 
Melbourne/ 
Adelaide 
Minor 1970-71 
David Shearer Insolvency; 
acquisition 
by Horwood 
Bagshaw 
Mannum (S.A.) Major 1972 
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms; various 
press clippings supplied by the Tractor and Machinery Association of 
Australia, Melbourne. 
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Takeover and failure 
Though the only takeover between small enterprises — David Brown 
by Case in mid-1972^ — followed expansion among huge international 
parent conglomerates not even directly concerned with the agricultural 
machinery industry, the consequences bear comparison to those of the 
Chamberlain-John Deere merger mentioned before. In contrast to 
Chamberlai n's immediate divestiture of facilities. Case retained all its 
acquisitions including several highly-competitive retail stores. These 
new outlets were used for machinery marketing while Case, enjoying 
improved sales conditions of 1973 and a fortified internal situation, 
deployed its own offices to handle buoyant industrial ranges. The 
dissimilarity of the two results shows the importance of demand, 
environmental and intra-firm factors in shaping spatial policy-making 
in corporate management, as presupposed in Stern's (1966: 13) 
distribution planning model (cf. Chapter One). 
Three failures also abetted significant development in the physical 
arrangement of short-line suppliers. The first, arising from David 
Shearer's announcement of insolvency in August 1972 (The Advertiser 
[Adelaide], 9 August 1972), caused a situation resembling takeover. 
Horwood Bagshaw purchased the company's assets and converted the Mannum 
(South Australia) factory into a division of its own organisation (see 
Appendix Three). Wholesale branches were likewise incorporated or sold 
during 1973, demonstrating some extended implications of the contraction. 
The transaction reflected not only the widespread financial movements 
characterising the agricultural equipment industry between 1967 and 
1972, but also the recession's removal of excess supply capacity. The 
exit of two other enterprises accentuated this role. Allis Chalmers 
ceased importing in 1969, leading to the closure of its Newcastle (New 
South Wales) warehouse. Domestic manufacturing was simultaneously 
phased out at a nearby factory'^. Financially-disarrayed Thiess 
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Equipment Distributors similarly disposed of alJ its inventory by 
mid-1972^ in an intense programme of heavily-discounted sales. 
Sydney assembly space reverted to its parent body and interstate 
branches were shut down. 
The three competitors which terminated their machinery interests 
had among the smallest turnovers in their respective classes and had 
all suffered acute losses with subsequent deterioration of liquidity 
early in the downturn^. They were hampered by product line difficulties 
which frequently predetermined an emphasis on the most depressed 
sub-markets and their positional power was low"^ . Hence, the 
preconditions and incidence of withdrawal from the farm machinery 
industry appear to reinforce the claims of the main hypothesis. While 
failure and the pressures of the slump brought turbulence to the 
highest channel levels of small suppliers, a diversity of behaviour 
suggests that corresponding conditions prevailed elsewhere in their 
distribution. 
WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION 
Wholesale representation policy varied distinctly between tractor and 
implement companies throughout the study era. Networks of the former 
remained essentially static or collapsed into forms of forward 
integration involving direct and bulk selling. By contrast, their 
implement counterparts displayed several different reactions ~ 
rationalisation and restructuring for sounder members, stability or 
retraction for the smaller or weaker competitors. In this arena, 
inter-class comparisons provide the best approach for assessing the 
structural position. 
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Tractor firms: stability and retraction 
Sales vol\imes of all short-line manufacturers were generally 
insufficient to warrant the extensive corporate facilities of large 
organisations. For example, in 1967-68, only two of the tractor 
concerns controlled wholesaling in more than two States and a reliance 
on independent middlemen was most common (Table 7.2). It restricted 
the choice of action open to management from the outset (cf. Little, 
1970: 34); distilled by the relative size of machinery operations, 
longevity and financial status, such dependence produced stability and 
retraction (Table 7.3). 
Three competitors, enjoying equipment revenue comparable with 
most small enterprises but significant penetration in their respective 
specialities, avoided change. They entered the recession in an average 
to favourable economic situation, evincing healthy accounts, weighty 
overseas backing, or wide interests in fields unaffected by decline. 
The only significant alterations were Case's takeover from a non-aligned 
agency in Western Australia and Howard Rotovator's entry into and 
subsequent retreat from company marketing in Victoria between 1968 and 
1971 (Table 7.3). 
Retraction was employed by a second group of four tractor firms 
which, despite their sizeable total standing, were of limited 
importance as equipment producers. For each one, annual penetration 
in any year between 1967 and 1972 was less than three per cent and 
other machinery lines were, similarly, of minor note. Since 
agricultural ranges were peripheral to their corporate thrust, 
distribution was frequently conducted in an autonomous fashion by a 
small division using its own facilities or those of outside agencies. 
Application of economic power in the form of greater investment could 
almost certainly have negated many of these networks' disabilities but, 
in three out of four concerns, liquidity was tight and aggregate 
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TABLE 7.2: WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION, SMALL TRACTOR FIRMS, 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-68 
Wholesale Distribution Facilities within States 
Firm Company 
branches 
Independent 
distributors 
Total Australian 
facilities 
Allis Chalmers 1 1 2 
Australian Motor 
Industries 
1 5 6 
Case 3 2 5 
Fiat 2 4 6 
Howard Rotovator 2 4 6 
Leyland 2 3 5 
Thiess Equipment 
Distributors 
4 1 5 
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms; and Power 
Farminy, Technical Annual 1967-68, [25th ed.], The Sydney and Melbourne 
Publishing Co. Pty Ltd, Sydney, 1967, pp. 11-12. 
TABLE 7.3: WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION STRATEGIES, SMALL TRACTOR FIRMS, 
AGRICULTtlRAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Wholesale 
Strategy Participants Locational Repercussions 
Impact on 
Total Dis-
tribution 
Network 
Year 
Stability Case Change of Hobart independent distributor 
Replacement of Perth independent distributor with wholesale branch 
Minor 
Major 
1968 
1971 
Fiat Intrametropolitan relocation of Sydney head-office and wholesale 
branch 
Minor 1968 
Howard 
Rotovator 
Establishment of Melbourne wholesale/retail store 
Closure of Melbourne wholesale/retail store 
Intrametropolitan relocation of Brisbane wholesale branch 
Major 
Major 
Minor 
1968 
1971 
1971 
Retraction 
> -H 4J 1T3 
U CP 0) JJ c M 
Australian 
Motor 
Industries 
Change of Brisbane independent distributor 
Cancellation of Brisbane distributor 
Cancellation of Sydney distributor 
Minor a 
Ma^or 
Major 
1970 
1971 
1971 
Leyland Replacement of independent distributors with wholesale branches in: 
Melbourne 
Perth 
a 
Major 
Major 
1971 
1971 
r-( IB c -H 
01 E-
Allis 
Chalmers 
Closure of Newcastle (N.S.W.) warehouse 
Cancellation of Perth independent distributor 
a 
Major 
Major 
1971 
1971 
Thiess 
Equipment 
Distributors 
Closure of wholesale branches in: 
Sydney 
Melbourne 
Brisbane 
Perth 
a 
Major 
Major 
Major 
Major 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1972 
a Operative factor in classification. 
Source: Unpublished internal documents cind interviews, sample firms. 
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Q 
profitability low . During the interval under consideration, returns 
on tractors varied from break-even to cascading losses and so 
executives were eager to cut costs, concentrate on other lines and 
curtail deficits. Retraction was therefore associated with either 
forward integration or termination of representation (Table 7.3). 
Different styles of integration were achieved by the important 
vehicle corporations with limited exposure in the equipment industry. 
Leyland amalgamated its tractor supply with that of trucks and buses 
to eliminate two State distributors which could no longer be supported; 
Australian Motor Industries was forced to supplant its formal State-
based wholesaling arrangements with regional assembler/distributors, 
leaving itself primarily a low-stocked importer/concessionaire. 
Terminal retraction, by comparison, saw two smaller, weaker enterprises 
close down various branches prior to quitting the machinery trade. 
Both negotiated huge bulk sales to former dealers who afterwards 
assumed direct importation of the respective brands (cf. Table 7.4). 
Allis Chalmers, never a major contestant in Australia, had gradually 
downgraded its operations over the late 1960s but the collapse of 
Thiess Equipment Distributors signified the most serious instance of 
decay over the recession. 
The implications of retraction vis-a-vis those of stability were 
clearly observable in ancillary facets of wholesale action. As formal 
supply organisation foundered, adherents of the former policies had 
to abandon set product forwarding boundaries over southeastern 
Australia and, consequently, often bore uneconomical transport costs 
through continuing freight absorption or inflated discount margins. 
Further, in contrast to stable producers, the four enterprises 
dispensed with defined representatives' territories and either employed 
roving staff at higher expense or sent factory personnel on service 
calls on an ad hoc basis. All these changes reflected a breakdown in 
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TABLE 7.4: UNIT MACHINERY SALES BY MARKETING MODE, 
SMALL RETI^CTING FIRM, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY 
INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1968-71 
(Percentages) 
Market 
Year 
1968 1969 1970 1971 
Franchised dealers^ 
(Australia) 
97 81 82 68 
Direct sales 3 19 18 8 
Bulk sales - - - 24 
Total sales 100 100 100 100 
a If 'agents'who did not sign franchise agreements had been segregated 
from this category, percentage sales of 'franchised'dealers would 
have shown an even greater decline. 
Source: Unpublished sales accounts, sample firm, 1968-71. 
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the cheap, co-operative arrangements outlined by the printed 1967 
franchise contracts. 
As a group, tractor suppliers lacked the turnover or general 
economic and positional power to apply definitive, cost-cutting 
strategies such as rationalisation. Their stability might have 
averted risk but was probably also an expensive option. The experience 
of marginal participants, however, became the most critical issue in 
differentiating wholesale administration potentialities across the 
entire company size spectrum. It pointed up that risks of outlet 
atrophy, loss of functional independence, and downgrading of coverage 
were imminent within the machinery industry over the crisis — even if 
they were sometimes obfuscated in the complexities of divergent 
business backgrounds and resulting actions, as was the case among the 
other class of small merchandisers. 
Implement firms: a varied response 
Longevity had assisted implement businesses to attain a greater 
complement of company branches than the tractor sample by the start of 
the downturn (Table 7.5). The majority ran depots in all three 
southeastern States and only one had not yet expanded nationwide. 
Relatively high levels of exposure, combined with functional 
specialisation, stimulated a significant amount of spatial readjustment 
in policies of rationalisation, reorientation, stability and forward 
integration (T^ b^le 7.6). 
(i) Rationalisation adopted by three contestants ranged from the 
closure of Adelaide and Sydney branches by New Holland in 
1970 to the deletion of a s^sidiary distributor by 
Melbourne-based Ralph McKay . 
(ii) Reorientation^'^, undertaken by two South Australian firms, 
involved downgrading or elimination of Victorian 
representation, offset by expansion of corporate facilities 
into Western Australia. 
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TABLE 7.5: WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION, SMALL IMPLEMENT FIRMS, 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967 
Wholesale Distribution Facilities within States 
Firm Company 
branches 
Independent 
distributors 
Total Australian 
facilities 
Alfarm Distributors 2 - 2 
Connor Shea 2 4 6 
Horwood Bagshaw 5 1 6 
Ralph McKay 3 2 5 
MobiIco 3 3 6 
New Holland 5 1 6 
David Shearer 2 4 6 
John Shearer 4 2 6 
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms. 
TABLE 7.6: vCHOLESALE Pi:PPi:SE\'TATION STRATEGIES, SMALL IMPLEMENT FIRMS, 
AGRICULTUPAL MACHirrEPY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
a Operative factor in classification. 
Source: Unpublished internal docurients and interviews, sa^ T.ple firms. 
V.'holesale 
Strategy Participants 
Locational Repercussions 
1 Impact on 
Total Dis-
tribution 
i Network 
Year 
F^tionalisatio.i Korwood 
Eagshav 
Closure of Melbourne wholesale branch 
Intranetropolitan relocation of Sydney wholesale branch 
I 
Ma-ior^ ! -.971 
1 Miner ; ^57 2 
t 1 
Ralph McKay | Closure of Melbourne vholesaling subsidiary Major^ ] 1970 
j Change in Toowoomba (Jld) independent distributor j Minor j 1970 
New 
Holland 
Closure of wholesale branches in: 
Sydney 
Adelaide 
a Ma^or a Ma;jor 
1 9 7 0 
1 9 7 0 
Reorientation David 
Shearer 
1 
Replacer.ent of Melbourne independent distributor with wholesale 
! branch 
! Closure of Melbourne wholesale branch 
! Closure of Adelaide parts depot 
Change in Perth independent distributor 
Kenlace.T.ent of Perth independent distributor with wholesale branch 
1 ' * 1 
1 Major 
Major-
Minor 
Minor . a Ma-or 
1 1 9 6 9 
1 
1 9 6 9 
1 9 7 0 
1 9 7 1 
1 9 7 2 
Shearer 
1 Intr=j7etropol:-an relocation of wholesale branches in ! 
! Melbourne | Minor^ 
Sydney | Minor 
1 Replacement of Perth independent distributor with wholesale branch ' Ma^or^ 
1 9 7 0 
1 9 7 2 
1 9 7 2 
Stability Conner Shea | - ! . ' . 
MobilCO 
i 
1 
Replacement of Sydney wholesale branch with wholesale/retail store i 
Change in Brisbane independent distributor 
Closure of Kobart wholesale branch 
Minor 1 
Major 1 
1 9 7 0 
1 9 7 1 
1 9 7 1 
Forward 
integration 
Alfarrr, ! Closure of Adelaide wholesale branch ! 
Distributors j Establisrjnent of wholesale/retail store in ToowooMa (Qld) 
Major-
Ma:;or 
1 9 6 7 
1 9 7 0 
-0 ro 
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(iii) Stability was founded on extensive use of independent 
distributors and incorporated only minor alterations to 
wholesale coverage. 
(iv) Forward integration was forced upon one of the smallest 
suppliers in the total sample by inadequate sales volumes 
and the unwillingness of dealers to accept the risk of 
high-value harvesting lines. 
Several undercurrents, therefore, characterise the approach of the 
implement set. Larger and more viable members accepted the 
competitive uncertainties of rationalisation, whereas smaller ones 
remained stable or were pressed into a retractive forward integration. 
Positional power increased the flexibility of Adelaide and, especially, 
Melbourne merchants. High degrees of corporate coverage prompted 
locational change for asset realisation and cost reduction, as 
evinced in the examples of Horwood Bagshaw, John Shearer and Mobilco. 
Despite a contrast in the implement sample's range of strategies as 
opposed to the relatively homogeneous behaviour of tractor producers, 
the wholesale action of all short-line companies corresponds with 
a major structural dimension. 
Evaluation of wholesale representation 
From the outset, economic standing appeared a chief factor in 
prescribing the choice of tactics in the small sector. Rationalisation 
characterised robust marketers with higher machinery sales volumes; 
the gradation through stability to retraction related to decreasing 
equipment volume and a deteriorating corporate trading situation. 
A spectrum of decay was also mirrored in allied activity such as the 
definition of product supply boundaries. The effects of different 
courses on control potentialities were exemplified in the cleft between 
the experiences of rationalising and retracting enterprises. The 
former were able to enjoy cost reductions but still maintain their 
distribution arrangement along 1967 lines; contraction of outlets 
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among the latter eventually necessitated expensive forms of direct 
intervention and promoted withdrawal. In sum, the situation provides 
tangible support for the relationship of economic power, channel 
authority capacities and spatial conduct proposed in the central 
hypothesis. Evidence from the next channel level seconds this 
viewpoint. 
RETAIL REPRESENTATION 
The prominence of between and within-group variations in small 
suppliers' wholesaling was repeated at retail. Here, from this study's 
stance, problems of heterogeneity were compounded by inadequacies of 
the available records. For instance, primary trade debtor analysis 
was sometimes necessary to complete a set of annual sales statistics 
by dealer point and scrutiny of invoices was even required on occasions. 
Often, disjointed marketing information could not be related 
satisfactorily to other accounts. Although such shortcomings, 
exacerbated by losses, discontinuation of series and personnel 
retrenchments, somewhat limit the following enquiry, minor tractor and 
implement sellers' strategies and franchise movement emerge with 
sufficient clarity to allow comparison with those of bigger enterprises 
in Chapter Eight. 
Retail strategies of tractor firms 
Widely differing patterns of retail coverage obtained among 
tractor concerns in 1967. The three more sizeable participants had 
predominantly active networks, consisting either of a restricted 
number of outlets localised by product applicability (Case) or a greater 
population spread throughout mixed-farming regions (Fiat and Howard 
Rotovator). By comparison, the structures of the remaining companies 
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included a significant complement of non-effective franchisees^^. For 
the two vehicle builders, a few specialists were greatly outnumbered 
by automobile vendees little interested in tractor sales or service. 
Similarly, the sales organisation of Thiess Equipment Distributors 
was inflated by many old, inert resellers taken over in 1967-68. The 
bearing of all four marginal franchisors was distinctly weighted to 
the State of head-office location. 
Differences in the initial constitution of dealerships thus 
presupposed varying courses for the two groups (Table 7.7). Stability, 
the keynote of policy among the first subset, was maintained through 
such techniques as expanded retail margins and credit, selected use 
of consignment stock, infusions of managerial acumen and a relaxation 
of franchise provisions. Compared to the 'stability' of principal 
machinery corporations, it involved the option of low maintenance and 
a far greater influx of additions to keep organisations at original 
strength. Despite the costliness of incessant turnover and high 
failure rates, participants successfully controlled their operations 
along 1967 lines such that no fundamental distribution changes were 
necessitated. The spatial dynamics of the policy are portrayed by 
a case study in Figure 7.1. Similar numbers of market-induced and 
entrepreneurial cancellations were widely scattered throughout 
southeastern Australia with a slight concentration in cereal-growing 
areas. Deletion outweighted replacement but was balanced by an energetic 
search for new appointees, focused on coastal and tablelands districts. 
Hence, the selected vendor apparently diversified geographically away 
from areas worst affected by the rural problems. 
Unwillingness to invest more heavily in machinery left the marginal 
tractor producers without the means to exercise effective control among 
over-large networks and, thus, prompted retraation. The tactic's chief 
characteristics were low maintenance, high deletion and failure rates 
TABLE 7.7: Rf:TAIL STRATEGIES, SMALL TRACTOR FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Retail 
Strategy 
Firm 
Effects on 1967 Dealer Network 
(percentage rate of) Commentary 
Maintenance Cancellation Replacement Deletion Failure Addition Retention 
Stability A 51 49 16 33 29 32 99 -
B 54 46 14 33 36 43 96 -
C Moderate 
to high 
Moderate 
to low 
-Moderate Moderate Low Moderate Slight 
expansion 
Assumptions based on 
interview discussions 
Retraction c 0 •a -H jj 
ra (0 3 SH VJ CP 0 oj -P c •H 
D Nominally 
low 
Low I,ow Low Nominally 
low 
effect-
ively high 
Low Effect-
ively 
fairly 
low 
Assumptions based on 
analysis of dealer 
sales volumes. Large-
ly inactive force. 
E 34 66 5 61 48^ 21 61 -
IB C •H 
(Li •P 
F 24 76 12 64 54 34 70 Total dealer network 
disbanded 1972 with 
franchisor's with-
drawal from market 
G 29 71 15 70 65^ 18 59 Dealer network became 
unaligned in 1972 
with franchisor's wit} 
drawal from market 
a Estimate. 
Source: Dealer lists 1967-72 and personal interviews, sample firms. 
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FIGURE 7.1: Franchise movement in retail stability, sample small tractor 
firm, agricultural machinery industry, southeastern Australia, 1967-72. 
Source; Dealer lists 1967-72, sample firm. 
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and a significant proportion of additions. These agencies, often 
unsatisfactory, were acquired by the two new entrants during their 
early expansion phases to bolster flagging representation and improve 
market share. The terrestrial manifestations of retraction are 
depicted in Figure 7.2. The chosen case shows that deletions, 
emphasized above all other aspects of franchise movement, were most 
prolific in the cereal-growing regions of New South Wales and Victoria. 
Though appointments were again directed towards more temperate zones, 
many subsequently failed because the franchisor's goods were of 
limited application. By 1972, very few dealers were still operative. 
Two different orientations were displayed among the retracting 
suppliers. For Australian Motor Industries and Leyland, the object 
was to contain and continue machinery marketing whereas Allis 
Chalmers and Thiess Equipment Distributors ultimately discontinued 
their participation (Table 7.7). Both avenues, however, frequently 
involved the dissolution of formal franchise procedures as dealers 
uncommitted to principal brands diversified functionally or shifted 
their emphasis to better-known lines of machinery. Retreat from 
selective and orderly distribution was accentuated by heavy discounting 
and bulk and direct selling, especially among the terminating firms 
after 1969^^. When appended to the costs of servicing largely moribund 
agencies, these methods boosted the expense of selling substantially. 
Yet, despite the introduction of hybridisations of franchising and 
even forms of laissez-fai-re merchandising, corporate stores were not 
contemplated (Table 7.8). Indeed, none of the sampled tractor firms 
made strong moves.into the field, probably because of the equipment 
operation's secondary position and restrictions on capital availability. 
For this class of company, the state of dealer forces in 1967, 
longevity, the application of economic power and size of farm equipment 
turnover appeared central to subsequent network authority. While 
FIGURE 7.2: Franchise movement in retail retraction, sample small tractor 
firm, agricultural machinery industry, southeastern Australia^, 1967-72. 
a No company operations conducted in South Australia. 
Source; Dealer lists 1967-72, sample firm. 
TABLE 7.8: CORPORATE RETAIL OUTLET MOVEMENTS, SMALL TRACTOR FIRMS, 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
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Firm Acquisitions Disposals 
Location Year Location Year 
Allis Chalmers - - - -
Australian Motor Industries - - - -
Case Cairns (Qld) 
Moree 
(N.S.W.) 
1967 
1969 - -
Fiat - - - -
Howard Rotovator Dandenonq 
(Vic.) 
1968 Dandenonq 
(Vic.) 
1971 
Leyland - - - -
Thiess Equipment 
Distributors - - - -
a Combined wholesale/retail facility. 
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms. 
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patterns of movement in relation to town size approximated those of 
bigger organisations and suggested a common industry trend to the 
disadvantage of minor nodes (Table 7.9), certain problems among the 
tractor group stand out sharply from those of other competitors. Risks 
of inactivity and attrition among retailers were high and, though Case, 
Fiat and Howard Rotovator retained the status quo through a programme 
of recruitment, the marginal contestants were less successful. In 
order to offset massive outlet loss and remain in the market, they were 
required to diverge from low-cost franchising into largely-untried, 
integrative forms of retailing. The inability of their low-throughput 
systems to maintain their original constitution because of raised 
entry barriers supports the tenets of the structural argument. 
Retail strategies of implement firms 
In 1967, every implement firm except one controlled about two 
hundred cross or multiple-franchised dealers in southeastern Australia. 
These vast networks had been acctimulated partly as a function of 
longevity, but also as a reaction to the concentrated pressure of 
full and long-line suppliers and the dangers of extreme manufacturing 
specialisation. While some franchisees were multifunctional and 
resilient, many others were weak and rather archaic businesses 
ill-equipped to handle the incipient contraction in rural supply 
markets. This siabject group's retail strategies parallelled the 
diversity in their wholesale behaviour and four overriding approaches 
may be discerned (Table 7.10). Definitive rationalisation was 
undertaken by the financially-strong New Holland and John Shearer. 
Backed by significant penetration in their respective product fields, 
they stressed performance criteria and eliminated many marginal or 
unstable dealerships over the recession. Again, a retreat from lesser 
settlements was evident in the association of franchise movement to the 
182 
TABLE 7.9: POPULATION OF RURAL TOWNS EXPERIENCING DEALER CHANGE, 
SMALL TRACTOR FIRMS^, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Retail 
Strategy Firm State 
Average (1971) Town Population 
by Type of Dealer Change 
Replacement Deletion Addition 
Stability Case N.S.W. 13440 12996 13941 
Vic. 7693 5790 7883 
S.A. 704 - 4426 
Fiat N.S.W. 8638 3989 5220 
Vic. 11611 3422 3706 
S.A. 5390 1853 834 
Retraction Allis N.S.W. 11426 3249 4637 
Chalmers Vic. 
S.A. 
19409 4642 8219 
Australian N.S.W. 25430 6360 7792 
Motor Vic. 9048 4657 5693 
Industries S.A. — 725 "" 
Thiess N.S.W. 13830 4740 4519 
Equipment 
Distri-
Vic. 
S.A. 
3508 
17867 
butors 
d Data for Howard Rotovator and Leyland unavailable. 
Sources: (i) Unpublished dealer lists, sample firms. 
(iL) Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Census 
of Population and Housing, 30 June 1971, Field Count Statements 
Nos 3, 4, 6; Canberra, 1971. Also, unpublished data on 
unbounded localities and bounded localities under two hundred 
population supplied by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Canberra, January 1974. 
TABLE 7.10: RETAIL STRATEGIES, SMALL IMPLEMENT FIRi-lS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Retail 
Strategy Firi" 
Effects on 1967 Dealer Network 
(percentage rate of) Commentary 
Maintenance Cancellation Replacement Deletion Failure Addition Retention 
Rationalisa-
tion 
H 56 44 17 27 35 6 78 -
I 61 39 10 31 26 5 74 -
Reorganisa-
tion 
J Average to 
high 
Low to 
average 
Average Low Low Average High Assumptions based on 
interviews 
K 68 32 16 16 20® 9 93 -
Stability L Low to 
average 
Average to 
high 
High High Average 
to high 
High High Assumptions based on 
interview results and 
South Australian data 
M 64^ 36" 2l" 15^ 18^ 7^ 92^ Estimates based on 
Victorian data only 
N Average to 
high 
Low to 
average 
High Average n.a. High High Assumptions based on 
interviews 
Forward 
integration 0 
b b b b b b b (100+) -
a Estimate. 
b Data withheld for confidentiality reasons. 
Source: Dealer lists 1967-72, sample firms. 
00 
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population of supporting urban nodes (Table 7.11). Though deletion 
and failure rates were relatively high, few new additions were made 
and, by 1972, each fi nn had reduced its force by an average of twenty-
three per cent (Table 7.10). The spatial implications of active 
rationalisation vis-a-vis the large manufacturer's more passive 
orientation can be seen by comparing Figures 6.11 and 7.3. The latter 
shows the short-line franchisor acting decisively in the Western and 
Wimmera Divisions of Victoria and in northern and western areas of 
settled South Australia. Elsewhere in the three States, patterns of 
change more closely resemble the sporadic repercussions of the less 
intensive rationalisation. New appointees were scattered in a rather 
random manner to accord with the exigencies of local demand. 
Interpretation of several small implement marketers' actions is 
complicated by insufficient information for 1967. However, contingent 
upon their wholesale moves, two producers appear to have reorganised 
their coverage considerably through administrative alterations in 
Victoria. David Shearer took over the sales organisation of an 
independent distributor^^ while Ralph McKay's southern resellers, 
14 
previously accountable to a Melbourne subsidiary , joined a three-
State force run by the Adelaide-based Port Implements Division. Moreover, 
company stores established in the late 1960s were closed for reasons 
of economy (Table 7.12). Given other franchise movement effected by 
these two concerns, it is unlikely that 'reorganisation' greatly varied 
dealer numbers^^. Each force probably contracted by about ten per cent 
between 1967 and 1972. On the other hand, lack of competitive power 
and recalcitrant product lines forced David Shearer into a more active 
role to counteract its outlets' declining capacity to stock and trade 
high-value items. Its participation paralleled that required of 
another harvesting equipment seller, Alfarm Distributors. 
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TABLE 7.11: POPULATION OF RURAL TOWNS EXPERIENCING DEALER CHANGE, 
SMALL IMPLEMENT FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Retail 
Average (1971) Town Population 
Firm State by Type of Dealer Change Strategy 
Replacement Deletion Addition 
Rationalisation New Holland N.S.W. 15262 3079 3121 
Vic. 9615 7027 1083 
S.A. 4760 634 1208 
John Shearer N.S.W. 5337 1156 9465 
Vic. 8628 2633 2000 
S.A. 1347 601 1473 
Reorganisation David N.S.W. 4769 1118 4375 
Shearer Vic. 1104<^  1660 11950 
S.A. 1532 508 316 
Stability Connor Shea N.S.W. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Vic. 8489 1015 2621 
S.A. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Forward Alfarm N.S.W. 17913 3121 8108 
integration Distribu- Vic. 27088 - 18721 
tors S.A. 
Sources: As for Tables 6.6 and 7.9. 
FIGURE 7.3: Franchise movement in retail rationalisation, small implement 
firm, agricultural machinery industry, southeastern Australia, 1967-72. 
Source: Dealer lists 1967-72, sample firm. 
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TABLE 7.12: CORPORATE RETAIL OUTLET MOVEMENTS, SMALL IMPLEMENT FIRMS, 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Firm 
Acquisitions Disposals 
Location Year Location Year 
Alfarm 
Distributors 
Toowoomba (Qld) 1970 
-
-
Connor Shea - - - -
Horwood Bagshaw Orange (N.s.w.) 
Naracoorte (S.A.) 
Maitland (S.A.) 
1967 
1967 
n.a. 
Orange (N.S.W.) 
Albury (N.S.W.) 
1970 
1970 
Ralph McKay Warrnambool (Vic.) 
Ballarat (Vic.) 
Dandenong (Vic.) 
1967 
1968 
1969 
Warrnambool(Vic.) 
Ballarat (Vic.) 
Dandenong (Vic.) 
1970 
1970 
1970 
MobilCO - - Parramatta (N.S.W.) 1970 
New Holland - - - -
David Shearer - - - -
John Shearer - - Temora (N.S.W.) 1970 
a Combined wholesale/retail facility. 
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms. 
188 
In the absence of 'hard' data, interviews suggested that stability 
prevailed in the representation of Connor Shea, Horwood Bagshaw and 
Mobilco. In any event, each still listed over two hundred points 
serving southeastern Australia in 1972. in conjunction with its 
wholesale rationalisation, Horwood Bagshaw realised on two less-
advantageous ly positioned stores and confined its corporate coverage 
to more immediate markets (Table 7,12). in this company and Connor 
Shea, the nature of output probably determined a slight decrease in 
dealer numbers and a degree of forward integration^^. By comparison, 
Mobilco's involvement in lower-value ranges largely unaffected by the 
setback facilitated control and the acquisition of new retailers. 
Finally, the oonoentvation and forward integration practised by 
Alfarm Distributors saw sales of the larger and more viable resellers 
supplemented by direct retailing, while a restricted number of well-
established small agents continued to act in a service and spotter 
capacity. Like other minor makers, the company reduced its area of 
operations and provided more assistance to franchisees. This 
constrained and highly-mobile form of marketing, backed by fluid 
franchise policy and experience as a machinery dealership at Albury 
(New South Wales), appeared somewhat more successful than formulae 
which involved extensive sales organisations used by other members of 
the lower size echelons^^. 
Against the background of the structural hypothesis, small 
implement houses lack the clear differentiation lent to the tractor 
sample by the criterion of atrophy. Yet, a dimension relating to the 
prominence of forward integration permeates their various strategies. 
Larger and economically more powerful organisations such as New Holland 
and John Shearer enforced distinctive actions and retained their 
wholesale role. Others, especially those selling expensive equipment 
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involving great risk to dealers, became directly concerned with the 
uncertainties of retailing. 
Evaluation of retail representation 
An overview of the various policies of short-line merchandisers 
is afforded by a comparison of aggregated statistics on franchise 
movement (Table 7.13). Among tractor producers, sixty per cent of the 
329 dealers existing in 1967 had been disenfranchised by mid-1972 
indicating a rather inequitable 40:60 probability of continuation. 
In contrast, the 62:38 ratio among their counterparts approximated 
that of large businesses. An estimated 132 tractor dealers were 
cancelled for lack of performance or other market-based reasons, such 
that the recession years exacted a forty per cent failure rate. 
Implement suppliers fared somewhat better with a twenty-seven per cent 
loss. 
During the recession, tractor merchants recorded the high 
increment rate of thirty per cent. Although this host of new appointees 
boosted their retention to eighty-one per cent, many of the final 
complement were only 'nominal' outlets. Indeed, if the withdrawal 
of Allis Chalmers and Thiess Equipment Distributors in late 1972 had 
been assimilated in these statistics, minor tractor suppliers' 
retention would have dropped to sixty-one per cent. The concomitant 
erosion of network and market control not only points up the negative 
implications of retraction and the difficulties faced by marginal 
competitors, but also the applicability of the structural hypothesis' 
predictions to the retail context. 
The combined results of the tractor and implement samples produce 
a maintenance rate of fifty-five per cent among small companies' 
dealerships. Replacement occurred at fifteen per cent of original foci, 
though deletion was twice as prevalent. The total failure rate of 
TABLE 7.13: RETAIL REPRESENTATION, SMALL FIRMS , AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Tractor Firms Implement Firms Total Small Firms 
Condition Aggregate Percentage Aggregate Percentage Aggregate Percentage Terminology 
number of of 1967 number of of 1967 number of of 1967 
dealers dealers dealers dealers dealers dealers 
Existing 1967 329 100 788 100 1117 100 1967 base 
Existing 1967-72 133 40 486 62 619 55 Maintenance rate 
Cancelled 1967-72 196 60 302 38 498 45 Cancellation rat' 
Replaced 1967-72 42 13 123 16 165 15 Replacement rate 
Deleted 1967-72 159 48 179 22 338 30 Deletion rate 
Failed 1967-72 132.^ 40+^ 212^ 27^ 344+^ 31.^ Failure rate 
Added 1967-72 99 30 59 7 158 14 Addition rate 
Existing 1972 268 81 659 84 927 83 Retention rate 
a Companies excluded for lack of data were Howard Rotovator, Leyland, Horwood Bagshaw and Ralph McKay, 
only Victorian information was included. 
b Estimate. 
Source; Dealer lists 1967-72 and personal interviews, sample firms. 
For Connor Shea 
o 
191 
minor franchisors reached thirty-one per cent but its repercussion on 
channel stability was alleviated by a moderate level of additions ~ 
fourteen per cent. Thus, by 1972, sales organisations stood at 
eighty-three per cent of their initial 1967 strength. Seen against 
their respective trends in retail coverage over the 1960s, the 
seventeen per cent decrease among short-line enterprises indicated 
a more striking metamorphosis than the nearly-equivalent fall in the 
dealer numbers of large corporations. More detailed comparisons are 
employed as indicators of relative co-ordination capacities in the 
following Chapter. 
RESUME 
As in franchise policy, the marketing practice of large and small 
producers diverged sharply. The most pronounced change in the latter's 
administration and manufacturing was the forced exit of three 
enterprises. Wholesale policy varied noticeably with a company's size, 
stage of specialisation and, to a lesser extent, positional power. 
The most crucial consequences of the setback were the collapse of two 
networks and the dissolution of formal franchise procedures in several 
others. These results highlight the dilemma encountered by the 
smallest sellers. In the retail sector, their problems created 
sufficient outlet atrophy and loss of authority to necessitate greater 
degrees of forward integration. Again, the principles of low-cost 
franchising were often relinquished. 
Of all the evidence from minor businesses, the decline among 
marginal participants offers the most substantial advocacy of the 
central hypothesis. Chapter Eight now evaluates the performance of 
large and small machinery merchants together to summarise the support 
for a relationship between structural power, consequent network control 
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potentialities and spatial policies during a business contraction in the 
sampled industry. The discussion broadens to examine the effect of 
these factors on market and trading performance as a test of the 
financial postulate of the main argument. Next, a solution to the 
applied problem concerning the economic and spatial response of 
franchising corporations to recession is proposed, finally leading to 
generalisations about the processes and parameters of an enterprise's 
spatial decision-making. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN FOOTNOTES 
1. The three small Melbourne equipment manufacturers were Mitchell 
and Co. Pty Ltd (West Footscray, 1958), Daniel Harvey Pty Ltd 
(Nunawading, 1963) , and Baltic Simplex Machinery Co. Ltd (Spotswood, 
1964). 
2. All Horwood Bagshaw statistics in this paragraph are taken from 
Annual Reports, Horwood Bagshaw Ltd, Adelaide, 1970-72. 
3. See The Weekly Times [Melbourne], 19 July 1972. 
4. The warehouse was located at Bennetts Green, the factory at 
Carrington, Newcastle, New South Wales. 
5. See The Australian Financial Review, 24 March 1972. 
6. See The Australian Financial Review, 23 March 1970; The Advertiser 
[Adelaide], 30 September 1970; The Age [Melbourne], 4 November 1970. 
7. Given the apparent advantages of a Melbourne location in the farm 
equipment industry, all three companies which failed could be considered 
peripheral. Certainly, Allis Chalmers' Newcastle (New South Wales) 
situation was determined more by engineering than machinery interests. 
In South Australia, David Shearer operated from a decentralised 
location at Mannum, about eighty kilometres east of Adelaide. With 
a headcount of over four hundred, it completely dominated the economic 
life of the town, whose population in 1971 Census Field Counts appears 
as only 2,036. The company thus faced extraordinary pressures to 
maintain its workforce and, finally, governmental intervention was 
necessitated. See The News [Adelaide], 19 September 1969, 11 December 
1969; The Advertiser [Adelaide], 6 December 1969, 10 December 1969, 
3 April 1970, 25 November 1970, 5 February 1971; The Murray Valley 
Standard [Murray Bridge, South Australia], 25 September 1969, 11 March 
1971. 
8. See The Age [Melbourne], 4 November 1970; The Australian Financial 
Review, 10 August 1971, 19 May 1972 for reference to these claims. 
9. Ralph McKay's moves were part of a complete corporate reappraisal 
which involved the integration of two newly-acquired and other existing 
subsidiaries as company divisions. See The Courier Mail [Brisbane], 
14 July 1970; The Advertiser [Adelaide], 30 July 1970; The News 
[Adelaide], 30 September 1970. Also, Annual Report 1970, Ralph McKay 
Ltd, Melbourne, 1970. 
10. Barring the Western Australian moves, reorientation can be 
considered almost analagous to rationalisation. 
11. The nominal size of retail forces serving small tractor firms in 
southeastern Australia in 1967 varied from about thirty to one hundred 
and fifty. 
12. See The Australian Financial Review,.17 September 1970; ^ 
Weekly Times [Melbourne], 14 July 1971. For an example of Thiess 
Equipment Distributors' aggressive, price-oriented advertising, see 
The Land [Sydney], 18 February 1971 (p. 42). 
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13. The Buckeye Harvester Co. of Richmond, Melbourne. 
14. Welch Perrin Pty Ltd. 
15. Because of data inadequacies, it is not possible to portray the 
spatial effects of a policy of reorganisation, 
16. Lack of 1967 information precludes mapping the pattern of 
'stability' among small implement firms. 
17. For reasons of confidentiality, the geography of concentration 
and forward integration cannot be mapped. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PRODUCT FRANCHISING UNDER RECESSION: THE STRUCTURAL 
DIMENSION IN CORPORATE STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 
This enquiry has contended that company structural attributes 
representing two forms of competitive power vary relative channel 
authority among selected franchisors. A geographical application of 
the argument predicted that large organisations should follow 
locational pol icies which would maintain or augment their existing 
franchise management capacities. In an economic sphere, it was 
anticipated that they would benefit from greater network control to 
secure better market and general accounting results. Support for these 
views emerged in the analyses of distribution policies and practices 
in Chapters Five to Seven. Now, it is appropriate to advance an 
overall assessment of the central hypothesis, the spatial postulate 
of which is tested by integrating and comparing foregoing results 
from both large and small machinery suppliers. Next, the financial 
variant is evaluated with data from the specialist ratio samples to 
expedite interpretation of the reaction of franchising enterprises to 
depressed demand. Conclusions about processes and relationships of 
corporate spatial decision-making follow in Part Four. 
THE SPATIAL POSTULATE: STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES IN 
DISTRIBUTION POLICY AND PRACTICE 
Large manufacturers, with higher liquidity and net return ratios, 
entered the rural crisis in a slightly more favourable state than most 
small counterparts. Although inter-divisional differences in the 
constitution of marketing agreements were not pronounced, the 
implementation of policy varied. Leading.producers' unequivocal 
stance on key questions of dealer assistance (involving monetary 
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measures and forward integration) and competing products was matched 
by only the soundest small enterprises. Other members of this 
division were unable to retain complete control and witnessed the 
partial collapse of their sales forces. Such atrophy introduced 
hybridisations of franchising or, in more extreme cases, laissez-faire 
techniques featuring direct or bulk selling. Although all subject 
firms aspired to similar authority in their 1967 contracts, a clear 
distinction based on structural features had occurred by 1972. It 
paved the way for further divergence in administration and production, 
and wholesale and retail strategy. 
Central administration and production 
The principal difference in the administration and production of 
farm equipment merchandisers between 1967 and 1972 lay in the incidence 
of failure. Whereas no large organisation closed down, three short-
line participants did. For this trio, deficits in economic and 
positional power produced inadequate network control and declines in 
market position. Finally, their finances became so strained as to 
necessitate withdrawal. Hence, in the manufacturing and management 
sector, the impact of the recession was circumscribed in the manner 
forecast by the central argument. 
Wholesale representation 
At the wholesale level, the spatial variant of the hypothesis is 
supported by study of the preconditions and outcomes of individual 
strategies. In total, five courses — rationalisation, reorientation, 
stability, forward integration and retraction — were employed by 
franchisors in varying economic situations (Table 8.1). Rationalisation 
was indeed the approach of the largest. As foreshadowed in Chapter 
Seven, a turnover gradient cut through the stable and reorienting 
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TABLE 8.1: WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION STRATEGY BY EQUIPMENT SALES SIZE, 
SAMPLE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-71 
($A million) 
Wholesale 
Equipment Sales of Participant Firms 
Strategy Five-year average Approximate range^ 
Rationalisation 15.71 5.00 - 35.00 
Stability 5.79 2.00 - 12.00 
Reorientation 3.76 2.00 - 5.00 
Retraction and a forward integration 
0.96 0.50 - 2.00 
a For reasons of confidentiality, results from policies of 
retraction and forward integration have been combined. 
b Generalised for confidentiality. 
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms. 
198 
enterprises. Retraction was undertaken by only the smallest sellers 
— the ones which, from a marketing viewpoint, could least afford 
such action. 
Other differentials also characterised the adoption of each 
policy. Rationalisation and reorientation, the distinctive and 
perhaps riskier options which alone offered prospects of reducing 
costs without necessarily sacrificing channel power, were entertained 
exclusively by businesses in a itcre robust income and liquidity 
condition at the start of the recession (Table 8.2). Such firms, whose 
mean age exceeded that of all others, were probably corporately over-
represented relative to the rest of the industry and needed to reduce 
their exposure. Thus, they drew on the positional advantages afforded 
by a Melbourne or Adelaide head-office location to withdraw 
strategically-redundant facilities (Table 8.3). Well-established 
dealer networks permitted continued high-level distribution control so 
that, by the end of the crisis, rationalising corporations still 
enjoyed their foremost status on key economic measures (Table 8.2). 
In any event, no participants reverted to old patterns after 1972 — 
partly because they had pre-empted long-term supply movements in the 
equipment trade. Such results contrasted with those attending marginal 
producers' retraction. As shown in Table 8.2, the course conferred 
little financial incentive or advancement to its users. It was 
associated with significant loss of penetration, the use of costly 
marketing alternatives and intensification of existing retail problems. 
Moreover, retraction was perceived as an unsatisfactory and temporary 
step to be rectified when conditions allowed. In two instances, 
however, it instead heralded an exit from the industry. 
Despite complications arising from data inadequacies and often-
intangible expenses and benefits, the ramifications of alternative 
wholesale strategies correspond s\±istantially with prior spatial 
TABLE 8.2: RELATIVE CORPORATE ECONOMIC CONDITION, SAMPLE FIRMS BY WHOLESALE STRATEGY, 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-71 
Wholesale 
Strategy 
Financial Condition Trading Condition 
Net Return on Sales Current ratio Quick ratio 
Average 
1967-68 
Average 
1969-71 
Average 
1967-68 
Average 
1969-71 
Average 
1967-68 
Average 
1969-71 
Rationalisation 2.38 2.11 0.85 0.64 0.05 0.00 
Reorientation 2.33 1.83 0.81 0.60 0.05 -0.15 
Stability 1.90 1.99 0.57 0.53 0.04 -0.01 
Retraction 1.96 1.52 0.54 0.50 0.02 -0.03 
Foirward integration 1.07 1.03 0.48 0.45 a a 
a Withheld for confidentiality. 
Source: Annual accounts and unpublished internal docuinents, sample firms. 
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TABLE 8.3: WHOLESALE REPRESENTATION STRATEGY BY LONGEVITY 
AND HEAD-OFFICE LOCATION, SAMPLE FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL 
MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Wliolesale 
Strategy 
Head-office Location 
Sydney Melbourne Adelaide Perth Other 
Total 
Average (1967) 
Age of Partici-
pant Firms (years) 
Reorientation 
Rationalisation 
Stability 
Forward 
integration 
Retraction 
90 
65 
27 
12 
10 
Total 
(or average) 19 41 
Source: Unpubli shed internal documcnti; and interviews, sample firms. 
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predictions. Although no policies averted economic contraction, 
large firms' attempts to maintain coverage and avoid forward 
integration without undue cost penalty upheld initial advantages and 
probably optimised the economics of network control under the 
circumstances (cf. Table 8.2). Further evidence that their structural 
background assisted better channel management through geographical 
representation tactics is found in the retail sector. Here, the 
hypothesis may be tested by reviewing various approaches' precursors 
and repercussions and by comparing consequent franchise movement between 
both groups of vendors. 
Retail representation 
Although many companies apparently adopted a unified locational 
policy in marketing, the hegemony of factors prescribing wholesale 
activity did not necessarily apply in the retail area (Table 8.4). 
Rather, economic condition, size of machinery turnover, functional 
specialisation and extent of dealer forces appeared primary determinants 
of a producer's choice among five distribution solutions — 
rationalisation, reorganisation, stability, retraction and forward 
integration. Rationalising merchants were all specialised and recorded 
substantial equipment volumes through extensive market coverage. In 
1967 they exhibited healthy finances and retained their primacy during 
the recession (Table 8.5). Their stand emphasized the elimination of 
marginal outlets as a cost-saving measure and, since it attracted only 
moderate maintenance and failure rates, significant channel control 
was still feasible. 
The situation of rationalising companies contrasted with 
difficulties experienced by most small organisations but accentuated 
among retracting producers. From the outset, members of this set had 
limited machinery interests and little jurisdiction in their outlets' 
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TADLK 8.4: WIIOUCSALK AND I'OiTAIL RJiPfiESENTATION STRATEGY, 
SAMPIJi FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
AUSTRALIA, 1067-72 
(Number of firms) 
a Retail Strategy 
Wliolesale 
Strategy Rationalisation Reorganisation Stability Retraction Forward integration 
Total 
Rationalisation 2 1 2 - -
Reorientation 1 1 - - - 2 
Stability 1 - 5 - - 6 
Retraction - - - 4 - 4 
Forward - - - - 1 1 
integration 
Total 4 2 7 4 1 18^ 
a Soutlieastern Australia only, 
b Retail data for one firm inaccessible. 
Source: Unpublished internal documents and interviews, sample firms. 
TABLE 8.5: RELATIVE CORPORATE ECONOMIC CONDITION, SAMPLE FIRMS BY RETAIL STRATEGY, 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-71 
Retail 
Strategy 
Financial Condition Trading Condition 
Net Return on Sales Current ratio Quick ratio 
Average 
1967-68 
Average 
1969-71 
Average 
1967-68 
Average 
1969-71 
Average 
1967-68 
Average 
1969-71 
Rationalisation 2.61 2.77 0.94 0.68 0.05 -0.02 
Reorganisation 2.32 1.96 0.87 0.66 0.06 -0.09 
Stability 1.90 1.95 0.61 0.69 0.04 -0.03 
Retraction 1.96 1.52 0.54 0.50 0.02 -0.03 
Forward integration 1.07 1.03 0.48 0.45 a a 
a Withheld for confidentiality. 
Source: Annual accounts and unpublished internal documents, sample firms. 
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management. Often, they found supplementary lines monopolising 
retailers' working capital or excluding their stock from the floor. 
The restricted penetration, scattered product populations and coverage 
prescribed by recent market entry hampered publicity efforts and 
dissipated farmers' confidence; heavy advertising and price 
discounting became the only solution to the dilemma. Finance companies 
were wary of extending consumer credit on equipment considered high-
risk. Further, since established brand loyalties determined product 
choice in about seventy per cent of sales, the chances of breaking the 
vicious circle without massive investment were slight (Wadley, 1970: 
144). As in wholesaling, marginal suppliers were beset with the 
breakdown of formal franchising and network atrophy. In some instances, 
the need for bulk and direct selling added further expense to that 
connected with servicing largely-inactive dealer forces; inability to 
attain satisfactoiry ongoing marketing arrangements finally contributed 
to the withdrawal of two retracting participants. Seen in aggregate, 
the preconditions and outcomes of different retail planning thus lend 
more weight to the structural claims on the relationship of economic 
and positional power, channel authority capacities, and spatial 
behaviour. 
Subject companies' franchise movement over the rural crisis is 
amalgamated in Table 8.6. Assuming that the data is derived from 
a random sample, inter-divisional variation in change rates can be 
dissected through a large-sample proportion-testing technique based on 
the standard normal distribution (Freund, 1967: 285-87). 
(i) The maintenance rate of major firms was significantly higher 
(p <0.001) than that of small competitors. Between 1967 and 
1972, the former were able to offer dealers a 68:32 
probability of continuation, whereas short-line franchisors 
could only promote a 55:45 ratio. 
(ii) The replacement rate of both groups showed no significant 
difference. 
TABLE 8.6: FRCPCKTION TESTING, RETAIL REPRESENTATION, SAMPLE FIRMS , AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA, 1967-72 
Large Firm.s Small Firms Proportion Testing 
Condition Terrr.inology i^ iimber or , Percentage of Number of ^ Percentage of 2 p Difference Q b francnises 1967 franchises franchises 1967 franchises significant? 
Existing 1967 1967 base 475 100 1117 100 - - -
Existing 1957-72 Maintenance rate 325 68 619 55 -5.00 <.001 Yes 
Cancelled 1967-72 Cancellation rate 150 32 498 45 -5.00 <.001 Yes 
Replaced 1967-72 Replacement rate 57 12 165 15 -1.33 >.025 No 
Deleted 1967-72 Deletion rate 93 20 338 30 -3.96 < .001 Yes 
Failed 1967-72 Failure rate 18^ 344^ -5.38 < .001 Yes 
Added 1967-72 Addition rate 16 3 158 14 -6.41 < .001 Yes 
Existing 1972 Retention rate 398 84 927 83 0.40 > .025 No 
a Three large, nine snail firms. 
b Amonc large firr-.s, virtually every franchise represents one dealership due to outlet exclusivity. Since small 
organisations cross-franchise, the figure of 1117 represents about seven hundred business establishments. 
c Two-tailed test, a = 0.05. 
d Estimate. 
Sources: Data taken from Tables 6.8 and 7.13; for technique used, see Freund (1967:285-87). 
to 
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(iii) The deletion rate of leading corporations, significantly 
lower (p <0.001) than that of their opposition, was a major 
contributor to the disparity in maintenance levels. 
(iv) The addition rate of large producers, who were able to 
maintain their networks principally by replacement, 
significantly underscored (p <0.001) that of their 
counterparts who were forced to seek more distantly for 
retailers in new locations. 
(v) The retention rate of the two samples did not vary 
significantly. 
The parity of the retention rates necessitates analysis of other 
measures to evaluate whether large producers in fact demonstrated 
the firmer channel management capacity. Indeed, their high 
maintenance teamed with low replacement, deletion and addition 
contrasted prominently with the low maintenance and replacement and 
high deletion and addition of smaller competitors. Restricted 
replacement and addition suggests that the retail control among the 
former was not seriously impaired over the recession. Conversely, the 
preservation of minor sellers' forces apparently needed substantial 
effort. Their concentration on new appointments reflected not only 
the difficulties of retaining existing sales organisations but also 
a dispersion of goodwill and external economies; they probably faced 
greater uncertainty than their large counterparts. Compared with 
replacement, additions characterised less populous towns throughout 
southeastern Australia, implying that sundry pressures were gradually 
forcing the short-line manufacturer from primary entrepots (Tables 6.6 
and 7.11). In view of many villages' and hamlets' blight during the 
crisis and centrifugal tendencies in the rural economy, the 
ramifications of this displacement were important in both the short and 
long-term. 
Failure rates command special attention as indicators of 
distribution control capacity. Small producers' market-induced 
cancellation was easily the greater; low sales volumes, untried goods 
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or newly-introduced ranges left their dealers without the service 
and parts market critical to viability in a depressed sales period. 
For little-known franchises, outside commercial wholesale finance^ 
and services offered by leading machinery companies such as floor-
planning, staff training, goodwill, national advertising and buy-back 
protection on faulty parts ordering were frequently unavailable and 
so minor firms' retailers more commonly succumbed to high degrees of 
competitive exposure. In essence, the nature of retail strategy and 
franchise movement endorses the structural viewpoint concerning the 
effects of franchisors' relative channel capacities on distribution. 
Evaluation of the spatial postulate 
Both policy and practical facets of marketing in the Australian 
agricultural machinery industry over the recession indicate principal 
sellers' anticipated primacy in network control. From the outset, 
they stood more firmly on their established marketing agreements and, 
in both wholesaling and retailing, were able to employ geographical 
policies which cut costs while still maintaining adequate authority. 
The financially-stronger small companies were similarly favoured but, 
in contrast, marginal machinery suppliers saw their sales forces 
recoil under demand declines. Their locational strategy was frequently 
determined by necessity, atrophy was common and in some cases 
contributed to failure. The disparity points up the applicability of 
the spatial postulate to the chosen context. Following sections now 
question whether major firms' more comprehensive distribution 
management and their representation action should have assisted better 
market and financial performance as predicted in Chapter Two. This 
enquiry permits a thorough review of the structural hypothesis' 
contribution to an understanding of business behaviour in a depressed 
208 
franchise system and expedites conclusions about corporate decision-
making in Chapter Nine. 
THE FINANCIAL POSTULATE: MARKET AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
An assessment of machinery producers' competitive standing is hampered 
by data limitations. As sales penetration information is elusive, 
turnover figures are used to gauge market status (cf. Bernasek and 
Kubinski, 1963: 480). At best, they approximate a vendor's relative 
position over time; thus, three measures — farm equipment and 
aggregate corporate dollar volumes, and extent of functional 
diversification — are examined to improve the analysis' accuracy. 
Relevant eaonomia parameters represent income relationships and short-
term operating condition, as expressed in liquidity. Profit and loss 
account and balance sheet ratios are again employed. 
Sales performance estimate of market control 
During the rural setback, large and small suppliers' net maahiner>y 
2 
sales declined in roughly equivalent proportion (Table 8.7) . Both 
groups were equally depressed until the 1969-70 collapse in which the 
former's turnover fell more heavily. Subsequently, it recovered 
faster than that of short-line manufacturers who experienced another 
reversal in 1971. However, equipment's importance to the two divisions 
varied considerably since large organisations were less dependent on 
machinery as a source of revenue. In 1957, it accounted for fifty-one 
per cent and, by 1971, only forty-two per cent of their total turnover 
(Table 8.7). In contrast, the small corporation's concentration 
retreated from seventy-nine to, still, seventy-one per cent over the 
same period. The continuing emphasis on depressed lines deflated its 
overall sales and profit performance. 
TABLE 8.7: MARKET CONTROL INDICATORS, SA^ P^LE FIRZ^ IS, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
AUSTRALIA, 1967-71 
Company 
Estimated Net Farm 
Machinery Turnover 
Consolidated Net 
Corporate Turnover 
Functional Diversification 
(percentage of net 
Financial 
Years (Index 1967 = 100) 
farm machinery to 
corporate turnover) 
Large firm>s Small firms Large firms Small firms Large firms Small firms 
1967 
! 
100 100 100 100 51 79 
1968 95 94 106 106 49 78 
1969 88 92 110 112 46 75 
1970 59 71 99 95 42 72 
1971 65 60 110 90 42 71 
Average 1967-71 81 83 105 101 46 75 
Source: Annual accounts and unpublished internal financial documents, sample firms. 
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The advantages of size and conglomerate status in combating 
moribund markets were strikingly apparent on the corporate plane. The 
aggregate volume of larger enterprises with limited machinery 
interests (such as the vehicle builders) scarcely betrayed any adverse 
effects of the downturn (Table 8.7), Major equipment producers and 
their opposition suffered similar contraction in 1970; whereas the 
former recovered a year later, the latter underwent a further reversal. 
As a result, their average 1967-71 index lags behind that of the 
principal firms^. 
With respect to the relationship of network and market control, 
present results are optimistic but inconclusive. Further testing is 
required with penetration data for key product groups between 1967 and 
1973; even the addition of 1972-73 sales statistics would allow 
a more satisfactory evaluation. On the other hand, the above 
information highlights the importance of corporate stature and 
diversification in dealing with localised demand declines. Coming 
investigation of financial performance offers further support to the 
large organisation's implicit resilience. 
Financial performance: profitability 
Standardised corporate net income figures reveal that small 
merchandisers suffered scattered losses between 1967 and 1969 (Table 
8.8). After 1970, the majority joined two large producers. 
Chamberlain and Massey Ferguson, in heavy deficits. Such unsatisfactory 
ret\irns, the first since inception for many companies, arose from 
excess competition in the agricultural equipment industry which 
promoted lower accommodation of overheads. In 1971, improved revenue 
assisted major suppliers to a marginal improvement while their 
counterparts descended further into depression. 
TABLE 3.8: CORPORATE NET TRADING PROFIT (LOSS) AFTER TAX, SAMPLE FIRMS, 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, AUSTRALIA, 1967-71 
($A thousand) 
! ] Company Financial Years 
Class Firr. 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Large Full-line International Harvester 3882 3113 3257 2061 1201 
Massey Ferguson 2516 2080 315 (2792) (1266) 
Long-line Chamberlain 590 815 587 (700) 319 
U 
Ford 9791 8651 13483 14995 16082 
Small 
1 
short-line Allis Chalmers (233) (786) (602) (429) 401 
i tractor Australian Motor Industries 1584 2140 1858 1653 1088 
Case 129 201 210 (704) (482) 
Fiat 28 78 6 37 32 
Howard Rotovator 76 93 145 232 200 
Leyland 799 1959 807 (783) (2470) 
Thiess Equipment Distributors 0 (20) 21 (2094) (65) 
Short-line Alfarm Distributors 130 6 62 15 (76) 
implement Connor Shea 336 274 154 (293) (337) 
Horv.'ood Bagshaw 219 (228) 191 (389) (1416) 
Ralph McKay 431 436 476 339 262 
Mobilco 196 99 73 (2) 0 
New Holland a a a a a 
David Shearer 55 148 (231) (738) (208) 
John Shearer 384 285 264 (381) (352) 
a Divisional accounts withheld for confidentiality. 
Source: Published annual accounts or yearly returns to the State Registrar of Companies. 
KJ M 
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Inter-firm comparisons can be pursued better through consideration 
of the net margin (net profit after tax/consolidated net sales) and the 
net return on equity (net profit after tax/shareholders' funds and 
reserves). Both show a similar interrelationship among specialist 
machinery sellers and total Australian manufacturing (Table 8.9). 
From 1966-67 to 1970-71, the net margin of the nation's secondary 
sector averaged 4.34 per cent. By comparison, the large equipment 
supplier recorded a 0.60 per cent return and his opposition -0.30 per 
cent. The performance of leading businesses was assisted by an upturn 
in 1971 whereas, in the same year, the minor companies slipped again. 
This inequality in recovery rates, also reflected in the net return on 
equity, provides a key distinction between the divisions (Table 8.9). 
Yet, although these profitability figures appear to uphold the 
structiiral predictions, the major company's income record did not 
necessarily extend to its economic condition. 
Financial condition 
Principal suppliers, with a mean 1967-71 current ratio of 2.39, 
manifested more satisfactory gross liquidity than small contestants 
over the rural setback, but their initially-high working capital 
diminished after 1970 because of heavy overheads (Table 8.10): 
we had a commitment on production — for one, to 
keep the factory open, for two, if we didn't 
produce the goods into a finished unit...we'd 
have the same amount of collateral in unfinished 
units, so all we really did was increase our 
investment, in man-hours labour [large Melbourne 
supplier, 12 July 1972). 
Extensive manufacturing obligations, combined with the stock 
accumulation of 1968-69 (cf. Table 3.8), created an inventory imbalance 
within current assets. Additionally, the ramifications of the large 
group's long-term trading goals introduced an element of hesitancy into 
supply management during 1969-70: 
TABLE 8.9: NET PROFITABILITY, SPECIALIST RATIO SAMPLES, 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY AND AGGREGATE 
MANUFACTURING, AUSTRALIA, 1967-71 
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Company 
Financial 
Years 
Per Cent Net Profit After Tax Oven 
Consolidated net sales 
(net margin on sales) 
Aggregate 
Australian 
manufacturing 
Machinery firms I Aggregate 
Shareholders' funds and reserves 
(net return on net worth) 
Large Small 
Australian 
manufacturing 
Machinery firms 
Large Small 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
4.00 
4.20 
4.70 
4.50 
4 .30 
5.00 
4.50 
2.00 
-7.50 
- 1 . 0 0 
5.50 
3.62 
3.38 
-6.50 
-7.50 
7 .00 
7.70 
9. 50 
9.60 
9.60 
13.50 
14.00 
6.00 
-16.00 
- 2 . 0 0 
14.50 
7.00 
6.55 
-7.67 
-10.67 
Average 
1967-71 4.34 0.60 
-0.30 I 8.68 3.10 1.94 
Source: Annual accounts and unpublished internal documents, agricultural 
machinery industry ratio sample, and Australia [Tariff Board] (1972: 14). 
TABLE 8.10: FINANCIAL CONDITION, SELECTED MEASURES, 
SPECIALIST P-ATIO SAMPLES, AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 
AUSTRALIA, 1967-71 
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Liquidity Measures 
Company 
Financial Current ratio Quick ratio 
Years Large firms Small firms Large firms Small firms 
1967 2.48 2.05 0.76 0.76 
1968 2.52 1.98 0.57 0.65 
1969 2.52 2.05 0.71 0,85 
1970 2.45 1.97 0. 34 0.51 
1971 2.00 2.16 0.65 0.63 
Average 1967-71 2.39 2.04 0.61 0.68 
Source: Annual accounts and unpublished internal documents, agricultural 
machinery industry ratio sample. 
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by April 1 9 6 9 . . . [we] suggested we should be 
cutting all our forecasts by about sixty per 
cent . . . unfortunately , this wasn 't executed 
until about November/December of that year. 
And, in the next y e a r . . . forecast levels were 
set around an industry level of fifteen 
thousand tractors and weren 't reduced until 
March 1970 to more or less ten thousand units 
{lavge Melboiame supplier, 8 May 1972) . 
By mid-1970, hedging behaviour and an almost universal excess 
4 
capacity perpetrated an industry crisis : the inventory/consolidated 
net sales ratio of large and small producers was seventy-one and 
f i fty per cent respectively, compared with twenty per cent for 
aggregate manufacturing (Australia [Tariff Board], 1972: 1 4 ) ^ . Amidst 
s ignif icant balance sheet movements in the large sector^, one company 
appealed to its dealers to deliver additional machines and make 
settlements within thirty days to ease: 
[a] liquidity problem [which] has developed 
because of the high inventories, both with us 
and on a floor plan basis with dealers and 
distributors , plus inventories of parts to 
build machines that we know will not be used 
for some time. Our liquidity is also greatly 
affected as cash collections planned for this 
year have not been forthcoming {oonf'tdent-iat 
letter to dealers, large supplier, source 
suppressed, 27 July 19 70) . 
Such acute stock d i f f icult ies found expression in the quick ratio, 
which excludes frozen short-term assets and compares cash equivalents 
against current l i a b i l i t i e s (Graham e t a Z , 1962: 219 [fn. 11 ] ) . In 
1970, large manufacturers' quotient fell to 0 . 34 as opposed to 0 . 51 
elsewhere in the industry: i t reduced their average 1967-71 quick 
liquidity slightly below that of short-line counterparts. This acid 
test of financial well-being therefore points strongly to advantages 
of f lex ib i l i ty accruing from the minor operation. I t also suggests 
that large merchandisers traded hard to achieve their market objectives 
and, in the short-term, sacrificed some internal strength. Such 
circumstances crystallise the rationale of their wholesale and retail 
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policies: spatial strategy was substituted to improve finances and 
became a powerful device in achieving corporate aims. 
Evaluation of the financial postulate 
The available evidence from machinery firms can afford limited 
backing to the structural argument. The relationship of network and 
market control appears viable but is clouded by data shortcomings. 
While net income statistics seem at first to correlate business size 
with profitability, an incongruence to previous findings demands more 
intensive review (cf. Sheridan, 1974: 46-50). Any move to include 
measures of financial condition further weakens the postulate, since 
its monistic assumptions cannot necessarily encompass broader 
performance with success. Specifically, it downgrades the role of 
non-distribution factors in the marketing mix and the contributions of 
other company functions to the final accounts. Nonetheless, the present 
brief enquiry usefully demonstrates the stability of the large 
enterprise, an outcome with notable geographic implications incorporated 
below in the overall solution to the applied problem. 
A SOLUTION TO THE APPLIED PROBLEM 
As a way of highlighting broader aspects of corporate behaviour, this 
study grappled with the problem of identifying and assessing the 
economic and spatial response of product franchisors to depressed 
demand. The rural recession modified the distribution policy and 
practice of the sample in three ways: 
(a) revision of objectives to accommodate rapid market shifts and 
increased prospects of failure; 
(b) more pronounced goal-orientation, which frequently invoked 
the substitution of spatial and non-spatial courses; 
(c) the introduction of economising actions, a policy which 
completely revised existing physical patterns. 
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The enquiry posited a link among company structural attributes, 
expressed in the intervening variable of channel authority, locational 
tactics and business fortune. As anticipated, the intensity and 
direction of the above changes varied with the type of organisation. 
Economic power (evident in a firm's size, financial resources, 
diversification and longevity) and positional influence (determined 
by the siting of head-offices and the extent of contemporary distribution 
facilities) acted through the franchise code and representation strategy 
to modify the downturn's impact. Thus, in aggregate terms, sizeable 
conglomerates were the least affected, followed by large and then small 
specialist machinery producers^. In the equipment market, major 
undertakings' advantages were reflected in their resilience, an ability 
to retract market coverage without significant loss of control (and, 
probably, penetration), higher dealer continuation rates, maintenance 
of existing retail locations and avoidance of network atrophy. 
Despite these concordant findings, the supposed association of 
firm characteristics with market and financial results can be accepted 
only with limitations. VThile the incidence of withdrawal from the 
industry and the nature of much competitive distribution activity 
accords with the hypothesized situation, the relative success of 
different systems is not sufficiently explained. On the other hand, 
the spatial argument seems highly relevant since it accurately accounts 
for the response of suppliers exhibiting varying commercial statures. 
Thus, the presumed interaction of firm factors, franchise management, 
and geographical policies can be sustained and, with more precise 
information, could probably be amplified to cover the parameters of 
market control and economic performance. This solution to the applied 
problem and qualified acceptance of the structural position can be 
pursued at two levels — in relation to farm machinery producers and 
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product franchising — as a prelude to specific comments about corporate 
decision-making in Chapter Nine. 
Agricultural machinery franchisors 
Although the 1967-72 setback furthered many prevailing patterns 
of the 1960s, it formed a distinct historical phase in the selected 
industry. It whittled away marginality and chronic excess capacity. 
A wave of failure and amalgamation lifted entry barriers, altered 
competitive relationships in the closely-knit oligopoly, and 
necessitated extension of product lines to assist the acquisition and 
g 
maintenance of sales forces (cf. Bernasek and Kubinski, 1963: 476). 
At the wholesale level, the decline encouraged rationalisation and 
asset realisation through a rise in the thresholds of branch operation. 
Expansion of corporate regions weakened adherence to political 
boundaries and furthered a national orientation among primary members of 
the equipment trade. In future, the reduction in outlets necessary to 
serve a market demanding fewer machines of greater unit value could 
allow smaller competitors to dispense with some independent 
distributors and assume Australia-wide integrated marketing (cf. Barber, 
1971: 76). In this respect, the rural crisis demonstrated to 
machinery corporations the benefits of a Perth-Melbourne-Brisbane depot 
pattern; they could also be acknowledged by other suppliers dealing 
chiefly with non-metropolitan demand. 
Further significant change appeared in the retail area. Raised 
requirements for effective outlet operation again supported 
rationalisation policies in the removal of marginal facilities and 
concentration on fewer, bigger dealers centred in major towns (cf. 
Tables 6.6 and 7.9), Such a move merely particularised the recession's 
impact within thie urban hierarchy — it hastened centrifugal tendencies 
in the country economy and beleaguered the less populous nodes. The 
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trend could perpetuate many franchisors' long-standing difficulties 
in finding suitable representation and thereby encourage corporate 
distribution through retail stores. Although it accounted for up to 
ten per cent of some machinery suppliers' turnover between 1967 and 
1972, this mode was generally avoided because of cost and risk 
disincentives. Yet, future company establishments could conceivably 
prove a more attractive investment through horizontal expansion beyond 
the sponsoring manufacturer's range. A move of this type would accord 
with a related and widely-anticipated development fostered by the 
recession's attack on brand exclusivity — the American-style farm 
supply supermarket. These facilities, which stress merchandising 
technique and a greater segregation of the sales and service function, 
could be used constructively to promote one line of goods backed up by 
associated products but, among consortia of short-line business, they 
are likely to advance cross-franchising. 
Essentially, a lack of differentiation at the sales point would 
represent a more laissez-faire form of marketing than the industry 
presently welcomes^. The escalation of retail barriers prescribed by 
a smaller number of cross-franchised outlets would upgrade the 
influence of positional power and revise current channel relationships 
in favour of dealers. Franchisors might be required to undertake 
greater forward integration in their services and in the placement of 
corporate stores to serve areas of inadequate penetration. Yet, since 
this possibility could be averted through merger or different 
representation policies, protracted discussion is still premature. 
More generally, however, the issue questions the value of product 
franchising as a distribution method in dynamic conditions — both 
during recession and in the fature. 
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Product franchising 
As Slater (1964: 21) has pointed out: 
editorialists like to wax enthusiastic about 
the untold opportunities in franchising, and 
as advocates of the system, we applaud this 
healthy outlook. By the same token, we fear 
that in their bullishness, the editors might 
be overdoing it a bit: most franchisees have 
done extremely well, but the franchisor did 
not merely wave a magic wand and -- presto, 
filled the parking lots. 
In addition to indicating franchising's many positive features, events 
in the farm equipment market throw new light on less sanguine 
possibilities removed from the glow of the system's recent publicity. 
Orderly marketing of producer durables depends heavily on accurate 
stocking and forecasting, adequate wholesale and retail facilities 
and organisational flexibility, especially as regards cost and asset 
management. Excessive inventories in the industry under review 
created severe dislocation through an inability of seasonality counters 
such as early sales programmes to handle cyclical movements. 
Accommodation of these more extenuated forces calls for increased 
market research and long-term planning but the cheapest and most 
effective solution probably lies in functional diversification. The 
example of machinery producers suggests that the recent entry and 
consequent lack of horizontal integration among many franchise 
organisations, particularly in business and trade name applications, is 
a point of potential vulnerability in the technique's growth. 
Clearly, the value of this distribution method lies not in its 
contractual relationship, as some writers have implied, but in its 
implementation. On the question of risk and change, one of the more 
perceptive critics, Ingraham (1963: 43) argues that franchising 
seems well suited to fujgtion under conditions 
of change. As Alderson points out, it can be 
classed as an ecological system because of the 
peculiar nature of the bond among the components. 
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The components are sufficiently integrated 
so that the system can operate as a whole, but 
[it] is simultaneously open to expansion via 
the addition of components, and to improvements 
in efficiency by the replacement of 
components. In a franchise system, the 
secondary units [dealers] share the risks 
attendant to adjusting to environmental change. 
This view may be accepted with certain reservations. A well-established, 
high-level system is a malleable and resilient tool. Yet, like other 
forms of business enterprise, franchising has a threshold below which 
it cannot perform effectively for any channel party. For instance, 
between 1967 and 1972, uni-f\inctional suppliers would have required an 
average annual turnover in tractors and machinery of at least $A3.00 
million to contemplate using the practice successfully. Below this 
volume, there appeared hybridisations or the complete collapse of 
marketing leading to corporate withdrawal from the industry. While 
the experience of marginal competitors was unfavourable, franchising 
did not necessarily 'break down' in adverse conditions. Some participants 
lacked certain prerequisites for satisfactory operations while others 
upset delicate physical distribution balances by accumulating excess 
stock. Such contingencies would have corroded almost any organised 
selling method. Yet, in several cases, the unique internal allocation of 
risk and overheads allowed studied networks to handle short-term declines 
of up to fifty per cent of average annual throughput without serious 
disruption. It seems unlikely that either corporate or horizontal 
modes would have performed as efficiently because of hindrances 
imposed by fixed costs and inadequate administration respectively. 
Although its strength clearly relates to the network control and 
structural attributes of the franchisor, product franchising appears 
adequately-equipped to accommodate the dynamic demands of recession 
now and henceforth. 
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Generalisation of results 
Exacting experimental conditions detailed in Column A of Table 
8.11 urge caution in generalising the project's results. The 
structural hypothesis was applicable to the produot franchise system 
of a produoev-durdbles industry in a oonsumev marketing environment. 
Unlike other depressions, the operative economic setback was localised, 
temporarily-confined, and induced by income factors within the demand 
function. Perhaps only amongst the motor vehicle and truck trades 
could all these specifications be replicated. Strictly, therefore, 
extension of the current findings should be limited to these fields. 
Moves beyond the contingencies arrayed in Column A of Table 8.11 should 
centre initially on Cells 3B and 6B, since the particular market and 
duration of recession would probably alter attendant reactions little 
from that observed in farm equipment supply. In fact, a longer, more 
widespread or severe setback would conceivably emphasize the larger 
concern's advantages and, hence, reinforce the claims of the central 
hypothesis. Similar structurally-oriented patterns of corporate 
behaviour could thus be expected within the oil, automobile, and 
specialised household appliance industries in a major business setback 
— whether the Depression of 1929, the 'Credit Squeeze' of 1961 or 
even the immediate economic downswing of 19 74. 
However, the present conclusions may not necessarily apply to other 
forms of franchising or marketing (Cells 1 and 2). Business and trade 
name systems relate primarily to non-durable goods and services with 
substantially different demand characteristics to the product-based 
group. The effect of variation in the type of marketing or recession 
is similarly obscure, since few Australian franchise organisations sell 
other than directly to consumers, and supply-induced recession has been 
rare in advanced economies since 1945. Yet, the contemporary fuel 
TABLE 8.11: EFFECT OF EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
ON GENERALISATION OF RESULTS 
Variable Cell 
Conditions 
A B C 
Type of marketing 1 Consumer Industrial Institutional 
Type of franchising 2 Product Business Trade name 
Type of market 3 Producer Consumer -
Type of goods 4 Durable Non-durable -
Nature of recession 5 Demand-induced Supply-induced -
Enjration of recession 6 Brief Protracted -
Extent of recession 7 Localised General -
Source: Author. 
ISJ 
NJ 
OJ 
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crisis with its implications for vehicle manufacturers could open 
possibilities — albeit unappealing ones. After the case of franchising 
such investigations could lead towards a wider view of distribution 
under economic contraction -- a useful practical endeavour and 
worthwhile contribution to a discipline whose theoretical masterworks: 
are not to be found in textbooks; they are 
still to be developed (Halbert, 1965: 59). 
The benefits to another nascent field, marketing geography, would also 
be considerable. 
RESUME 
Although an association of channel and network authority and general 
financial performance could not be demonstrated conclusively, core 
aspects of the main hypothesis had direct application to the conduct 
of Australian farm equipment merchants between 1957 and 1972. An 
integration of findings from large and small franchisors supported 
the predicted relationship of company competitive powers expressed 
through structural attributes, distribution control capacities, and 
the choice of spatial strategy. This insight permitted a broad 
interpretation of the recession's effect on the subject industry, the 
adaptation of product franchise systems to uncertainty and the 
universality of current results. Completion of the analysis now leads 
to conclusions about selected processes of corporate spatial decision-
making in Part Four. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT FOOTNOTES 
1. In fact, finance companies, controlling wholesale floor-planning 
while also selling near-new repossessions, became serious competitors 
for machinery dealers. 
2. Raw data were entered into the computations without adjustment. 
Price increases between 1967 and 1972 were largely offset by the 
indeterminate, raised, or floating wholesale margins which effectively 
lowered producers' net sales during the period. 
3. Three small suppliers, specialising in areas outside the 
machinery market onslaught, were fortunate enough to escape the 
recession's blight. In contrast, the most debilitating total sales 
decl ine recorded in the division was fifty per cent from 1957 levels. 
4. See The Australian Financial Review, 12 May 1970. 
5. Overstocking led to severe price wars, expressed in inflated 
wholesale margins and trade-in allowances at retail. See The Australian 
Financial Review, 17 September 1970, The Weekly Times [Melbourne], 14 
April 1971. 
6. Specifically, Massey Ferguson was required to undertake heavy 
overseas borrowing. See The Australian Financial Review, 22 June 1970, 
14 December 1971 for further details of the company's problems. 
7. Much of the recession's impact was therefore related to levels of 
corporate exposure. 
8. If further amalgamations ensue as a result of the recession, the 
industry structure of the late 1970s could exhibit more pronounced 
concentration. Remaining small firms would face a choice of intensive 
specialisation for competitive advantage, merger, or product and 
functional diversification. Either of the last two options — probably 
the more attractive for risk and profit-conscious management — would 
contribute to the corporate growth process described by Steed (1971c: 
55) . 
9. The development of restrictive trade practices legislation will 
afford dealers greater discretion on exclusivity issue. Cross-
franchising is widely practised in the United States. 
10. W. Alderson, Marketing Behaviour and Executive Action, Irwin, 
Homewood, 1957, pp. 29-32. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
ASPECTS OF CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING DURING RECESSION 
Until recently, the rise of the corporation had not attracted great 
attention in geography. Now, however, its striking impact on advanced 
and developing lands has demonstrated the need for information about 
its geographical activities. Conventional theory, centred around the 
small businessman, is of limited assistance in the quest. Yet, its 
relevance can be gradually uplifted by study of the large producer's 
decision-making and its relationship with that undertaken by the 
entrepreneur. Such a method was adopted in this enquiry, whose chief 
finding is the influence of firm size and other structural factors 
expressed through channel management potentialities on high-level 
commercial action during recession. Conclusions about establishment 
turnover, scale effects and the siibstitutability of policy elucidate 
further the processes and relationships governing major companies' 
choice-patterns and show how they differ from those of the single-plant 
operation. 
PROCESSES OF DECISION-MAKING 
Even among a few leading undertakings, much heterogeneity prevails in 
competitive tactics. It is best countered by intensive, longitudinal 
analyses of business adjustment, in which an awareness of line 
management functions and their part in the proposal of geographical 
moves is essential. Practical aids such as Stern's (1966: 13) 
marketing planning schema offer an integrated view which is often 
missing in the design of extensive surveys. This particular technique 
treated location through underlying firm goals which it separated from 
divisional objectives. In the subject industry, an oligopoly with 
227 
numerous conglomerates, the former exercised a decisive influence on 
the conduct of specialists, whereas the latter appeared to hold 
somewhat more sway among diversified concerns whose chief interests 
were in other product fields. Various responses to the setback were 
therefore latent from the outset. But in contrast to the predictions 
of traditional theory — and, presumably, the position of the 
entrepreneur — most depression-bound suppliers seemed preoccupied with 
aims other than profit maximisation. Balance sheet relativities were 
a focal issue among minor distributors, while primary organisations 
could still consider trading criteria — market share, representation 
and so forth — as foremost in facility placement and the achievement 
of future desires (cf. Webber and Daly, 1971: 16). Though not mutually 
exclusive, the two orientations were based on a fundamental gap between 
both groups' perspectives and expectations. Major concerns frequently 
expressed their certainty of survival despite the dangers of the crisis 
but such assurance was by no means universal in the small sector. 
Much of the diversity in spatial behaviour among sampled contestants 
could be traced to this distinction, illustrating the importance of 
size factors in the determination of strategy. The response of the 
bigger undertakings was also modified by the perceptions of the 
participants in decision-making procedures. For example, one instance 
of inter-divisional conflict over a spatial question accentuated 
a range of formal pressures which could have scarcely impinged on the 
deliberations of the local businessman. The nature and intensity of 
the corporate policy-process suggests even greater disparity between 
the two actors' situations, as outlined with respect to establishment 
turnover. 
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Establishment turnover 
Manufacturing investigations have fostered the notion that 
commercial shifts involve long-term management choices and heavy 
capital investment, making the penalties of error sufficiently severe 
to predispose inertia (see Steed, 1971c: 54). This study confirms the 
high cost burden in relocation. Yet, the conventional argument 
neglects the stimuli to change inherent in the business cycle and 
caused additionally by demand oscillation, monetary appreciation, and 
the wish to realise assets. As one illustration, recession prompted 
intense physical alteration over a six-year period among farm equipment 
merchants, encompassing not only the wholesale and retail areas but 
also production installations. Clearly, these results support Steed's 
(1971a: 207) speculations about large producers' facility transition. 
Some of the mobility was probably due to the neglected option of 
leasing, whereby location decisions need not presume extensive funding. 
High-risk industries together with new and 'footloose' firms often 
prefer this proposition as a means of reducing financial exposure and 
hedging against functional diversification or technological progress. 
Wider application of the principle should be anticipated in the 
future, thus allowing spatial tactics to be accomplished in an 
investment or operating framework depending on the certainty prevailing 
(cf. Toffler, 1971: 65-68). Establishment movement could increase 
commensurately, though perhaps not to the extent portrayed among the 
selected companies which were under duress from the economic downturn. 
Nonetheless, the magnitude of the observed change again points out the 
cogency of the corporate phenomenon and its transcendence from the 
entrepreneur. More specifically, it underlines the significance of 
scale, and relationships governing the enterprise's policy determination. 
229 
RELATIONSHIPS IN DECISION-MAKING 
Stem's model listed both the processes ccnd the variables likely to 
affect choices in the major concern's marketing sector. At a general 
plane, diverse influences in the environment, the market and within 
the organisation itself play a role. Physical movement occurs 
chiefly as a part of product distribution. In this setting, it can 
be substantially modified by communications demands or those of the 
goods in question. Therefore, between proposal and implementation, 
plentiful opportunities exist for the substitution of geographical 
with other types of activity. 
Substitutability of spatial policy 
Most of a large undertaking's manoeuvres are contemplated in 
response to its overall aims and divisional objectives. Rarely is 
location regarded as an end in itself but one among many competitive 
courses open to executives in achieving their ends. Several subject 
businesses, for instance, executed spatial action through asset 
realisation as a way of augmenting cash flows and counteracting 
liquidity pressures. Others attained the same outcome in an aspatial 
manner — through short-term borrowing. An appreciation of the 
rationale behind such varied behaviour demands a more intensive 
focusing on the intra-firm situation than has previously obtained in 
geography. In this respect, present conclusions about scale effects 
provide some useful perceptions. 
Scale effects 
The bearing of scale on the distribution of commercial facilities 
can be interpreted at two levels. In the-higher echelons of an 
industry, it is expressed through company structural attributes and 
2 30 
exercises a marked influence by laying the bases on which choices are 
made. In a well-established field of production, a vendor's stature 
is determined by a wide range of correlates, such as sales, investment 
and financial strength, and operating stability. They are linked to 
market representation through network control, a medium virtually 
unrecognised in previous writing. 
This project has also argued the effects of scale in the 
divergence of the enterprise's decision process to that of the single-
plant concern around which much work has centred in the past. The 
distinction is amply depicted by the case of the recession; large 
organisations' courses were devised with copious information through 
extensive feedback mechanisms and proceeded with a calculated fashion 
towards specified aims. The composition of strategy employed developed 
pathways; it was not an ad hoc or infrequent exercise but, rather, 
an ongoing task based on change in the milieu, market and intra-firm 
position. In fact, several negotiations could have been undertaken 
concurrently. Yet, for each, the corporation would have suffered 
less aggregate financial exposure than the small businessman in his 
one locational initiative. For the former, economic objectives are of 
central interest and little adherence was found to accrue to lifestyle 
factors which may pointedly affect the geographical predilections of 
the entrepreneur (cf. Katona and Morgan, 1952: 80-81; Eversley, 1965). 
While the pecuniary orientation vindicated the current concentration 
on accounting statistics, their use and the subsequent application of 
other accepted methods of industrial analysis must depend greatly on 
the development of the conglomerate. Its growing complexity is 
outpacing research efforts to find basic parameters, let alone its 
locational matrices. Therefore, directions for future research are 
critical. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH THRUSTS 
As a basis for the coming discussion, it is apposite to list briefly 
this thesis' main findings and their relation to prior writing. The 
study has established certain repercussions of recession at six levels 
— that of the Australian rural economy, country towns, product 
franchising, the farm machinery industry, and its participant 
manufacturers and dealers. Most importantly, conditions of extreme 
uncertainty conferred an unusual view into the nature of corporate 
spatial decision-making. As portrayed by establishment mobility and 
strategy substitution, its component processes and interrelationships 
seemed removed from those of the entrepreneurial situation; it was 
geared more expansively to serve different company aims. They were not 
necessarily the aims of classical location theory and varied with the 
characteristics of individual organisations. Apart from implying that 
the assumption of continuing prosperity has weighed too heavily in the 
past, these findings support the supposed divergence of the enterprise 
and lone businessman. By centering on the former, little-explored 
area, they afford some insight upon the interface. 
To pursue this thrust, the ultimate objective of enquiries issuing 
from this analysis would be a reassessment of conventional theories in 
the light of the corporation's progress. A three-stage attack is 
envisaged. The immediate step is to verify present conclusions by 
contacting a sample of extant and de-registered machinery firms smaller 
than the nineteen selected here in order to examine their experiences 
between 1967 and 1972. A later check on all subject groups should 
evaluate the recession's prolonged ramifications. Second, the results 
must be generalised by considering the different states listed in 
Table 8.11. The initial emphasis would deal with the outcome on 
policy-formation of variation in the type, duration or extent of an 
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economic setback or the nature of the market served. Siibsequent 
enquiries within other forms of franchising and marketing could 
produce a theory of corporate location in franchise systems during 
both depressed and favourable business eras. 
Establishment of this bridgehead would introduce a third drive 
designed to detect whether the behaviour reviewed here (or any other 
aspects under further investigation) hold throughout the secondary 
sector. Sophisticated comparisons of tactical choice in horizontal 
or fully-integrated vertical distribution could employ previously-
determined franchise information as a control. Recognition of the 
effects of variation in experimental conditions (as demonstrated in 
Table 8.11) would foster a scientific approach to the discovery of 
spatial regularities characterising the large firm's marketing — the 
sector which provides most opportunities for geographical change. 
Emergent principles could be later integrated with results of research 
into its manufacturing patterns and, finally, turned to improve the 
applicability of existing theory. 
Such planning presumes preparatory logistics work. Apart from 
material on size concentrations collated by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics and the Industries Assistance Commission, sources by which 
enterprises and their operations may be identified are lacking. 
Although the new Census of Economic Activity is attempting to tackle 
the definition problems, broader acknowledgement is needed of issues 
relating to reporting and disclosure (cf. Mautz, 1968). Multi-
disciplinary conferences between company directorates, collection 
agencies, and users of statistics would be a worthwhile measure to lay 
the bases for future studies. 
Assuming headway with these practical considerations and the 
continued support of enlightened business management, a complementary 
advance could be effected to the dynamics of corporate strategy and 
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aspects of Australian economic geography. To avoid the confusion of 
facts hampering conceptualisation in marketing, a focus on established 
theory must always obtain (cf. Kernan and Sommers, 1968: vii). 
A paramount responsibility is the assimilation of new empirical 
conclusions with prior research into firm behaviour and plant location. 
Given properly organised investigations and the growing importance of 
both product distribution and the corporation to the nation's welfare, 
marketing geography appears poised to make a significant applied 
contribution and forge a new place in the mainstream of the discipline. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
PARTICIPANT AND OTHER FIRMS 
This Appendix presents a list of the nineteen agricultural machinery 
companies which participated in the study and various other Australian 
firms referred to in the text. 
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THE NINETEEN PARTICIPANTS 
Alfarm Distributors Pty Ltd, 
Hume Highway, 
ALBURY. N.S.W. 2641 
Allis Chalmers Australia Ltd, 
N.R.M.A. House, 
26 Ridge Street, 
NORTH SYDNEY. N.S.W. 2060 
Australian Motor Industries Ltd, 
155 Bertie Street, 
PORT MELBOURNE. Vic. 3207 
J.I. Case (Australia) Pty Ltd, 
Windsor Road, 
NORTHMEAD. N.S.W, 2152 
Chamberlain Industries Pty Ltd, 
(until 1970) and, thereafter: 
Chamberlain-John Deere Pty Ltd, 
Welshpool Road, 
WELSHPOOL. W.A. 6106 
Connor Shea and Co. Pty Ltd, 
Fourth Avenue, 
SUNSHINE. Vic. 3020 
Fiat of Australia Pty Ltd, 
Cnr. Egerton Street and Silverwater Road, 
LIDCOMBE. N.S.W. 2141 
Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd, 
(Tractor and Implement Division), 
1764 Sydney Road, 
CAMPBELLFIELD. Vic. 3061 
Horwood Bagshaw Ltd, 
Victoria Street, 
MILE END. S.A. 5031 
Howard Rotavator Pty Ltd, 
Boxindary Road, 
NORTHMEAD. N.S.W. 2152 
The International Harvester Co. of Australia Pty Ltd, 
171-205 City Road, 
SOUTH MELBOURNE. Vic. 3205 
Leyland of Australia Ltd, 
(Tractor Division), 
52 Joynton Avenue, 
WATERLOO. N.S.W. 2017 
Ralph McKay Ltd, 
36-42 Hampstead Road, 
MAIDSTONE. Vic. 3012 
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Massey Ferguson (Australia) Ltd, 
2 Devonshire Road, 
SUNSHINE. Vic. 3020 
Mobilco Ltd, 
410-422 Whitehorse Road, 
MITCHAM. Vic. 3121 
New Holland Division of Sperry Rand Australia Ltd, 
232 Princes Highway, 
DANDENONG. Vic. 3175 
David Shearer Ltd, 
Adelaide Road, 
MANNUM. S.A. 5238 
(until 1972) 
John Shearer and Sons Ltd, 
Share Street, 
KILKENNY. S.A. 5009 
Thiess Equipment Distributors Pty Ltd, 
Alexander Avenue, 
TAREN POINT. N.S.W. 2229 
(until 1972) 
OTHER FIRMS UNDER DISCUSSION 
David Brown Tractors Pty Ltd, 
49 Derby Street, 
LIDCOMBE. N.S.W. 2141 
(until 1972) 
John Deere Ltd, 
160 Sunnyholt Road, 
BLACKTOWN. N.S.W. 2148 
(until 1972) 
H.V. McKay Pty Ltd, 
(until 1930) and, from 1930-58: 
H.V. McKay Massey-Harris Pty Ltd, 
2 Devonshire Road, 
SUNSHINE. Vic. 3020 
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APPENDIX TWO 
A COMPOSITE AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY 
FRANCHISE AGREEMENT 
This Appendix presents a composite franchise agreement typical of those 
obtaining in the Australian agricultural machinery industry in 1967. 
From the sixteen available contracts, representative clauses have been 
selected to cover the thirty-nine subject areas listed in Table 5.5. 
Rather than simply reproducing one firm's document, this procedure was 
adopted to ensure confidentiality and avoid bias. For practical 
reasons, however, the more detailed examples have been chosen to allow 
a full view on the average marketing code. On the question of 
manufacturer/dealer equitability, the collation attempts to maintain 
a neutral stance. 
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DEALER AGREEMENT 
for the Sale of 
Products manufactured and/or sold by 
SURROGATE COMPANY LTD 
Made this day of 19, 
between 
SURROGATE COMPANY LTD 
(Herein called THE COMPANY) 
and 
trading as 
in the State of 
(Herein called THE DEALER) 
Agreement Number, 
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INTRODUCTORY CLAUSES 
(1) Purpose of agreement 
The Company believes that a well-informed and prosperous dealer 
organisation is necessary to bring the full benefits of [its] 
equipment to the primary producer. [It] commands facilities for 
design, production, and supply of numerous types of agricultural 
equipment and desires to maintain and extend the use of its equipment 
by Australian primary producers in volume and efficiency. The Dealer 
has been selected by the Company as a dealer in its equipment competent 
to provide throughout the Dealer's territory adequate and continuous 
sales effort and prompt efficient and courteous technical service. The 
Company desires to assist its dealers to obtain the best possible 
results and expects the Dealer to maintain suitable business premises, 
sales, service and parts facilities to avail himself of the Company's 
sales guidance, merchandising plans, advertising programmes, business 
organisation methods (including financial recording and housekeeping) 
and personnel training. 
(2) Previous agreements cancelled 
This agreement supersedes all prior dealer agreements whether 
verbal or written subsisting between the parties immediately prior to 
the date hereof in relation to goods of which the Company may be the 
distributor and all such agreements are hereby cancelled by mutual 
consent. 
(3) Interpretations 
In this agreement, lonless the context otherwise requires, any word 
importing the singular includes the plural and vice versa and any word 
importing the male includes the female and neuter; machine means a 
tractor or any tool, implement or appliance designed for use in 
agriculture or pasturage and offered for sale or sold by the Company 
and includes parts and accessories; industrial in relation to use 
means use other than agricultural or pastoral and in relation to 
equipment means anything being used or intended to be used for any 
purpose other than agriculture or pasturage; person includes 
corporation; and, in relation to the Company, Manager means the Chief 
Executive Officer of the .Company. 
(4) Jurisdiction stated 
All rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities under all orders 
received by the Company from the Dealer shall be governed by the laws 
of the State of It is understood, however, that such orders 
are in a general form and that any provisions therein which may in any 
wise be illegal or void under the laws of state, territory, or other 
jurisdiction in which a contract is being enforced shall be deemed not 
to be a part of the order. 
(5) Products covered 
The Company's products included in this contract are all 
agricultural tractors, agricultural machines and agricultural 
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implements for the time being manufactiired and/or dealt in by tlie 
Company, together with attachments, accessories, and parts (including 
plough shares, and earth-engaging discs and points therefor). 
(6) Contract non-assignable 
This agreement cannot be sold, bartered, traded, transferred or 
assigned either in part or as a whole by the Dealer without the prior 
written consent of the Company. 
(7) Franchise granted 
The Company hereby extends a franchise to the abovenamed Dealer 
for the sale of implements and machines, attachments and duplicate 
parts (hereinafter referred to separately, or collectively as goods) 
s\Jbject to the terms and conditions hereof and to such instructions as 
may be given in writing by the Company from time to time. 
GENERAL CLAUSES 
(8) Design changes, product exclusions 
The Company may discontinue the supply of any model of the said 
goods or make any modification in the design of the components or 
fittings or parts for any of the said goods at any time and shall be 
under no obligation to make any such modification to any of the said 
goods previously ordered or purchased by the Dealer whether they are 
then new or have become used or second-hand and the Dealer shall not 
alter any of the said goods whether new or second-hand or change or 
substitute any of the components, fittings, or parts as sold by the 
Company nor do anything that will in any way infringe, impeach or 
lessen the validity of the patents or trademarks under which any of the 
said goods may be made or sold. 
(9) Passing of title to goods 
The property in goods delivered under this agreement shall not pass 
to the Dealer before payment for them is made by the Dealer to [the 
Company]• 
(10) Non-agency franchise 
The relationship between the Company and the Dealer shall be that 
of vendor and vendee and the Dealer shall under no circumstances be or 
be deemed to be the agent of the Company and, except as may be 
hereinafter provided, the Dealer shall not have any right or authority 
express or implied to enter into any contracts or commitments, nor to 
make any representation or condition, nor to give any warranty in the 
name of or on behalf of the Company or purporting to bind the Company in 
any respect whatsoever and the Dealer shall indemnify and keep 
indemnified the Company against all actions,.claims and expenses arising 
out of any breach by the Dealer of this provision. 
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(11) Use of trade marks 
The Dealer will sell the machines under their respective names or 
trade marks and not otherwise, and will not use those names or trade 
marks or any of them in connection with any firm name or telegraphic 
address or in any form or connection to which tlie Company shall have 
objected and, on termination or cancellation of this agreement, the 
Dealer will cease and abstain from further use of such names and will 
thereafter not use any word, expression or device so nearly resembling 
any such name or mark as may tend to confuse or deceive the public. 
(12) Definition of territory 
The Dealer's territory comprises the town of 
and the surrounding districts (herein called the Dealer's territory). 
(13) Exclusivity of territory 
The Company hereby grants to the Dealer, subject to the terms and 
conditions hereinafter appearing, the right within the territory... to 
canvass for offers for the sale of or letting out on hire (on such 
terms and conditions as the Company may from time to time in writing 
direct) of new tractors, implements, equipment accessories and spare 
parts. The Company reserves the right to make such amendments or 
alterations to the territory as it shall from time to time consider 
desirable for any reason whatsoever. The right hereby granted shall 
not prejudice or affect the right of the Company or any subsidiary, 
distributor, dealer, or agent of the Company to sell or hire any of the 
said goods within or for use within the territory, which right is 
expressly reserved, to the intent that the right hereby granted is 
non-exclusive. The Company's ruling shall be final in connection with 
any matter arising from or connected with infringement of the territory 
or any infringement by the Dealer of any of the provisions of this 
agreement. 
(14) Types of prohibited sales 
The Dealer recognises and understands that the Company may sell, 
lease, or loan the goods covered by this agreement for use in the 
Dealer's trade area to: 
(a) the Commonwealth Government and any department and agency 
thereof; 
(b) State or local governments and any department or agency 
thereof; 
(c) manufacturers to be used by them in equipment of their 
respective manufacture or assembly or the repair thereof; 
(d) dealers or distributors of the Company's other product 
lines for use by such dealers or distributors in the 
operation of their business; and 
(e) educational or charitable institutions or agencies. 
The Dealer also recognises and understands that the Company may sell, 
lease or loan the goods covered by this agreement through: 
(a) Company-owned retail outlets, wherever located; and 
(b) to dealers wherever located. 
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No commissions will be allowed or paid to t±ie Dealer on any sale 
of tlie types referred to in this section made by the Company or any of 
its dealers or distributors in the Dealer's trade area. Wtien, upon 
request of the Company, the Dealer assembles, adjusts, or delivers to 
the place specified by the Company any goods sold, leased, or loaned by 
the Company for use in the Dealer's trade area, the Company will 
compensate the Dealer for his services at the rates established by the 
Company for such purposes and in effect at the time the services were 
rendered. 
(15) Policy on sub-dealers 
A Dealer may distribute the goods within his territory through 
agents or sub-dealers appointed by him. The Company accepts no 
responsibility for arrangements between the Dealer and his agents or 
sub-dealers. 
(16) Instructions to dealers 
All orders, directions or requirements to the Dealer, if made in 
writing and signed by any manager or other duly authorised employee of 
the Company shall, for the purpose of and incidental to this agreement, 
be deemed an order, direction or requirement of the Company and the 
Dealer agrees to be bound by them. The expression the Company shall 
be deemed to include any manager for, or duly authorised employee of 
the Company in the Commonwealth of Australia; and the word office 
shall mean the Company's chief office which controls the Company's 
business for the State in which tlie Dealer resides. 
(17) Service of notices 
Any notice under this contract may be served by letter signed by or 
on behalf of the Company or the Dealer and posted to the address of the 
other and shall be deemed to have been served on the day following 
posting. 
(18) Variations of contract 
This agreement shall not be varied, added to or altered, nor shall 
any obligation thereunder be waived or modified otherwise than in 
writing under the hand of the Manager for the time being of the Company 
or under the seal of the Company. 
(19) Policy on competing products 
During the continuance of this agreement, the Dealer shall not and 
shall procure that no person, firm, or corporation on behalf of or as 
agent for the Dealer or being directly or indirectly siobstantially 
under the control of the Dealer or being a subsidiary of the Dealer 
shall, without the consent in writing of the Company first had and 
obtained enter into any agreement with any person, firm, or corporation 
for the sale of any tractors, accessories, equipment attachments, 
implements and spare parts other than the said goods. 
(20) Powers of waiver 
The failure or forebearance of tlie Company to enforce at any time 
any of the provisions of this agreement, or to exercise any option or 
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right which is herein provided, or to require at any time performance 
by the Dealer of any of the provisions hereof shall in no way be 
construed to be a waiver of such provision and shall not in any way 
affect the validity or effectiveness of the agreement or any part 
thereof, nor the right of the Company to thereafter enforce each and 
every provision. The exercise of one right or remedy shall not 
constitute an election or preclude the Company from exercising all the 
rights and remedies available to it by law or hereunder. 
OPERATING CLAUSES 
(21) Policy on acceptance of orders 
The Company may, at its option, accept any orders for any of the 
said goods forwarded to the Company provided that, notwithstanding 
anything herein contained or implied to the contrary, there shall be no 
obligation upon the Company to accept any order from the Dealer or to 
deliver any of the said goods so ordered to the Dealer. All orders 
accepted by the Company shall be deemed to have been accepted subject 
to and upon the condition that the Company is londer no liability 
whatsoever for failure to deliver or for delay in delivery from any 
cause whatsoever and howsoever arising. Any order given by the Dealer 
to the Company may be accepted by the Company as to part only of the 
goods ordered. Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the 
contrary and whether express or implied, the acceptance by the Company 
of any order or any part of any order for any of the said goods shall 
be revocable by the Company and be final and binding on the Company only 
as to such of the said goods referred to in the order for which the 
Company has given written notice to the Dealer in readiness for delivery 
(hereinafter called delivery notioe) . 
(22) Terms of payment 
Payment for goods are to be made not later than the twenty-fifth 
day of the month following the month in which the invoice is raised. 
All goods supplied by the Company to the Dealer remain the property of 
the Company until the whole of the purchase price and transport and 
other charges are paid to the Company. Payment to the Company means 
payment in cash, and payment by cheque shall not be treated as payment 
until the cheque is honoured. 
(23) Used equipment dealing 
The Dealer shall undertake second-hand dealing in tractors and 
agricultural machines and equipment as a corollary of being able to 
offer to take the same trade-ins on the sale of the Company's 
products, and, to this end, the Dealer shall establish a second-hand 
equipment trading fund available to finance such second-hand trading. 
(24) Delivery and financial procedure 
Delivery of any of the Company's products purchased by the Dealer 
shall be at the Company's premises from which the goods are despatched. 
Unless otherwise arranged at the time of order, payment of the price 
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for the Company's products shall be made on delivery provided always 
that , i f in any case extended terms of payment are allowed, the Company 
shall have an unpaid s e l l e r ' s lien upon the Company's products 
concerned, and the Dealer shall not part with title to or possession of 
those Company's products to any purchaser or bailee until payment in 
full to the Company of the purchase price of those Company products is 
made. 
(25) Non-fulfilment of orders 
The Dealer assumes al l responsibility for loss or damage to the 
products from any cause after despatch by the Company from its 
factories or any of its branches to the Dealer, and no loss or damage 
from any cause during the period between despatch of the products by 
the Company and f inal payment in cash of the purchase price shall 
relieve the Dealer from any of his obligations hereunder. The Company 
shall not be l iable to the Dealer in any manner whatsoever for loss, 
damage, detention or delay in final deliveiry resulting from causes 
beyond its control, or caused by act of God, f i r e , strike , war, c iv i l 
or military authority, insurrection or r iot , embargo, car shortage, 
wreck, delay by suppliers of materials , or delay in transportation; or 
in any event for consequential damages, the Company's sole 
responsibility being limited to fulfilment of the warranty referred to 
[before] . 
(26) Consignment conditions 
I f , by agreement, the Company supplies any of the Company's 
products to the Dealer for sale on consignment, the Dealer shall hold 
those Company's products and the proceeds of sale thereof in trust for 
the Company and the following conditions shall apply. 
(i) No property in Company products on consignment shall pass 
from the Company until they are sold and the full retail 
price therefor is received by the Company. 
( i i ) All moneys, cheques and negotiable instruments received by 
the Dealer shall be paid into the Company's banking account 
to the Company's credit without deduction for discounts or 
otherwise. 
( i i i ) The Dealer w i l l insure with an approved insurance off ice 
at his own expense, in the name of the Company, against loss 
or damage by fire or other cause at their retail cash value 
all products sent to him on consignment by the Company and 
w i l l indemnify the Company against loss or damage in the 
event of his failure to comply with this clause. 
(iv) The Dealer shall not deliver any products to a customer 
from consignment stock without f irst securing a signed order 
from the customer and obtaining the consent of the Company 
and any failure on the part of the Dealer to observe this 
provision shall render him liable to pay for such products 
at retail l ist prices . 
(27) Retail pricing policy 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein or 
implied, the Company reserves the right to 'a lter or amend as it may in 
its absolute discretion deem f i t the dealer wholesale buying price 
f ixed by i t from time to time by notice in writing sent by prepaid 
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post to the Dealer at his address appearing in this agreement. The 
Dealer undertakes that he w i l l advertise and sel l tlie [products] at 
only the r e t a i l prices f ixed by the Company from time to time. The 
Company reserves the right to change its retail sel l ing prices and 
Dealer wholesale prices of the [products] at any time by telegram or 
letter . 
(28) Policy on written orders 
Orders for equipment w i l l be accepted by the Company from dealers 
for fully-equipped machines only, and these must be on the o f f i c i a l 
order forms. These orders w i l l be regarded as irrevocable contracts. 
No machine w i l l be despatched without a signed order form from a 
dealer , or a signed [subsidiary] finance agreement. 
(29) Spare parts policy 
The Dealer undertakes to buy from the Company the whole of his 
requirements of parts for the Company's products and to maintain 
throughout the currency of this agreement a stock of such parts as i s , 
in the opinion of the Company's responsible o f f i c e r s , adequate to 
service the Company's products in the Dealer ' s territory . The Dealer 
undertakes to place orders for parts in accordance with regular parts 
ordering programmes which the Company may conduct from time to time. 
After expiration of thirty days from date of purchase, parts purchased 
by the Dealer under this contract shall be returnable to the Company 
only after submission of a detailed l i s t by the Dealer and after 
receipt of written approval from the Company. For current parts , the 
Company w i l l credit the Dealer with the ruling dealer p r i c e , less 
f i f teen per cent discount . Parts which are not current in the opinion 
of a responsible o f f icer of the Company w i l l be credited less such 
greater discount as the Company may determine. The dealer agrees to 
pay a l l freights and charges incurred on parts which he returns to the 
Company. [In normal circumstances], the Dealer undertakes to pay a l l 
charges on the said parts ordered by him, other than freight , from the 
Company's premises. 
(30) Product insurance 
Until the Dealer has paid the whole of the purchase price together 
with transport and other charges, the Dealer shall at h is own expense 
insure and keep insured the goods in the joint names of the Company and 
the Dealer . 
(31) Product alterations 
In order to maintain standardisation of models, the Dealer shall 
not make any alterations to any product without the prior consent in 
writ ing of tiie Company. 
(32) Warranty 
The Dealer shall have no authority to make or give any warranty 
whatsoever other than that set out on the order forms as issued by the 
Company. The Company's warranty in respect of new tractors, implements 
and accessories as at the date of this agreement is set out hereunder: 
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the Company warrants and guarantees, as regards 
all new tractors, implements and accessories 
supplied by it, that all precautions ttiat are 
usual and reasoniible have been taken to ensure 
excellence of materials and workmanship and Uiat 
each such tractor, implement and accessory is 
free from defects in material and workmanship 
under normal use and service, its obligations 
under this warranty being limited to making good, 
at a factory to be nominated by it, any part or 
parts thereof including equipment and accessories 
(except tyres, electrical equipment and 
proprietary accessories and other articles and 
parts not manufactured by or on behalf of the 
Company) which shall, within six months (or, in 
the case of wheeled tractors used in the sole 
opinion of the Company entirely for agricultural 
purposes, twelve months) after delivery of such 
tractor, implement, or accessory to the original 
purchaser, be returned to it with transportation 
charges prepaid and which its examination shall 
disclose, to its satisfaction, to have been thus 
defective. The above warranty does not extend or 
apply to any tractor, implement or accessory which 
shall have been repaired, altered, neglected or 
used in any way so as, in the judgment of the 
Company (whose decision is final) , to affect 
adversely its stability or reliability or to any 
tractor, implement or accessory, any of whose 
identification numbers shall have been altered or 
removed. 
The Company does not give any warranty in respect of any Company 
tractor or any implements or accessories except the warranty contained 
above, which is given expressly in lieu of all other warranties and 
conditions expressed or implied and of all other obligations or 
liabilities in its part. Tractors which are sent for repair will be 
driven at the risk and responsibility of the owners only. Repairs of 
tractors are undertaken only on the assumption that the owners give 
authority to drive them on their behalf. The Company accepts no 
responsibility for loss or damage to customers' goods howsoever 
occasioned whilst such goods are in the Company's or Dealer's 
possession. The above warranty is siibject to alteration or amendment 
from time to time at the Company's discretion. All other warranties, 
whether express or implied by statute, common law or otherwise are 
hereby expressly negatived and excluded. 
(3 3) Collateral and set-off 
The Dealer shall, upon request of the Company, endorse and deliver 
to it to be held as collateral security sufficient good, well-secured 
notes and book debts to cover any indebtedness for goods shif)ped to the 
Dealer either on past due notes, open accounts, or for goods resold by 
the Dealer. The Dealer shall guarantee the payment of said collateral 
notes and book debts promptly at maturity, waiving presentation, demand, 
protest, notice of protest and diligence b.oth as to makers and 
endorsers, and full power and authority is hereby granted to the 
Company to make collections, enforce payment, renew or compromise such 
collateral in its own name as it deems necessary and best, but it shall 
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be under no obligation to collect such collateral or to protect such 
collateral against the claims, i f any, of third i^arties. 
In case of default in payment of any of said collateral notes or 
book debts, deale rs shall remit cash for the full amount of the same 
within ten days after maturity. On payment of Dealer 's indebtedness in 
f u l l , a l l collateral in the Company's possession shall be returned to 
the Dealer . Upon request, the Dealer shall execute and deliver to the 
Company the t it le retention notes and such other security instruments 
as may be required by Company covering unpaid goods shipped. Such 
notes shall be taken as evidence of indebtedness and not as payment. 
(34) Tenure of franchise 
Except as otherwise provided below, this agreement is made for the 
period ending but shall continue thereafter for consecutive 
twelve month periods until cancelled by either party by sending to the 
other notice in the manner specif ied at least thirty days before the 
end of any such period . 
(35) Dealer obligations 
As evidence of the Dealer 's intention to exploit his [franchised] 
dealership to the f u l l , he undertakes to order simultaneously with 
completion of this agreement implements applicable to his territory 
and w i l l always maintain in stock machines and spare parts to be used 
for demonstration and display purposes. 
The Dealer undertakes without prejudice to any other obligations 
already provided for in this agreement, to provide a motor vehicle at 
his own cost for the following purposes: 
(a) to canvass his territory for orders with or without the 
Company's representatives; 
(b) to convey the Company's service personnel when required for 
starting and/or adjusting machines or implements; 
(c) to convey the Company's representatives to effect 
settlements and collect overdue accounts; 
(d) to keep the Company's goods under the notice of farmers and 
others in h is territory and to thoroughly canvass tiie said 
territory for orders and settlements himself or per medium 
of his employees. 
The building of the Dealer shall be of satisfactory appearance and 
size to properly display , handle and store goods delivered under this 
contract and in keeping with the sales potential of the Dealer 's 
territory . The Dealer shall : 
(a) receive and distribute to probable customers advertising 
matter and catalogues forwarded by the Company; 
(b) maintain a record of the names and post off ice addresses of 
probable customers in his territory described herein and make 
such records available to officers of the Company when 
required and forward schedules of the names and addresses to 
the Company when required by the Company; 
(c) advertise at his own cost the Company's goods in such manner 
as he and the Company agree is adequate for his territory; 
(d) furnish, when required, complete financial particulars of 
a proposed customer; 
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(e) not promise any customer that any machine or implement will 
be kept in repair free of charge; 
(f) pay at his own cost all cartage, storage, postage, telegraph, 
or telephone charges in connection with the franchise; 
(g) be active at all times in the canvassing of his territory, 
securing orders, and keeping prospective customers supplied 
with the fullest information, and maintain a record for the 
perusal of the Company's visiting representative of these 
customers and the attention they have received; 
(h) demonstrate the Company's goods to any potential customer 
on his property, whether at the customer's request or 
otherwise; 
(i) keep a record of the type, serial number and purchaser of all 
goods sold in the Dealer's territory, and to provide to the 
Company at the end of each month a list showing such 
information in respect of all goods sold during that month; 
(j) at all times co-operate fully with the Company's 
representative whilst he is visiting the territory; 
(k) inspect and put into operation on his customer's property 
any goods supplied to his territory whether direct from the 
Company or from his own store, and ensure that every customer 
is thoroughly conversant with the mechanical operation of the 
goods and their particular application to his property; 
(1) provide the Company from time to time with information 
concerning the presence and performance of comparable goods 
and equipment marketed or manufactured by other persons or 
companies in the territory of the Dealer; 
(m) not supply employees of the Company with money to defray 
expenses unless specifically requested by the Company to do so. 
(35) Company obligations 
The Company will use its best endeavours to: 
(a) supply the requirement for...products within a reasonable 
time after the Dealer has ordered same; 
(b) inform the Dealer of his service responsibilities to owners 
of Company products already located in his sales and service 
area; 
(c) organise the Dealer's service department and train his 
mechanics so that he will be capable of providing [Supeviov 
Service] to present and future...owners and also realise the 
profit potential that is his through the sale of service 
labour and genuine [spare] parts; 
(d) explain the service aids that will be provided by the Company 
and explain, interpret, and assist in implementing the basic 
service policies of the Company; 
(e) furnish the Dealer with a complete set of operator manuals, 
service bulletins and warranty policy booklets and forms 
applicable to this agreement; 
(f) thoroughly explain and interpret the Company warranty policy 
to the Dealer using the policy manual as a guide; 
(g) examine the Dealer's service facilities and, in company with 
tiie Dealer, fill out [the questionnaire] Qualifiaations to 
Certify...Dealer's Service Shop and take the Dealer's order 
for any special service tools that are necessary to qualify 
his service department; 
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(h) instruct and demonstrate to the Dealer and his servicemen 
proper assembly and pre-delivery procedures and acquaint 
the dealership with the operation and adjustment of any 
machines that he may have received; 
(i) discuss shop management practices and lay out a planned 
shop development programme for the Dealer's service 
department and assist the Dealer in procuring and training 
any additional mechanics who may be needed; 
(j) review in detail with the Dealer the profit that can be 
developed in parts and labour sales through good service 
management — this includes methods of service solicitation, 
establishment of proper labour rates, selection and training 
of mechanics, investment in appropriate tools and facilities 
and service department accounting; 
(k) advertise its products in such advertising media and in such 
manner as in its judgement will best tend to promote their 
general use, such advertising to be at the Company's expense; 
(1) upon request, and volxantarily from time to time, supply...to 
the Dealer [at set prices or free of charge] such catalogues, 
circulars, and other advertising matter as in the judgement 
of the Company may be necessary. 
TERMINATION CLAUSES 
(37) Termination by notice 
The Dealer may at any time, with or without cause, terminate the 
agreement by giving notice of termination to the Company's [local 
representative]. Such notice of termination shall specify the date 
upon which the termination is to become effective and not less than 
ninety days shall intervene between the giving of such notice and 
effective date. The agreement may be terminated at any time by mutual 
consent, the effective date of termination to be as mutually agreed 
upon. The consent on behalf of the.Company shall be executed by its 
[local representative]. The Company, with or without cause, may 
terminate the agreement at any time by giving to the Dealer notice of 
termination signed by the [local representative]. Such notice of 
termination shall specify the date upon which tlie termination is to 
become effective and not less than ninety days shall intervene between 
the giving of such notice and such effective date. Notice of 
termination shall be in writing. When issued by tiie Company, notice may 
either be given to the Dealer personally or forwarded to him by mail. 
When issued by the Dealer, notice shall be mailed to the Company's [local 
representative]. 
(38) Termination by event 
The Company may without prejudice to any rights arising from any 
breach by a dealer of any condition herein contained by notice in 
writing to the Dealer, forthwith, from the date of such notice, 
terminate this agreement in any of the following events: 
(a) if the Dealer shall fail to observe or perform any of the 
terms or conditions hereof; 
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(b) if there is any default or undue delay on tlrie part of the 
Dealer in making payment for parts or accessories; 
(c) if any disagreement shall arise between any of the persons 
interested in the management, control or ownership of the 
business of the Dealer which, i n the opinion of the Company, 
may imperil the interests of the Company; 
(d) if the Dealer dies or there is any change in the address or 
in the constitution or management of his business by 
dissolution of partnership or otherwise or, being a limited 
liability company, there is a retirement or change of any of 
the directors or re-arrangement of control or management; 
(e) if the Dealer commits any act of bankruptcy or is made 
bankrupt or compounds or makes an arrangement with his 
creditors or executes a bill of sale or suffers or takes any 
proceedings analogous thereto; 
(f) if the Dealer, being a company, is wound up either 
compulsorily or voluntarily or a receiver is appointed, 
(39) Obligations on termination 
Upon the termination of this contract howsoever occurring: 
(a) all unfulfilled orders of the Dealer to the Company shall be 
cancelled; 
(b) all debts outstanding by the Dealer to the Company shall 
forthwith become due and payable, notwithstanding that the 
time for payment thereof has not arrived; 
(c) any of the Company's products on consignment with tlie Dealer 
shall forthwith be returned to the Company; 
(d) the Dealer shall forthwith deliver to the Company all price 
lists, printed matter, technical bulletins and advertising 
signs and material in his possession relating to the Company 
products and shall remove from his premises and vehicles all 
references to the Company or its products or its trade marks; 
(e) all records of the Dealer relating to the Company's products 
and/or to purchasers or potential purchasers thereof shall be 
made available to the Company; 
(f) the Company shall, at the Dealer's expense, undertake all 
unfulfilled service duties in respect of the Company's 
products pursuant to the manufacturer's warranty applicable 
thereto. 
The Company may, at its option, re-purchase all or any of the Company's 
products not re-sold by the Dealer upon the following terms: 
(a) for tractors, machines and implements, the Company shall credit 
the Dealer at net dealer price less ten per cent and less costs 
of restoration to condition as new; 
(b) for parts, attachments and accessories, the Company shall 
credit the Dealer at net dealer price less fifteen per cent; 
(c) the Dealer shall deliver to the Company's branch warehouse 
freight paid Company products which the Company may 
re-purchase under this option; 
(d) the Company may set off the value of Company products which 
it may re-purchase under this option against any moneys which 
the Dealer may owe to the Company; 
(e) this option shall be exerciseable by the Company by notice in 
writing to tlie Dealer given before, on, or within sixty days 
after termination. 
Dated t±iis day. 
Signed by or on behalf of the Dealer, 
Witness 
Signed by or on behalf of the Company. 
Witness 
Issued from the Company's office 
in the State of 
at 
251 
252 
APPENDIX THREE 
ILLUSTRATIONS OF CORPORATE FACILITIES 
Selected plates in this Appendix illustrate the type of corporate 
facilities mentioned in the analysis. By including the offices of 
companies which failed as well as those which survived, they afford 
a visual appreciation of the recession's impact on the Australian 
agricultural machinery industry and its implications for business 
decision-making. 
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FACILITIES IN OPERATION, 1967-72 
(Full-line companies) 
PLATE A3.1: International Harvester's factory at 
Geelong (Victoria). 
PLATE A3.2: Massey Ferguson's head-office at 
Sunshine, Melbourne. These premises were once owned 
by H.V. McKay. Note the header on railway cars in 
foreground. 
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FACILITIES IN OPERATION, 1967-72 
(Long and short-line companies) 
PLATE A3.3: Head-office and assembly plant of Ford 
at Campbellfield, Melbourne. 
PLATE A3.4: Head-office and factory of John Shearer 
at Kilkenny, Adelaide. 
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FACILITIES AFFECTED BY RECESSION 
PLATE A3.5: Head-office and factory of David Shearer 
at Mannum, South Australia. The firm subsequently 
became insolvent and these premises were acquired by 
Horwood Bagshaw. 
PLATE A3.6: John Deere's wholesale branch at 
Braybrook, Melbourne, closed after the amalgamation 
with Chamberlain. Note the 'For Sale' signs on 
windows. 
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PLATE A3.7: Massey Ferguson's wholesale depot in 
Port Adelaide, shut down in 1972. 
PLATE A3.8: Retail atrophy in rural areas — em 
abandoned dealership in north-western New South 
Wales. 
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